Abstract
Vietnam has come to represent any situation of unexpected military failure or frustration, having an unexpectedly negative or counterproductive effect on the failing or frustrated actor: shades of nemesis and schadenfreude are frequently associated with its invocation by opponents of said actor; it is also invoked by partisans of the actor as a reason not to act. Vietnam—representing the dangers of ill-considered action—has become the reverse of Munich—so frequently invoked to illustrate the dangers of tardy action: together the two are opposite sides of a coin tossed in the air, dropped and snatched at every time a war is in prospect.
The true political lesson of the Vietnam War is far subtler, to do with the dangers of unilateral action, of the signing of blank cheques, of a domestic political debate overrunning the boundaries of electioneering and robbing politicians of their discretion. The military lesson was more straightforward, but, as far as the United States is concerned, the problems have been avoided rather than addressed.
This article will look at the three phases of the war—background, conflict and occupation—in turn, focusing on the political and military similarities to, and differences from, Vietnam where appropriate.
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