Abstract
The rhetoric of industrial development has been used to garner support for the nuclear program in India. “Development” was not merely a cover for the use of a civilian nuclear program for other purposes. The idea that nuclear energy would spur development is still alive, although the official economic orientation has shifted from state-directed capital-intensive development to export-oriented growth led by the private sector. Earlier, the claim was that indigenous nuclear projects were essential for self-sufficiency; currently, opportunities for international co-operation are stressed in keeping with India’s image as an emerging market. In his speech at the Carnegie Endowment, India’s then-Foreign secretary Shyam Saran drew on the rhetoric of development to justify the nuclear agreement, foregrounding his discussion of strategic issues with lengthy references to economic partnership, and more specifically, India’s growing stakes in a “knowledge-driven society.” The first paragraph of the statement on the implementation of the India-US agreement firmly situates the deal in the context of ensuring energy supply. The opening sentence reads: “The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the United States arose in the context of India’s requirement for adequate and affordable energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition of its growing technological prowess.” Recent Indian administrations have been assiduously cultivating military ties with the US. India was one of the first countries to propose its participation in [George W. Bush]’s planned missile defence system. Strategic ties were consolidated after the 9/11 attacks on the US, with India offering military support to the US invasion of Afghanistan. More broadly, India intensified its campaign to reinforce the perception of the links between Kashmiri and other secessionists with Islamic militancy in general and with al Qaeda in particular. India has successfully presented itself as a victim of terrorism and thus a “natural ally” of the US. Another strategic motivation for the deal could be the American design to “contain” China. Several commentators have advocated helping India to consolidate its power as a hedge against revisionist tendencies on the part of a rising China. Acknowledging its nuclear arsenal would be an important preliminary step in initiating a joint effort to balance against China. A few weeks before the nuclear deal was announced, India and the US signed a historic military partnership. India is reportedly considering the purchase of $5 billion worth of conventional military equipment from the US.13 While common strategic goals could have eased the path to America’s acceptance of India’s arsenal, we must also remember that India now figures on the mental map of US strategic planners mainly because it has successfully portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power. The July nuclear deal impinges on India’s energy policy in another way. Since 2004, India has been negotiating with Iran on a natural gas pipeline that would transfer fuel to India’s west coast. The 207okm pipeline would pass through Pakistan. The Bush administration expressed its disappointment at India’s cooperation with Iran, a country that it considers part of the “axis of evil.” Instead, it has been encouraging India to consider an alternative project, partly funded by the oil giant Unocal (the Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan pipeline). American diplomats also made it clear to their Indian counterparts that congress would approve the July deal only if the Indians were seen as cooperating with the U S in their attempts to force Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program. Thus in the crucial vote at the IAEA on 24 September 2005, on the question of referring Iran to the UN security council, India broke with the nonaligned countries and voted along with the US. Iran responded immediately, indicating the $21 billion gas pipeline was in jeopardy. This stance has since been softened. However, the question remains: can India afford to antagonize Iran? If Iran does withdraw from the pipeline project, will the shortfall in fuel supplies be made up by the US-supported project or by nuclear energy?