Abstract
THE APRIL 1975 victory of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA)-sandwiched between comparable denouements in Cambodia and Laos-has been greeted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with barely disguised perplexity. While publicly applauding the great changes in Southeast Asia as an example of the validity of Mao’s “peoples war” doctrine, China remains concerned over both the stra- tegic and political implications of the Democratic Republic of Viet- nam’s (DRV) success, particularly during a period in which Peking’s leaders prefer to focus inward on problems of economic growth and leadership succession.
Peking’s concern centers on two issues: (1) whether a unified Viet- nam, with two potential client states in Laos and Cambodia, will move outward beyond Indochina to foment and support other insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, thus establishing itself as a rival source of revolutionary support to China; and (2) whether as a price for the continuation of large-scale economic and military assistance Hanoi agrees to align with the Soviet Union against China on either or both political and military issues. The former would probably be tolerated by Peking insofar as it meant only verbal endorsement of Soviet foreign policy positions. The latter, however, would present a fundamental challenge to Peking if it led to such developments as the provision of naval facilities along the Vietnam coast to the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
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