Abstract:
The failure to agree on a statement fostered the impression that the ADMM-Plus could go the way of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an older and more established regional experiment in security cooperation that many today feel has grown moribund. Moreover, despite the decision by the ADMM-Plus to conduct its ministerial gatherings on a biennial rather than triennial basis, some pundits warn of the risk that the ADMM-Plus will end up as a “talk shop” that achieves little real progress. But for the defense officials and military practitioners who make the ADMM-Plus tick, nothing could be further from the truth. Since the inaugural ADMM-Plus in Vietnam in 2010, joint military exercises involving the grouping’s eighteen member countries have grown in frequency and complexity. Yet the success of the ADMM-Plus has raised questions about the evident lack of progress of the ARF. If anything, the apparent decline of the ARF-in contrast to the euphoria and hope that accompanied its early years-sounds a cautionary note to the cheerleaders who fete the ADMM-Plus today. […T]he lack of a concerted ASEAN response in HADR to Typhoon Haiyan (also known as Typhoon Yolanda) in November 2013 was an indictment of the ADMM-Plus’s failure to translate its potential into substantive cooperation when needed. The demonstration of commitment, goodwill, and resolve in the ADMM-Plus has also not been as effective as one might have wished in reducing tensions in the South China Sea or in deepening strategic trust and confidence among member countries.
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