Abstract: This article aims to explain the multilateral negotiations of the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted at the UN General Assembly
on July 7, 2017, from the model of institutional bargaining. Its findings are: first,
non-nuclear states’ sense of frustration and crisis about the failure of progress on
nuclear disarmament under the NPT regime served as a critical momentum to move
towards the negotiations. Second, consensual knowledge about the humanitarian
effects of nuclear weapons and solutions served as a driving force behind
embarking on the negotiations. Third, the leadership by a core group of pro-ban
non-nuclear countries was effective in mobilizing political support and facilitating
the timely conclusion of the negotiations. Fourth, a salient solution of a simple
and robust treaty, and a bridging solution to allow any country in possession of
nuclear weapons to join the treaty before their elimination contributed to the prompt
agreement on the treaty. Fifth, clear and effective compliance measures regarding
non-nuclear states facilitated the conclusion of the negotiations, whereas the lack
of clear and effective compliance measures regarding state parties possessing
nuclear weapons rather contributed to the timely end of the negotiations. Finally, a
fast-track approach, a single-text negotiating strategy, and an issue decomposition
strategy were effective in reaching consensus on the treaty text. Full text available here.
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