Introduction
The deep strategic differences between the United States and Russia, and the origins of those differences, have never been properly understood by either side.
After more than two decades in obscurity, nuclear strategy and the threat of Armageddon have returned to the forefront of US–Russia and NATO– Russia relations, reviving old fears and mutual suspicions. In August 2014, at the height of the Ukraine crisis, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared:
Our partners, regardless of the situations in their countries or their foreign policies, should always keep in mind that Russia is not to be messed with. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the largest nuclear powers. This is reality, not just words; moreover, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrence forces.
Many Russian military experts expounded on this statement, proposing to complement official military doctrine with ideas for ‘selective use’ of nuclear weapons as a ‘show of resolve’ or for the ‘de-escalation of conflict’. These views might have been dismissed as the fantasies of armchair strategists were it not for the fact they drew on past official documents. In 2003, such proposals had been largely ignored: a NATO–Russia war seemed unthinkable. But in the 2014–15 environment of escalating political and military confrontation they became chillingly realistic.
Russian declarations on nuclear weapons produced shock abroad and provoked a tough response. US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter responded: ‘Nuclear weapons are not something that should be the subject of loose rhetoric.’ Carter said that there was ‘no need’ for Putin to have made the point, as Russia’s nuclear capabilities are well established. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work said in the House of Representatives: ‘Anyone who thinks they can control escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire … Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate escalation.’
There is a tradition of explaining Russian behaviour by projecting Western thinking onto Russian defence planners. This often leads to assertions of the aggressive character of Moscow’s nuclear posture. The core of the issue, however, is not simply that a benign US–NATO nuclear-deterrence posture faces a menacing Russian war-fighting stance. The real problem is that the Soviet and Russian strategic mentality has mostly been, and remains today, very different from that of the United States and its allies. This is a complex issue, relating to Moscow’s specific way of dealing with nuclear deterrence, which stems from Russia’s historic experience, geostrategic position and technological development – all of which are very different from those of the West.
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