Abstract
The establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) by relevant countries on the basis of voluntary agreement is one of the most important and effective ways to advance nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. It is beneficial to regional and world peace, stability, and security. Learning from the experiences of the existing NWFZs will assist future efforts to establish a Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone for Northeast Asia (NWFZNEA). Since 1991, the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP) at the Georgia Institute of Technology has been exploring the possibility of establishing such a zone in Northeast Asia, covering Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia. Since 1995, second-track consultations sponsored by the Center have made some progress.
At present, the positive factors for establishing the NWFZ-NEA outweigh the negative ones. States in the region have demonstrated their willingness to participate in bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation agreements, and nuclear weapon states have not deployed nuclear weapons on the territory of these states. However, North Korea’s failure to participate in CISTP’s second-track consultations, as well as the extended deterrence strategy adopted by the United States, are cause for continued concern.
This viewpoint attempts to apply the lessons of existing NWFZs towards advancing nonproliferation in Northeast Asia. It will first review the advantages NWFZs offer beyond existing multilateral nonproliferation agreements. It will then describe the current nuclear proliferation scenario in Northeast Asia and the progress to date of efforts to establish a NWFZ in the region. After detailing both the positive and negative factors affecting efforts to establish such a zone, the viewpoint will conclude by making specific recommendations on how NWFZ-NEA negotiations should proceed, based on the experiences of existing NWFZs.
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