Abstract
 The next U.S. president confronts a tough decision on whether and how to play out the unfinished hand that she or he will inherit in the high stakes arena of nuclear proliferation. A key question is what to do about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the controversial nuclear deal that the United States and five other world powers struck with Iran in the summer of 2015. For better or worse, the JCPOA now stands as the precarious linchpin of U.S. efforts to avert a dangerous nuclear proliferation spiral in the Middle East that would have global reverberations. This negotiated settlement with the Islamic Republic represents an audacious gamble by President Obama, not least because its durability relies on his successor’s willingness to carry forward a fragile political bargain in the face of persistent doubts about its fundamental merits, both at home and among the United States’ closest partners in the region. In other words, the stage is set for a new president to reassess the wisdom of continuing U.S. support for the JCPOA.
While I have argued against the deal on its demerits and harbor serious concerns about its ultimate efficacy, this essay explores why it is not smart for Washington to walk away now, despite the very real risk, or even likelihood, that the JCPOA will fail to prevent Iran from going nuclear sooner or later. In this context, the essay argues for a hedging strategy that includes a reemphasis on supply-side efforts to impede Iran from improving its nuclear and missile capabilities from within the JCPOA framework.
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