Abstract: The general situation of the South China Sea in 2017 is easing with an obvious increase of regional cooperation. However,under the apparent calmness, there are two important changes: first, the problem of the South China Sea has risen from a partial sovereignty issue to a monolithic issue of maritime rights; second, conflicts in the region still exist and will fundamentally affect the stability in the South China Sea. These changes will increase the challenge for China to maintain its rights in the South China Sea and build a maritime power. Full text available here.
Topic: Maritime Security
Zhao, Kejin, and Hao Zhang
Abstract: Policy communities throughout the world tend to agree that in recent years China has become more assertive in its maritime disputes with neighbouring countries. However, scholars vehemently disagree about the underlying motivations for such a change, whether structural factors, China’s external pressures, or growing overseas interests. This article argues that existing analysis runs the risk of dismissing the embedded logic of domestic legitimacy as the single most important explanation. China’s maritime strategy has almost always served the goal of legitimisation in consistence with the Party’s central enterprises, be they survival, modernisation, or political influence/power. The rise of naval nationalism from within has pushed the central leadership to respond with determination for the sake of maintaining credibility as ‘national saviour and protector’. More importantly, in view of the bureaucratic fragmentation in China’s maritime governance, new policy actors can forward their own interests by appealing to nationalist sentiments, and to the Party’s new central task of projecting political power. Our case studies on Sansha City, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the Haiyang Shiyou 981 Drilling Rig bring in supportive evidence. Specifically, they demonstrate that all extant explanations may indeed influence China’s maritime strategy, but mostly through their impact on domestic legitimacy. Based on our legitimacy thesis, it can be predicted that, if the central leadership manages to consolidate its domestic legitimacy, China will assume a more moderate, cooperative, and constructive attitude towards maritime disputes. Full text available here.
Liang, Jiarui
Abstract: Separated by the vast Pacific Ocean, China and Pacific Island countries have been interlinked through vigorous ocean diplomacy which helps strengthen their political, economic and cultural relations. Based upon common perceptions and with new momentum generated under China’s “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” both sides can join hands in building a community of shared future for their mutual benefits. With regard to the cultural diversity, colonial history, group identity and various legitimate concerns of Pacific Island countries, China needs to adopt a more comprehensive and pragmatic approach in order to achieve win-win cooperation. Full text available here.
Patalano, Alessio
Abstract: The paper challenges the notion that Chinese maritime coercion in the East and South China Seas (ESCS) is best described as a grey zone strategy. The ‘grey zone’ notion raises two issues. Conceptually, it adds little to the existing literature on maritime coercion. Practically, it creates confusion over the understanding of maritime coercion by blurring the distinction between military and constabulary activities. The paper articulates this difference to elucidate the functional correlation between Beijing’s strategic objectives and maritime claims. Within this context, the grey zone construct is particularly problematic since it uncritically assumes that the use of force is designed to remain below the threshold of war. By contrast, the paper argues that Chinese maritime claims to control ‘rights and interests’ are a function of a broader strategic intention to project military power within and beyond the confines of the ESCS, whilst preventing others to do the same. Thus, Chinese maritime coercion (military and constabulary) increases strategic competition and the risk of war, and is therefore better described as part of a ‘hybrid’ strategy. Full text available here.
Ishibashi, Natsuyo
Abstract: Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan’s security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US–Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan’s recent security partnership with India is part of Japan’s long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan’s policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo’s policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan’s policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China
Lee, Seokwoo, and Eonkyung Park
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to review the practices of South Korea concerning interdiction, especially on the seas, in response to the various sanctions placed on the DPRK by the UN Security Council (UNSC). This article examines the UNSC’s resolutions along with Korean statutes and practices. The UN resolutions that are touched on in this article seem to mollify concerns of a breach of international law, and all member states owe a legal obligation to implement them. The primary institutions in charge of maritime law enforcement of South Korea are the Korea Coast Guard and the Korea Customs Service. The Korea Coast Guard is in charge of maritime law enforcement of coastal waters, adjacent waters, and pelagic waters in accordance with the Coast Guard Act. However, there is no statutory provision that provides for the measures, such as attachment and/or disposal of the seizures during search and inspection on the sea, and there is no provision concerning compensation and/or liability due to such measures. Therefore, there needs to be secure legal grounds for direct enforcement measures on seizures in line with the Coast Guard Act. The Korea Customs Service reserves the exercise of police power: to the extent of the legislative purpose of the Customs Act; in the proper administration of the imposition and collection of customs duties and the customs clearance of exported and imported goods; and in securing revenues from customs duties. However, the Customs Act does not provide that weapons of mass destruction and items related to them shall be subject to its application. Given these reasons, it is necessary to develop and implement legislation that recognizes that the transportation of weapons of mass destruction and transportation of designated items by the relevant Resolutions on the DPRK are a breach of the Customs Act.
Whiejin, Lee
Abstract: Reflecting upon the desire to expand the jurisdiction in the sea, the UNCLOS introduced and established the exclusive economic zone, new continental shelf system, and archipelagic waters and agreed upon the width of the territorial sea. In addition, compulsory settlement of international maritime disputes has gone into effect. Northeast Asian states such as Korea, China, and Japan enacted domestic laws and ratified the Convention in 1996. They concluded fisheries agreements, establishing a tentative legal order on fishery. There remains the task of effecting delimitation at sea. The delimitation does not seem to be feasible over a short term, with such big hurdles as method of baseline and possession of island issue. Since in the Yellow Sea no delimitation is in effect yet, Chinese vessels’ overfishing poses problems to the Korean economic zone. In the East Sea, the Southern Continental Shelf Joint Development Agreement is scheduled to expire in 2028 unless extension is made. Possible conflict seems to be in the offing in East China Sea around the development of natural resources and it may flare up further if endowment of resources is apparent. While continuously ascertaining the position of other states through maritime negotiations and making adjustment to their positions to be consistent with the practice, jurisprudence and the provisions of the Convention, an agreement is necessary to be reached. On occasion, political breakthrough needs to be made through decisions made at the highest level.
Ma, Jinxing
Abstract: The status of maritime features is one of the core issues in the South China Sea Arbitration. The essence of this issue is territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes between China and the Philippines. Based on the interception of certain facts and evidence, the Tribunal did not interpret the China’s diplomatic position as it wanted, and it had an intensely subjective interpretation of Article 121(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Combined with the Chinese government’s positions before and after the publicity surrounding the Award, this paper, which takes the logical approaches of the Award as the main line, focuses on chapter 6 of the Award, raising questions about disputes on the status of maritime features, analyzing the treaty interpretations related to the status of maritime features, and clarifying the defections.
Yang, Zewei
Abstract: Global ocean governance is a historical product. In the course of development, the UNCLOS has established the contemporary global ocean governance system. The current system, however, has many defects, including ambiguity in rules and fragmentation in structure. Furthermore, some new challenges are ever-emerging in the system. But all these could be improved through the establishment of a UNCLOS review agency and an enactment of supplementary agreements. China has taken lessons from its participation in the development and reform of the system. This includes the creation of the identity of a developing country, being an active participant and promoter of change as opposed to being a passive recipient and follower inside the system. In its push for reforming global ocean governance, China should not only initiate the establishment of a “World Ocean Organization,” but also enhance its agenda setting, drafting and contracting capabilities of international legislation.
Ramadhani, Eryan
Abstract: China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China’s assertiveness. I argue that China’s assertive foreign policy originates in leaders’ domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders’ crisis behaviour. China’s non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China’s assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.
He, Kai
Abstract: This paper examines the three faces of the Indo-Pacific from an IR theory perspective. It suggests that the realist face of the Indo-Pacific is a “balancing strategy” against China. The liberal face of the Indo-Pacific aims to form a new “institutional setting” that facilitates cooperation among states across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. According to constructivism, the Indo-Pacific offers an “ideational construct” for promoting value-oriented and norm-based diplomacy in the region. This paper argues that these three faces of the Indo-Pacific concept are theoretically problematic and practically flawed. There are two ways of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific, though. One is exclusive institutionalization with China as an outside target, which follows the realist logic of making China a common threat in the region. The success of this approach mainly depends on how China behaves in the future. The other is the inclusive approach of institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific by embracing China and other states into a new Indo-Pacific institution. It will not be easy, but the endeavor of the inclusive institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific will produce positive externalities of peace and stability to the region.
He, Baogang
Abstract: The existing literature on the Indo-Pacific has largely focused on how and why the USA, Japan, Australia, India, and Indonesia have promoted the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific, and how China has rejected it in the domain of maritime security. What has been overlooked, however, are dramatically expanded Chinese perceptions of the region and changing and complex Chinese attitudes and responses toward the Indo-Pacific. This essay aims to fill this gap by demonstrating how China has coopted certain components of the Indo-Pacific in its geoeconomic hegemonic project. This can be partially explained by unfolding and expanding Chinese perceptions of the region, characterized by geoeconomics and maritime/continental hybridity. This paper brings a missing perspective to the debate by highlighting China’s evolving, complex, and multifaceted approaches regarding the Indo-Pacific. It also offers a conceptual tool of a hybrid vision of the institutionalization of the Indo-Pacific for the enterprise of regional cooperation.
Doyle, Timothy
Abstract: The Indo-Pacific, constructed either as a region, super-region or non-region, is currently a hotly contested map-making phenomenon. Various countries and cultures, washed by the waters of these amorphous oceanic boundaries and sea spaces, are currently seeking to establish exclusive territorial claims over these water spaces by invoking stories and narratives taken from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. These stories are often used in an attempt to legitimate “natural”, and more essentialist relationships between certain cultures and/or nation-states with their surrounding seas. These narratives both challenge the broader international system and its rule of law, and create internal narratives, strengthening domestic and national support for state-building programs in the region/s. But the Indo-Pacific is more than a contestation between nation-statist imaginations and aspirations. It also invokes stories which seek to develop and celebrate a shared “maritime regionalism” beyond the exclusive and usually dominant politics of nation-states. Finally, a third interpretive category is used: the construction of the Indo-Pacific as a globalised “non-space”.
Van Nieuwenhuizen, Simon
Abstract: Through qualitative comparative analysis of policy documents and official statements over the last 10 years (2008–2018), this paper examines Australian and PRC government conceptions of the international order and the associated policy implications. Their understandings of the international order are informed by their self-defined national role conceptions and perceptions of other states, and are manifested in discussions of institutional reform, international law and human rights. Australia’s self-conception as a middle power informs its emphasis on maintenance and US leadership of the existing order, while the PRC’s self-conceptions as both a developing and established power enable it to frame itself as either an upholder or reformer of the order. Both governments highlight the ‘rules-based’ mechanisms of the WTO, and are more likely to agree on trade and economic issues than on other matters. Their responses to the 2016 South China Sea arbitration tribunal decision and discussions of the role of human rights in the international order suggest less agreement is likely on international law and human rights norms. While Australia considers the PRC a potential challenger to the existing order, Australia does not feature in PRC discussions of international order, suggesting its limited ability to affect PRC foreign policy decisions.
Loh, Dylan M.H
Abstract: Since the Cold War, South-East Asia has been marked by a period of relative calm and stability. Yet this peace belies ongoing tensions, mistrust and stress in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and among its member states. Within the scholarship on ASEAN, not enough attention is devoted to these underlying currents. How and in what way do tensions stress the ASEAN norms? What are some of the coping mechanisms adopted by ASEAN and its member states? Engaging with the scholarship on norms, the author contends that changes wrought in this relationship are both extra- and intra-mural. These have accelerated as contentious issues—particularly the South China Sea disputes—gain more visibility. The author argues that ASEAN is put under pressure, firstly, through a more muscular Chinese foreign policy that disrupts but does not yet break the fundamental norms of ASEAN and, secondly, through internal contestation over ASEAN norms that challenges the meaning of these norms. Essentially, the article gives an account of how internal and external pressures are burdening ASEAN norms but yet remain durable because of resistance against duress by the bloc and member states. This is done through an examination of instances where the established order and practices in the region were disturbed, and the response to this disturbance.
