Summary
As he prepares to visit India in November, President Obama faces criticism that his administration has done too little to enhance U.S.–Indian relations. Pundits of this persuasion in Washington and New Delhi complain that Obama’s team has tried too hard to cooperate with China in addressing regional and global challenges and has not done enough to bolster India. In reality, the United States can only contribute marginally to India’s success or failure. The actions of Indians at home and abroad will determine which path India takes. The United States will have much more influence on vital global issues—international finance and trade, the future of the nuclear order, peace and security in Asia, climate change—that also shape the environment in which India will succeed or fail. Therefore, the United States can best serve its interests and those of India by ensuring that its policies toward India do not undermine the pursuit of wider international cooperation on these global issues. The imperative to strengthen the international system would obtain even if India had the capabilities and intentions of working closely with the United States to contest China. Yet, India’s interests, policies, and diplomatic style will often diverge from those of the United States, including in relation to China. Washington and New Delhi both want their share of economic, military, and soft power to grow relative to China’s (or at least not to fall), but both will also pursue cooperation with Beijing. For the foreseeable future, the three states will operate a triangular relationship, with none of them being close partners of the others. This is another reason why promoting multilateral institution-building is a sound U.S. strategy, and why India should be valued in its own right, not as a partner in containing China. This report analyzes American and Indian interests in a range of policy domains in order to evaluate how the United States should balance its policies toward India with its other priorities and responsibilities.
