Abstract: This commentary describes an opportunity for clarification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ‘regime of islands.’ It describes the growing need to authoritatively distinguish between islands, rocks, and artificial islands for the purpose of stabilizing claims to maritime territory. Sea level rise and island building activities in the South China Sea and elsewhere are increasing the pace at which new islands appear and existing islands disappear. This commentary proposes a two-part interpretation of UNCLOS, which (1) freezes the status of islands and rocks, and (2) asserts a practical distinction between ‘islands’ and ‘artificial islands.’ The United States is identified as a possible actor to forward this interpretation, and the benefits for that country and the international community as a whole are reviewed. Full text available here.
Topic: Maritime Security
Martin, Peter J
Abstract: In this Maritime Century, the notion of “sea blindness” is an interesting development. There is a perception that Australia has long experienced a “sea blindness”, where the sense of the sea and surroundings is not generally apparent in Australians]. However, reference to “sea blindness” is not restricted to Australia’s circumstance alone. Britain’s “dangerously weak Royal Navy” and reliance on sea traffic elicited the phrase in 2009 when Britain’s policy-makers were branded as suffering “sea blindness” an accusation substantiated in relation to the need for security, vulnerability to interruption of supply, and a weakened naval force structure. A nationwide survey of Seafarers UK in 2011, suggested that the British public had an alarming ignorance of the island’s dependence on the sea and that “sea blindness” was a “huge problem”. Yet in 2017 a further opinion poll conducted by the UK Chamber of shipping confirmed that “sea blindness is a myth”. Does “sea blindness” exist in the Australian circumstance? An intimate appreciation of the Australian LNG trade could provide a publicly visible appreciation of Australia’s strategic maritime circumstance in relation to other sovereign interests. Full text available here.
Description: In the sphere of future global politics, no region will be as hotly contested as the Asia-Pacific, where great power interests collide amid the mistrust of unresolved conflicts and disputed territory. This is where authoritarian China is trying to rewrite international law and challenge the democratic values of the United States and its allies. The lightning rods of conflict are remote reefs and islands from which China has created military bases in the 1.5-million-square-mile expanse of the South China Sea, a crucial world trading route that this rising world power now claims as its own. No other Asian country can take on China alone. They look for protection from the United States, although it, too, may be ill-equipped for the job at hand. If China does get away with seizing and militarizing waters here, what will it do elsewhere in the world, and who will be able to stop it? In Asian Waters, award-winning foreign correspondent Humphrey Hawksley breaks down the politics—and tensions—that he has followed through this region for years. Reporting on decades of political developments, he has witnessed China’s rise to become one of the world’s most wealthy and militarized countries, and delivers in Asian Waters the compelling narrative of this most volatile region. Can the United States and China handle the changing balance of power peacefully? Do Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan share enough common purpose to create a NATO-esque multilateral alliance? Does China think it can even become a superpower while making an enemy of America? If so, how does it plan to achieve it? Asian Waters delves into these topics and more as Hawksley presents the most comprehensive and accessible analysis ever of this region.
Satake, Tomohiko
Description: In this article, Satake examines the competing interpretations of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept first introduced by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. The author argues that FOIP is best understood as a “regional order-building strategy,” and outlines three aspects of the concept as such: creating a stable power balance; promoting regional resilience, development, and connectivity; and rule-making and norm-setting. The article then focuses on the implication of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy in Japan’s relations with ASEAN. Full text available here.
Harding, Brian
Abstract: After nearly two years, the Trump administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region has finally taken shape. Its objectives are a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, in line with decades of U.S. policy in the region, but in a new context of outright strategic competition with China. Its means include familiar tools of U.S. engagement, with some modest improvements for the times. But in Donald Trump’s America, actions often do not support stated goals and, in the case of policy in the Indo-Pacific, President Trump’s personal instincts, in particular his dogmatic approach to trade, have undermined his administration’s best efforts in the region. Full text available here.
Mecalf, Rory
Abstract: The concept of the Indo-Pacific plays a role of growing importance in the way the world is coming to terms with China’s power and assertiveness. This concept serves two related purposes: an objective definition of an Asia-centric strategic and economic system, spanning a two-ocean region and replacing the late-twentieth-century idea of the Asia-Pacific, and the foundation for a strategy of incorporating and diluting Chinese power within a multipolar order reflecting respect for rules and equal sovereignty.1 No one country or strategic thinker can lay claim to the rapid emergence of this concept. In fact, the Indo-Pacific is not such a new idea, with precursors of pan-Asian maritime connectivity going back to pre-colonial times. Moreover, a sense of this revived regional construct emerged through a process of interaction among policy establishments and strategic thinkers in a number of nations, including Australia, India, Japan, the United States and Indonesia, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. It is notable, however, that Australia has been the most prominent and active proponent of this concept. Australia was the first country to formally introduce the Indo-Pacific as the official definition of its strategic environment in 2013. This has consistently been reaffirmed since, and elaborated in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper that provides a vision for Australia’s international relations. It is fair to say that the Indo-Pacific is now bipartisan orthodoxy in Australia. A likely change to a Labor government in 2019 is unlikely to shift this perspective. Full text available here.
Gong, Xue
Abstract: The growing pluralization of Chinese society has made China’s foreign policy decision-making more complicated. As a result, traditional state-centric approaches to analysing China’s foreign relations may no longer be adequate. A nuanced understanding requires attention to new actors in the formulation and conduct of the country’s foreign affairs, including central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). This article explores the increasingly important role played by Chinese CSOEs in Beijing’s policy towards the South China Sea. It hypothesizes that although CSOEs are employed by the state as policy tools, they fulfil different roles in Beijing’s South China Sea policy. Some CSOEs mobilize resources to influence state policy; some CSOEs proactively take advantage of state policy when opportunities arise; while other CSOEs are mostly policy takers. In the case of the last category, it is interesting to note that their activities are not just a demonstration of political subjugation to the state; they also combine state-directed political tasks with efforts to seek market opportunities. This article employs three case studies—tourism, energy extraction and infrastructure—to demonstrate how the roles of Chinese business actors vary in China’s South China Sea policy. Full text available here.
Xue, Song
Abstract: Although nearly twenty joint development agreements have been signed since the 1950s, only a few have been implemented and even fewer have achieved successful commercialization. This article discusses the conditions leading to the implementation failures of joint development agreements. Applying the Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis method to nineteen joint development agreements between 1958 and 2008, this article argues that the only causally-related condition associated with the failed implementation of joint development agreements is the deterioration of bilateral relations, often arising from the maritime boundary dispute that the joint development agreement was supposed to resolve. Other possible hypotheses, such as lack of economic incentives, energy independence, domestic opposition, third-party intervention and disagreements over the details of the project, do not show any correlated pattern with the failure to implement such agreements. The finding provides policy implications for the current boundary disputes in the South China Sea: improved bilateral relations is the prerequisite for the effective implementation of joint development ventures, and not the other way around. Littoral states should also not pursue joint development agreements as a false pretext to secretly consolidate their maritime boundary claims, or to confirm the status of a “dispute”. Furthermore, successful negotiations for a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea may help to create a conducive atmosphere for claimant states to agree on the joint development of offshore hydrocarbon resources. Full text available here.
Koga, Kei
Abstract: This article argues that by creating a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (FOIPS) in 2016, Japan has engaged in “tactical hedging” to cope with the strategic uncertainty engendered by China’s growing economic power and political influence in Asia and the Trump administration’s uncertain foreign policy towards the region. Tactical hedging refers to a declaratory policy doctrine that aims to utilize temporal strategic ambiguity to understand and determine whether any long-term strategy shift is necessary or possible. In doing so, Japan has bided its time in order to understand strategic trends and coordinate policies and principles with allies and partners—especially the United States and ASEAN—and shaped the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) in accordance with those consultations since 2016. Nevertheless, the emerging trend—especially the clear division between America’s more hardline stance towards China and ASEAN’s own conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific which aims to facilitate cooperation with China—indicates that the benefits of tactical hedging are diminishing, and that Japan needs to clarify its political stance if it wants to maintain its own FOIP concept as a viable strategic vision. Full text available here.
Hossain, Delwar, and Md. Shariful Islam
Abstract: The paper analyses Bangladesh-India maritime connectivity in the Bay of Bengal region from a Bangladesh perspective. It aims at contributing to emerging literature on policy studies on maritime issues. It argues that to a larger extent, stability, prosperity and progress of Bangladesh depend on exploring and exploiting her untapped marine resources in the Bay of Bengal region. More than 90 per cent of Bangladesh’s trade takes place through the sea. At the same time, there are growing maritime issues and concerns in the Bay of Bengal region that Bangladesh and India can jointly address. Consequently, the paper argues that it is of paramount interest for both Bangladesh and India to deepen their bilateral maritime connectivity in order to promote maritime cooperation. Areas and possibilities of maritime connectivity are visible from blue economy to joint research promotion. However, that connectivity needs to be based on reciprocity and mutual respect, but not on a zero sum pattern. Full text available here.
Hardy, Dennis
Abstract: The Bay of Bengal has for centuries been the scene of commercial and cultural interactions between the surrounding countries. In contrast, the second half of the twentieth century saw something of a hiatus. That break in continuity has now passed and the aim of this paper is to demonstrate how, in response to changing circumstances, a new dynamic is evolving. For different reasons, the region is being ‘repositioned’. One fundamental change is that the strategic redefinition of the Indian Ocean, so that it becomes part of the more expansive Indo–Pacific region, has effectively shifted the Bay eastwards. China’s presence in the region emphasizes this, while the littoral countries are all themselves on the frontline of far-reaching change. Nothing is as it was. Yet, for all that, the framework of governance is weak, opening the question of how to bring it more into line with the realities of the new situation. Full text available here.
Rao, P.V
Abstract: Motivated by regional economic integration and geo-strategic interests, the Bay of Bengal (BOB) littorals are now striving to build land and maritime connectivities to promote trade and investment networks. India’s geographic centrality to the BOB region makes it indispensable to any regional connectivity plan. Indeed, regional groups such as SAARC and BIMSTEC also encouraged its members to devise regional plans to build transport infrastructure; however, no enthusiasm was exhibited to create such linkages until recently when extra regional initiatives primarily by China began transforming the economic and geopolitical profile of the region as it pushed for transportation links with the BOB countries. Beginning with Burma, China moved ahead constructing a chain of infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Thailand. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that more the extra regional initiatives than intra regional efforts have driven the BOB states to promote intraregional connectivities. Full text available here.
Brewster, David
Abstract: There is a growing understanding among maritime security practitioners of the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as an essential enabler of maritime security. This article describes Australia’s efforts to develop an integrated national MDA system that brings together data and intelligence from a range of military and civil agencies and commercial sources to which a risk-based assessment is applied. This has become an essential tool to combat transnational maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. But inherent limitations of national MDA systems are also pushing Australia and other countries to cooperate in trying to improve MDA. This paper then examines ways in which Australia can promote MDA cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It considers the effectiveness and limitations of current and proposed multilateral information sharing arrangements in the region. It concludes that Australia should primarily focus on working with selected Indian Ocean partners to enhance information sharing and help develop integrated national MDA systems. Full text available here.
Mishra, Vivek
Abstract: Donald Trump’s presidency and its consequent policies have spurred a series of geopolitical developments upending America’s core beliefs about globalization. Trump’s unilateral disruptions on various occasions, turning America’s back on globalization, have impacted the global economy, security, trade, climate, and polity in almost equal measure. However, the most severe implications of the Trumpian retreat from globalization could be for Asian security, an area where the USA has commanded a dominant influence since the end of the Second World War. Even as a transactional foreign policy approach has started to flow from Washington, Asia’s notion of collective security under the US umbrella faces an uncertain future. This process has been hastened by China’s growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Full text available here.
Basu, Titli
Abstract: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of the ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principles of universal values and norms, has created space for India in Japan’s grand strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse, both in Japan and the USA. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demand more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy – with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas, institutions, and infrastructure – Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive region, including all countries in the geography as also others beyond who have as take in it’. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define the India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific, such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal norms and values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions, including Bay of Bengal, the Mekong region, and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. Full text available here.
