Abstract
Indonesia has been conducting foreign policy under the New Order government for almost three decades, yet the nature of that policy remains as puzzling as ever. Indeed, until very recently, Indonesia’s foreign policy under the Suharto administration had not received much scholarly attention, unlike that seen during the Sukarno era (1950-65). The reasons for this lack of interest are of course varied, but as one observer wrote almost a decade ago, “there was . . . less written about Indonesian foreign policy be- cause there was less to write about.” The same observer also pointed out that lack of interest on the part of analysts could be attributed to a conscious act by the New Order government to play down the role of foreign policy.’
Recent signs of change in Indonesia have aroused new interest as its foreign policy, long charged with maintaining a “low profile” to the outside world, once again appears to have entered a more “active” stage. Foreign observers have suggested that since the mid-1980s, Jakarta has moved toward a more assertive stance. Interestingly, in Indonesia itself the New Order’s foreign policy has recently come under severe criticism. For example, in a hearing between Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and the Foreign Relations Com- mission of Indonesia’s parliament, the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR), in February 1994, Indonesia’s foreign policy was charged with being “defensive,” “passive,” “reactive,” and “too accommodative.” Alatas seemed rather amazed and challenged those criticisms, maintaining that Indonesia has never been “passive” or “defensive,” but “we were always reluctant to brag about the success of our effort.”
 
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