Abstract
Beijing cultivates an image of a status quo power. But it has not yet fulfilled its ambitions, and there are indications that the easy part of China’s rise might be over.
In what has become a tradition for new Chinese presidents seeking to confirm their peaceful intentions, Xi Jinping has put forward yet another ostensibly original security concept. Describing the approach as ‘common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable’, Xi has called on countries other than China to align their diverse security interests within a common project; avoid monopolising security affairs; work towards security without exclusive alliances; and tackle the full range of traditional and nontraditional threats. In line with the new security concept of former President Jiang Zemin, and the idea of peaceful development espoused by his successor Hu Jintao, Beijing now cultivates the image of China as a status quo power that is restrained in its use of military force, willing to accept international norms and prepared to actively participate in international organisations. It also supports the notion of China as a constructive power that is inclined to cooperate and strike a compromise.
There is nothing new in Xi’s security concept, however, and Chinese scholars have not reached a consensus in the renewed debate about grand strategy. The praise for Beijing’s forward-looking leadership and ability to pursue such a strategy is therefore misplaced. Under previous leaderships, China was reactive rather than proactive, in both economic and security affairs. Beijing managed to be flexible, and to adjust without having to compromise on the four great aspirations that it had pursued since 1949. But it was the security environment that changed first, not China. This strategy of adaptation has been remarkably successful. Beijing has acquired military capabilities far stronger than those of its neighbours, while provoking only limited resistance. The true bearing of its great aspirations is increasingly clear: to fulfil them, China must become the most powerful country in Asia by far, and attain the power to deter other protagonists by force. The chance that its peaceful rise will continue is therefore small. Either China’s growth will run into trouble or it will become harder to maintain the peace.
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