Abstract
In current analysis and debate concerning China’s rise, the subject of soft power is either missing or misapplied. Since the 1990s, China has achieved impressive gains both in terms of soft power resources and the ability to convert the resources into desired foreign-policy outcomes. Unlike the former Soviet Union, China appears to be more successful in developing hard and soft power in tandem. Its steppedup endeavours in expanding its soft power nevertheless continue to be constrained by three factors: imbalance in resources, legitimacy concerns regarding its diplomacy, and a lack of coherent agenda. How Washington and its allies respond to this unique power pattern will shape the future strategic landscape of East Asia and beyond.
Analysis and debate concerning China’s rise is focused almost entirely on the economic and military aspects of its growing power. Yet ‘soft’ sources of power – including culture, political ideology and diplomacy – are increasingly recognised as essential components of Great Power status. It seems odd that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China, or misapplied. While China is constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its softpower resources are considerable and demand scrutiny.
The concept of soft power can be traced to the works of Hans J. Morgenthau, Klaus Knorr and Ray Cline. As summarised in recent years by Joseph Nye, soft power is a directing, attracting and imitating force derived mainly from intangible resources such as national cohesion, culture, ideology and influence on international institutions. According to Nye, it is the ‘ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.
Examination of China’s soft-power resources in the areas of culture, political values and diplomacy shows that, while China’s soft power is increasing, Beijing faces serious constraints in translating these resources into desired foreign-policy outcomes.
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