Abstract
The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic chokepoint in the Arabian Gulf through which ninety percent of all Gulf exports pass –the equivalent of around forty percent of all daily traded oil, globally. The Strait consists of an inbound and outbound corridor for transiting traffic, each 2 miles (3.2km) wide and separated by a buffer zone of the same width. Connecting the Sea of Oman to the Arabian Gulf the Strait, with the long Iranian coastline above and Omani and Emirati territory lining its southern periphery, is some 280km long in its entirety and just 45km wide at its narrowest point. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would demonstrate the extent of Iranian power, denying the U.S. and allies access to critical nodes in the Arabian Gulf and send the price of oil shooting through the roof. In the process, Iran will be able to draw international attention to its wider conflict with the West and possibly strengthen its bargaining power. Success in closing the Strait of Hormuz could arguably be a greater strategic victory for the Iranians than the acquisition of even the nuclear bomb.
Most analysts agree that closing the Strait of Hormuz would be attempted as an absolutely final resort for Iran, where perhaps only preemptive strikes designed around regime-change or attempts to neutralize critical national capabilities would lead Iran to this course of action. In this sense, it is difficult to see an attempt by Iran to close the Strait in isolation to other actions it may take against ‘aggressor’ forces – and any such attempt would probably occur in the midst of a rapidly escalating confrontation unlimited to any one front. Moreover, some eighty seven percent of Iranian imports and about ninety nine percent of its exports are by sea, and so closure to the Strait will probably impact Iran more severely than any other single nation. However, Iranian threats to ‘close’ the Strait of Hormuz must be taken seriously for it will remain a vital dimension of its grand strategy for some time more. This report does not in any way suggest the imminence or likelihood of Iran closing the Strait or indicate the imminence of pre-emptive strikes against Iran or support for them, but seeks only to explore the aspects of an important topical theme in the emerging security environment in the Gulf region.
Iran may attempt to close the Strait in pre-emption to a strike against it which it may sense is imminent, or retaliate to economic sanctions of they prove particularly effective and contribute to spiraling internal unrest. The Strait could potentially be closed in a number of different ways however doing so through the use of naval mines is probably the most effective method Iran would employ. According to some American intelligence experts, Iran may be able to close the Strait with as few as three hundred naval mines – it possesses ten times that number. Many experts agree that closing the Strait largely rests on the ability of Iranian forces to rapidly lay a web of naval mines in its narrow passages without early interception. The size and sophistication of the Iranian mine arsenal, the capacity and availability of its mine-laying platforms, its overall military strategy whilst undertaking such operations, and key variables such as the circumstantial political and military contexts in which action is initiated will determine the ability of Iran successfully carry out its mission objectives. This report seeks to explore these factors and ascertain the credibility of Iranian threats to close the Strait by the employment of naval mines.
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