Abstract
There is substantial literature on the various methods and tactics the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could employ to enforce a naval blockade of Taiwan during a Taiwan Strait crisis. However, there has been very little assessment of how the qualities of today’s global maritime shipping industry might affect the effectiveness of a blockade. If China chose to implement a blockade, would the global maritime industry continue to utilize Taiwan’s ports and support its import/export trade in the face of Chinese threats? If international merchant shipping abandoned the Taiwan market, does the maritime industry of the Republic of China have sufficient capacity to keep its supply lines filled on its own? This article attempts to answer these questions, making the case that the global maritime trade industry is not likely to support Taiwan’s seaborne trade in the face of a PRC blockade, leaving Taiwan’s merchant fleet to meet the island’s strategic resupply needs. Although the merchant fleet owned by Taiwan-based interests is theoretically able to meet most of the island’s critical energy and food supply demands on its own, the dynamics of vessel corporate ownership and flag-of-convenience registry will likely place the burden of the resupply effort on the small percentage of ships actually registered under the Republic of China (ROC) flag. Without support from foreign-flagged vessels, Taiwan’s strategic resupply lines cannot be sustained. Recommendations for policy makers in Taiwan are offered in terms of possible methods to mitigate capacity deficiencies in specific areas of the ROC maritime trade industry; measures to offset physical vulnerabilities in shore-based infrastructure; and considerations for fully exploiting the capabilities of modern merchant ships. Shipping-related considerations for the United States and Japan also are included, since such a crisis could significantly impact international maritime trade in the entire East Asian theater.
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