Abstract
Due to the global energy crisis many analysts and even policymakers have contended that Russia could become the next energy superpower or that it already is. Presumably it could then be a supplier of either first or last resort to East Asia, the most dynamic region of the global economy, in times of crisis in the Middle East and possibly even replace the Middle East as primary supplier. Other observers have also cited the increased attention paid by East Asian regimes to Central Asian energy producers as they seek to diversify their sources of supply, while Central Asia seeks to diversify its customer base and build new pipelines not controlled by Russia. This essay examines both the interaction between East Asia and Central Asia on the one hand and with Russia on the other and casts a rather skeptical look upon the possibilities for these states reaching their full potential to supply East Asia. The difficulties involved are primarily structural, stemming from embedded political and economic structures that invariably point to sub-optimal outcomes insofar as energy production is concerned. Undoubtedly Russia and China will be major suppliers for East Asia, but it is quite unlikely that either of them or both regions together can achieve their full potential vis-a-vis East Asia without large-scale reform and investment. Unfortunately it is precisely current policies that precludes either the reform or of the investment necessary leading to a vicious circle by which these producers will ultimately fail to supplant the Middle East in East Asian energy calculations.