Summary
This paper describes a potential disconnect between U.S. military efforts to maintain freedom of access in support of U.S. global interests and the U.S. foreign policy objective to rebalance to Asia. In order to overcome “anti-access” challenges to its ability to project power, the U.S. military is developing the Air-Sea Battle concept. As a concept of operations, Air-Sea Battle posits the value of attacking and destroying—preemptively if possible—an opponent’s targeting, command, and weapons systems wherever they are located in order to disrupt the opponent’s ability to hinder U.S. military operations. However, while Air-Sea Battle seeks to defeat anti-access challenges around the globe, with no particular country or region in mind, it may be undermining U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia. In particular, despite repeated official U.S. statements to the contrary, the concept continues to be seen as a military strategy to attack China. Should this belief solidify among the Chinese leadership, it could complicate U.S. efforts to improve relations with China—a key pillar of the U.S. rebalance to Asia. In addition, it could result in an unnecessary and costly arms race between the United States and China. In order to prevent that from occurring, the United States should consider the following recommendations:
Conduct a senior-level policy review to determine whether Air-Sea Battle supports or undermines the U.S. rebalance to Asia. This review should include both the Executive branch and Congress. Those conducting the evaluation should not only include military experts, but also those responsible for diplomatic and economic policymaking.
Evaluate the necessity for preemptive and offensive operations to counter anti-access capabilities. Any review of Air-Sea Battle should investigate the concept’s emphasis on the need to conduct early attacks against key targets wherever they may be located. In particular, this review should consider whether the necessity of this approach may be overly provocative, thus undercutting other U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Investigate whether other possibilities exist to ensure access and deter aggression without undermining greater U.S. foreign policy objectives. Air-Sea Battle is not the only method available to counter anti-access challenges; alternatives do exist. All possible options should be assessed and routinely reevaluated in order to guarantee that U.S. military and diplomatic policy objectives are closely aligned.
Assess the strategic messaging on Air-Sea Battle (or follow-on concepts), with a priority towards disassociating it from China. Examining how to better message the concept in order to disassociate it from China would help to better align U.S. military and foreign policy objectives. In the event that disassociation is impossible, the U.S. government should consider a complete rebranding of the concept.
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