Abstract
In July 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that his cabinet had approved a reinterpretation of the country’s constitution. Although Article 9 of the document, effected in 1947, stated that Japan had forever renounced war as a sovereign right, the change meant that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) would, for the first time since their founding in 1954, be permitted to participate in acts of collective self-defence (generally understood to be the right to use force to repel an armed attack against a foreign country that has a close relationship with one’s own country). Abe’s historic plan sparked criticism from China and South Korea, two countries affected by Japanese aggression during the Second World War. Both countries issued warnings about the resurgence of Japanese militarism, amid growing concerns that both China and Japan were leading an arms race in East Asia.
Although Abe’s move to reinterpret Article 9 is indeed historic and groundbreaking, concerns about a resurgence of Japanese militarism are unwarranted. The basis for the reinterpretation is straightforward: in response to a changing threat environment for Japan, the rise of China and the desire among Americans that Japan bear more of the two countries’ alliance burdens, Japan has rationally charted a path for its military to do more. Put another way, the reinterpretation need not have any negative impact on regional security. In fact, a Japanese military that is more able to tackle threats – whether to Japan itself or to the US–Japan alliance – would argu-ably contribute to regional security. The only potential pitfall concerns not what Japan is doing regarding its constitution, but rather how it is communicating that change to its neighbours. Japan must work to reassure not only its domestic public, but also its neighbours, that a more assertive or ‘normal’ Japan would come clean on issues of history and shape the reconfiguration of the JSDF for the greater good.
PDF