Abstract
The strategic worldview of India’s political elite is typically described as having evolved in linear fashion. At the time of Independence there was ostensibly a broad consensus on the ends and means of diplomacy, which included peaceful co-existence and anti-imperialism on the one side, and non-alignment and non-violence on the other. This consensus, crafted by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, is depicted as having steadily weakened over subsequent decades, eventually collapsing when diplomatic isolation and near bankruptcy toward the end of the Cold War compelled the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to foreign relations. The evidence does not support this narrative, however. Drawing on debates in the Constituent Assembly, this essay shows that from the outset there were voices, even inside the Congress Party, calling for realism in the conduct of international relations. Though Nehru’s dominant position meant that these critical voices were brushed aside at the time, recollecting them reveals that the realism that is said to have recently seeped into Indian foreign policy discussions is not a new development but rather the fruition of a long-standing critique.
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