Abstract
The United States and China’s antithetical stances on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea have consistently caused military tensions in East Asia. Based on employing the crisis bargaining theory, this article postulates that the United States and China are able to implement a hard-line strategy or an accommodative strategy in dealing with the controversial freedom of navigation issue in the South China Sea. This article categorizes each country’s strategies in a 2×2 model and examines four different cases for exploring each country’s payoffs: Case (1) the United States and China can both use force; Case (2) the United States can make unilateral concessions and China can hold its original demands; Case (3) China can make unilateral concessions and the United States can hold its original demands; and Case (4) the United States and China can make strategic compromises to avoid military clashes. This article maintains that the United States and China will choose both accommodative strategies in order to avoid open military conflicts. This article also contends that unilateral concessions either from the United States or China will harshly damage one side’s interest, thereby both countries will not choose unilateral concessions as a plausible option. In addition, both countries’ use of force is the most unlikely option.