Abstract
The most plausible justification for possessing nuclear weapons is deterrence – deterring the first use of the nuclear weapon by others and responding in kind when deterrence fails. However, no first- use of nuclear weapons may not be the only approach to deterrence. Most nuclear weapon states employ a conditional first-use (or conditional no-first-use) policy. Though such a policy may appear less self-restraining, it could also be effective in preventing a situation where the survival or other key interests of a nation – the nuclear weapon state in question or its allies – are at stake should they be pressured by a major conventional threat.
However, in the present context, such a scenario is simply a theoretical possibility when it comes to nuclear weapon states. Given a deeply interdependent world, any first use of nuclear weapons equates more or less to committing suicide. In the case of all nuclear weapon states or advanced industrialized states capable of developing nuclear weapons at short notice, it is unlikely that they can use nuclear weapons in the first place against each other without inviting a nuclear counterstrike in kind – unless a foolproof missile defence becomes available.
Sixty-five years after its invention, the atomic bomb is gradually losing its rationale. Yet there is still a long way to go before the legal and technical framework of a nuclear weapon free world can be established. President Obama’s Prague speech of 5 April 2009 issued an important call for a nuclear weapon free world, and the US–Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-up treaty, signed in 2010, may help revitalize the global momentum in this direction.
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