Abstract
Writing shortly after North Korea’s inaugural nuclear test in late 2006, Jonathan Pollack observed that ‘a decision to proceed with additional testing would constitute compelling evidence that the DPRK deemed the first test results unsatisfactory and that Pyongyang’s goals for its nuclear program are more ambitious than a one-time demonstration of strategic autonomy’. Pollack’s observation, while perceptive, is probably only partly correct. While there can be no doubt that Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions go far beyond a straightforward ‘look at me’ statement of autonomy, it is not clear the DPRK’s 2009 test was undertaken because the 2006 test was a failure. Given North Korea’s long-standing weapons research and development (R&D) programme, it is very plausible that the low yield of the first test was in fact deliberate and aimed at developing a small warhead for the country’s medium range Nodong missile force. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the North Korean testing programme will have significant repercussions for the future security of East Asia and the Asian region more generally. How the international community responds to this programme will be watched with considerable interest by other would-be proliferators, particularly Iran.
The key claim underpinning the analysis here is that North Korea’s decision to undertake a second nuclear test confirms that Pyongyang is determined to become the world’s ninth nuclear weapons state. It heralds the arrival of a new phase in North Korea’s nuclear weapons development programme, where the emphasis will henceforth be on acquiring an operational capability for deployment, as distinct from the programme’s first phase which was concerned with generating sufficient fissile material and honing warhead design as a springboard for developing an operational force.
The bad news in our analysis is that North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme has become so deeply ingrained in the DPRK’s political economy that disarmament is no longer an option for the regime in Pyongyang. The good news, however, is that despite its extreme anti-social behaviour in East Asia, North Korea has an established pattern of rationality in its approach to strategic issues. If stable relations with a nuclear-armed North Korea are to be achieved, the key for the international community will be to engage the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state, not as a state that can somehow be disarmed of its nuclear weapons. Persisting with the failed strategy of disarmament is a flawed approach that mistakenly assumes North Korea will be willing to de-link its nuclear weapons ambitions from its national security doctrine. Such an approach will merely make it harder to address some of the key challenges in managing the birth of a new nuclear weapons state.
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