Abstract: This article examines Japan’s role conception in its multilateral commitments to the Asia-Pacific after the global financial crisis in 2008. The Hatoyama government launched an East Asian Community initiative, which aimed to assume a kingmaker role in creating a new order in East Asia. However, the East Asian Community initiative did not develop due to stress on self-reliance and distance from partnership with the USA. The Abe government sought to play a dual role in its major multilateral commitments. On the one hand, the government sought to play a follower role in enhancing the position of the East Asia Summit with an eye to consolidating the US-based institutional framework. On the other, Abe’s new multilateral initiative of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific represented Japan’s kingmaker role in maintaining a free and open maritime regime, and to keep a liberal and open economic regime under the emergence of the Trump administration.
Topic: Maritime Security
Koga, Kei
Abstract: Japan has a national interest in the South China Sea issue. Although its direct commitment is ultimately limited in a material sense due to a lack of military capabilities, as well as political and constitutional constraints on the Self-Defense Force, Japan has maintained its firm stance to uphold international maritime rules and norms, and nurtured strong diplomatic relations and conducted maritime capacity-building programs with the South-East Asian states, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. These actions contribute to consolidating the rule of law at sea and provide those claimant states an opportunity to withstand pressures from China. Given the Trump administration’s unclear South China Sea policy and South-East Asia’s strategic uncertainty, Japan is becoming a key player in maintaining regional maritime stability in East Asia through diplomacy.
Kobayashi, Izumi
Abstract: As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.
Collin, Koh Swee Lean
Abstract: The Sino-Indian rivalry features an increasingly prominent maritime dimension amidst the countries’ naval buildups and deployments in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Western Pacific. This study finds that the patterns of naval buildup and nature of the seas as an ambiguous, international medium do not necessarily shape mutual perceptions between China and India as pure security seekers. India’s concerns about China’s IOR forays revolve around its expanding bluewater naval capabilities, especially submarines, and port access. Beijing is wary of New Delhi’s reach into the Western Pacific and role within a perceived US-led containment scheme that allows it to leverage on partners’ bluewater assets. While war remains a remote prospect, this Sino-Indian rivalry at sea – extending from unresolved terrestrial political problems – looks set to persist.
Wuthnow, Joel
Abstract: Chinese President Xi Jinping has touted an Asian security architecture in which “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia.” But does China really want to exclude the United States from the regional order? This article argues that previous answers are often insufficient because they do not account for sub-regional variation in China’s strategy. In maritime Asia, China seeks a significantly reduced role for the US and its alliances though major constraints limit the prospects for success. In continental Asia, however, the situation is more nuanced, with Beijing alternately ignoring, supporting, or hedging against US presence. The policy implication is that Washington should not overstate Beijing’s role as either a regional adversary or a regional partner. Rather, the United States needs to approach China on its own terms across sub-regions.
Grossman, Derek
Summary: Vietnam’s military modernization is increasingly focused on deterring China from seizing disputed territory in the South China Sea. By developing and fielding select capabilities—including Kilo-class submarines, Su-30MK2 maritime strike fighters, a network of anti-access missiles, and other weapon systems—Hanoi has likely achieved its core objective of convincing Beijing of the hardships it would face in a military conflict against Vietnam in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, if deterrence fails because Beijing believes it can mitigate the substantial but reasonable risks, then Vietnam is probably incapable of sustaining an extended, large-scale, or high-intensity conventional conflict in the region. This conclusion is supported by an analysis of its evolving warfighting doctrine in the air and sea domains, lack of jointness and unrealistic training activities, and shortcomings in the Vietnamese military’s maritime domain awareness capabilities and weapon systems interoperability.
Kipgen, Nehginpao
Abstract: The South China Sea disputes involve both island and maritime claims among sovereign states and the issue has long been a point of debate in international politics. It involves not only the countries in dispute but also other major world powers, including the United States. Its important strategic location and the abundant resources make the South China Sea a target of contention among the claimant countries. The arbitral ruling in July 2016 gives a new momentum to the dispute. The article examines the strategic relations of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by analyzing the positions and steps taken by ASEAN and China, as well as ASEAN-China joint initiatives. It also discusses the challenges and viable solutions to the dispute.
Pant, Harsh V., and Abhijnan Rej
Preview: we argue in this article, while India endorses the idea of the Indo-Pacific rhetorically, three issues prevent actual operationalization of the concept for New Delhi. These issues geographically pertain to India’s east, north, and west. On its east, strategic, naval capability, and normative deficits prevent India from playing a larger role in the western Pacific. To its north, a manifest power differential with China—and an uncertain future trajectory of India-China relations—further contributes to India’s reticence to play a larger and more robust role in regional security. Finally, to its west, divergent Indian and American positions in the western Indian Ocean, in particular on Pakistan and Iran, prevent the creation of a unified cohesive view of the Indo-Pacific that both countries share. These divergences have concrete consequences for the future of U.S.-India regional cooperation. We conclude with some policy recommendations on how the United States could indeed help India become a leading power in the Indo-Pacific.
Draudt, Darcie, and John K. Warden
Preview: This article begins by describing the broad strategic challenge that North Korea, once armed with an operational nuclear weapons capability, poses to the United States and its allies. It then reviews the history of maritime clashes between North and South Korea in the Yellow Sea (“West Sea” in Korean) and describes the ongoing risk of violent provocations and war. Finally, the article proposes measures that could reduce tension, arguing that they would be mutually beneficial to the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China, and would contribute to, rather than detract from, an ideal U.S.-led strategy for deterring and containing a nuclear-armed North Korea.
Clary, Christopher, and Ankit Panda
Preview: On January 9, 2017, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) announced that the country had successfully carried out the first-ever flight test of a nuclear-capable, submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM)—the Babur-3, a variant of the Babur-2 ground-launched cruise missile.With the introduction of the Babur-3, Pakistan seems headed toward adding a sea leg in the coming decade to complement a nuclear force structure that previously relied solely on land-based missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons.
Emmers, Ralph, and Sarah Teo
Abstract: Security Strategies of Middle Powers in the Asia Pacific examines what drives the different regional security strategies of four middle powers in the Asia Pacific: Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia. Drawing on the extant middle power literature, the authors argue that the regional security strategies of middle powers could take two forms, namely, functional or normative. A functional strategy means that the middle power targets its resources to address a specific problem that it has a high level of interest in, while a normative strategy refers to a focus on promoting general behavioural standards and confidence building at the multilateral level. This book argues that whether a middle power ultimately employs a more functional or normative regional security strategy depends on its resource availability and strategic environment.
Jackson, Van
Abstract: The claim that the United States seeks primacy – a concept distinct from military superiority – in the Asia-Pacific is fundamentally wrong.
Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, and Kate Sullivan de Estrada
Abstract: Bound by the strategic primacy of the Indian Ocean and by the constraints on its sea-power projection, India’s interests sit uneasily with those of the other Quad powers.
Kennedy, Conor
Abstract: China employs three sea forces to defend and advance its maritime claims – the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard and the maritime militia. This third force plays a vital role in protecting China’s maritime rights and interests, performing tasks that fit what observers are increasingly referring to as the ‘grey zone’ between war and peace. In this article, Conor Kennedy addresses Chinese considerations that guide the use of maritime militia and defines a range of operations by reviewing publicly known cases.
Murphy, Martin, and Peter Roberts
Abstract: It is the policy of the Chinese Communist Party that the country should become a great maritime power. In this article, Martin N Murphy and Peter Roberts provide an overview of what this means militarily, where China is laying down a challenge to the US and its regional neighbours, where it is falling short, and what this has to do with Europe.
