Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has pursued a persistent, reasonably coherent, two-part strategy toward China. Albeit with some shifts in rhetoric and emphasis, successive administrations have sought to engage China through trade and diplomacy while at the same time taking steps to maintain a favorable balance of hard power in East Asia. To this latter end, the United States has bolstered its own military capabilities in the region, strengthened strategic cooperation with traditional treaty allies (especially Japan, South Korea, and Australia), and built what might be called “quasi-alliance” partnerships with other countries (such as Singapore and India) that share its concerns about China’s growing power.
The goal of the balancing half of U.S. strategy is to deter aggression or attempts at coercion directed at the United States’ Asian allies. Meanwhile, through engagement, Washington aims to “tame” Beijing, encouraging it to become what the George W. Bush administration termed a “responsible stakeholder” in the existing international system. While they do not always say so in as many words, U.S. policymakers hope that in the long run trade and dialogue will help transform China, easing it along the path from authoritarianism toward liberal democracy.
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