Abstract
As China and India gradually rise and become the centre point of world politics in the 21st century, both these nuclear states tend to transform their strategic force postures to hide their vulnerabilities and ensure the credibility of their deterrence force. This article conceptualizes the gradual transformation of China and India’s strategic force postures under the essentials of minimum deterrence. In doing so, it examines the conceptualization of minimum deterrence, doctrinal use of deterrent forces and the modernization of strategic forces, though the perceptional aspects of these three imperatives may differ between these two nuclear states. This article attempts to find out whether or not these strategic imperatives, in relation to their transformation of strategic force postures, are consistent with the essentials of minimum deterrence conceived here. This article concludes that if China and India’s deterrence force modernization falls within these essential categories (i.e. modernization, accuracy, upgrades, correcting ranges, credibility, penetrability, survivability), they may be consistent with minimum deterrence. Alternatively, if both China and India go beyond the minimum deterrence that they initially conceptualized, this may remain inconsistent with the minimum deterrence conceptualized here.