Abstract
A peace regime in the Korean peninsula has been a largely unfamiliar issue among U.S. policy makers until recently. Remarks on a Korean peace regime have been very limited in frequency among U.S. policy makers and mostly made on superficial notions when publicly expressed. A recent rise in the U.S. concern with a peace regime in the peninsula originates primarily from a motivation to work out the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons. This paper is concerned with prime U.S. interests associated with the provision of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula. The U.S. has shown passivity with regard to a peace regime in the Korean peninsula, The U.S. seems to fear that a peace regime may work in a destructive way to the U.S. interests, undermining the hub-and -spoke system that has served for the last several decades to protect the U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. The U.S. begins to recognize the utility of a peace regime in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, but is afraid of high uncertainty associated with such adjoining issues as the future presence of the U.S. forces in Korea and a prospect for the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Any proposal for a peace regime in the Korean peninsula that can secure the U.S. support should be able to meet the following conditions; it should contribute to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, the maintenance or expansion of the U.S. influence in the peninsula and Northeast Asia, and the procurement of future presence of the U.S. forces in Korea, Methodologically, a comprehensive approach will be able to deal most effectively with the complex nature of interconnectivity among the constituting issues of a peace regime. The importance of the U.S. role in successful implementation of a peace regime in the peninsula cannot be underestimated. And this explains why a proposal for a peace regime that keeps away from reflecting the U.S. interest is doomed to fail.