Abstract
Something profound seems to have occurred in Chinese foreign policy since the global financial crisis starting in 2007–08. Many have noted an assertive and nationalist Chinese shift, as most dramatically demonstrated in its high-profile global diplomacy to promote its agenda and maritime disputes with its neighbors to defend its “core” interest. But how to characterize the change remains unclear. Even the “assertive” label, an innocuous term in international relations, is contested. More common is the pessimism regarding China and East Asia, as expressed by strategist Robert Kaplan when he said, “The 21st century map of the Pacific Basin, clogged as it is with warships, is like a map of conflict-prone Europe from previous centuries.” Does this signal the start of a wholesale Chinese reversal of a formerly placid, cooperative strategy? What does the recent turn of events mean for the Sino–U.S. relationship, the East Asian order, and global governance?
The story of China’s rise is long, consequential, and global. The maritime disputes in East Asia, while important, hardly tell the whole story of China’s international trajectory. While vague and contested, for much of the post-Cold War era the idea of “international responsibility” gave China a sense of direction for its domestic and international transitions. As an idea, it embodied the best practices as well as the international norms and institutions that had informed and inspired Chinese reformers. The idea of being a “responsible power” reined in nationalist impulse and realpolitik calculations, which helped contribute to its successful rise. Equally important, integrating the reforming socialist country into the international community set the terms of Western engagement with China.
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Yong, Deng
Published inBlog