Abstract
Some 15 million barrels of oil – more than 18% of daily worldwide oil demand – transit the Strait of Hormuz each day. Many experts fear that an accident, terrorist attack, or military effort to close the straits, even if it only temporarily interrupted oil tanker traffic, could threaten the global economy. This paper will evaluate the severity of that threat. How hard would it be to close the strait? How would the oil market adapt? What political and military steps could powerful countries take to remedy the situation? What is the role for unique American military capabilities in various disruption scenarios? Most importantly, the project will analyze the possible synergistic effects of multiple threats to tanker traffic – for example, mine sweeping is generally a manageable if slow task, but that task is substantially more complex if mine sweepers are threatened by anti-ship cruise missiles or attacks by small boats.The analysis has direct implications for American grand strategy, force structure, investment, peacetime military deployment, and alliance relationships. Can tankers be defended with convoys that provide air defense and mine sweeping, for example, or would a more offensive response be required (e.g., an air campaign to destroy mobile launchers for anti-ship cruise missiles)? What role can – and would – Gulf Cooperation Council allies play in defense of the Strait? What contribution might other major oil consumers (Europe, China, Japan) offer? This study, like all good military campaign analyses, will emphasize sensitivity analysis to try to understand the range of possible outcomes in each scenario and to try to find key sources of leverage to remedy problems, setting the stage for a policy response.