Abstract
In this article, I argue that the United States does not have a coherent geopolitical vision of the Indian Ocean Region. The result is an allocation of political and military resources that, with regard to the Indian Ocean Region as a whole, is fractured and at times incoherent, which makes it difficult for the United States to make a credible commitment to the security of the Indian Ocean Region as a whole. First, to the extent that the United States has an alliance structure in the Indian Ocean Region, it is composed of the residual relationships from other strategically important regions, thus decreasing their ability to be turned to the security of the Indian Ocean Region. Second, while the US Department of Defence rhetorically recognises the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean Region, there is no single US military command structure dedicated to the Indian Ocean Region. Third, the military forces that are prepositioned in the region are not insignificant, but are ill suited for making the necessary commitments to the region as a whole. This spatial distribution of resources has implications for the United States’ ability to make a credible claim that the Indian Ocean Region as a whole is at the core of its interests.
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