Abstract
Early leaders of the Republic of India, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and prominent nuclear scientist Homi Bhabha, highly prioritized the development of nuclear technology. Nehru gave Bhabha much autonomy over the nuclear program, and Bhabha devised a three-stage nuclear program in the 1950s to utilize India’s domestic reserves of thorium and uranium. India has remained committed to the three-stage program and also developed nuclear explosives in the 1970s. This paper uses prospect theory to analyze India’s nuclear fuel cycle decision-making from 1948 to 1990. This analysis shows that India’s nuclear program served two of the country’s main strategic interests: self-sufficiency and attaining equal international standing with the great powers. Prospect theory helps explain how Indian leaders perceived these strategic interests and how the nuclear program fit into pursuing these interests. Indian leaders, in a risk averse gains frame, viewed signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s as risky because that could have reduced self-sufficiency. Indira Gandhi, in a risk acceptant losses frame, authorized the Pokhran-I nuclear explosive test in the early 1970s to demonstrate Indian capability, and India had to accept the isolation of its nuclear program from the global market as a result. Prospect theory allowed this analysis to focus on the frame of reference and perceptions of the decision-makers and then understand why certain policy options were selected over other policy options, rather than prescribing a particular model of nuclear decision-making.