Abstract: The fourth wave science and technology revolution is quickly ushering in a worldwide military revolution. The major powers such as the United States, Russia and China are all striving to catch up with the wave by accelerating their own research on new military technology and the deployment of new military equipment. This presents significant changes to the international security system: the existing disarmament and arms control system is on the brink of collapse, strategic competition among the big powers has intensified, and the risk of global turbulence is on the rise. The future of international security and its mechanism depends both on the method and direction of the technology revolution, and on the ability of the big powers to put aside their differences and avoid conflict in the major arenas of competition. In this process, China should seek to play a bigger and more constructive role. This would not only be conducive to world peace and development, but is also the only way for China to secure a seat in the future international system. Full text available here.
Country or Region: Russia
Ma, Xue
Abstract: Since the Crimean crisis, the US has continuously tightened financial sanctions on Russia.In the short term, this doesn’ t appear to be working very effectively, but in the long run, it has indeed had an irreversible impact on the Russian economy. Though the US has repeatedly upgraded its sanction plans, four puzzles have long remained unsolved: appropriate sanctions have avoided a humanitarian crisis, but raised moral dilemmas; actual enforcement of sanctions is getting more and more difficult; EU cooperation with the US is vital, but the two regions more often than not play different tunes; and the frequent use of sanctions weakens US legitimacy and integrity,leading to a degradation of the sanction mechanism. Sanctions have continued to be implemented since President Trump took office, but with some new adjustments. Full text available here.
Cheng, Kefan
Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War ,the power comparison between the United States and Russia in the Middle East has been “strong US, weak Russia”. But since sending troops into Syria on September 30 of 2015, Russia has taken a forceful position of involvement in the Middle East and achieved fruitful results, not only boosting its military presence in the Middle East, but also greatly increasing its political influence. Russia is now an important external force influencing political changes in the Middle East. Since taking office as US president, Donald Trump has changed the policy of strategic contraction pursued by his predecessor, Barack Obama, in the Middle East,taking a proactive rather than a stiff approach to further intensify contention with Russia in a bid to reshape and consolidate its position as a top dog in the Middle East. US-Russia contention has led to new geopolitical divisions and realignment as well as profound and complicated changes in geopolitical structure in the Middle East, thus perpetuating US-Russia contention, as the two countries will lock themselves in fierce contention over regional dominance on both military and political battlegrounds. Full text available here.
Li, Dong
Abstract: In 2017,Russia took proactive steps in the face of adversity and experienced the best year since the Ukrainian crisis with a more positive attitude in responding to internal and external difficulties. In domestic politics, although there were new challenges, Putin stayed firm in his presidency and there will essentially be no doubt about his re-election. In the economy ,Russia climbed out of recession and started on a recovery path of growth. As for diplomacy, although Russia failed to re-establish relations with the West, significant achievements were made in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions. Full text available here.
Allison, Roy
Abstract: This article contributes to research on non-Western regionalism by examining the function of security policy coordination in two macro-regional organisations in Eurasia, which include the primary non-Western powers: the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—with China and Russia—and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)—with Russia. The SCO has wider formal functions, and the CSTO is more hierarchical in practice, but both claim to be regional security providers with a focus on Central Asia. It is puzzling that Member States stress the importance of these organisations, that there have been regular meetings for over 15 years, yet their functionality is low judging by their ability to implement various ambitious projects. This article offers the explanation for this in the focus of SCO and CSTO Member State leaders on the interaction between domestic political, and regional security priorities. As a result, these bodies express the phenomenon of ‘protective integration’. It is a phenomenon that does not offer substantive regional integration or emphasise collective-action problem solving. It is intended to be sovereignty enhancing and to bolster regime security, stability, and legitimacy. It fosters a culture of interaction, normative bonding, and collective political solidarity. This is confirmed in empirical analysis of SCO and CSTO discourse and agreements over counter-terrorism, information security, and foreign policy coordination. However, the bonds of protective integration have weakened as separatism has become a divisive issue since 2014 over Russian action in Ukraine. Moreover, organisational enlargement of the SCO further threatens its cohesion, while it is being displaced by the belt and road initiative in the wider context of Chinese foreign and economic policy priorities. Neither the SCO nor the CSTO are likely to be dissolved, but their purposes are likely to become more diffuse. Full text available here.
Lake, David A
Abstract: The United States–China relationship is more likely than not to slide into economic and military competition, despite the perhaps best intentions of both states. This new bipolar competition is not inevitable. The key question is whether both governments have the self-restraint to limit domestic rent-seeking interests who will undoubtedly demand protection at home and exclusivity in their spheres of influence abroad. If not, the new superpowers will, like great powers in the past, ‘race’ for economic privileges that can quickly divide the world up into exclusive blocs. Like the security dilemma, great powers need not actually exclude one another from their economic zones; the fear of exclusion alone is enough to ignite the process of division. There was always some likelihood of a competitive economic spiral given China’s close business–government relations in a ‘state-capitalist’ economy. Now, for the first time in seven decades, there is a chance that the United States, in the grips of economic nationalism, might abandon its historic policy of free trade and ignite a new race for economic privilege as well. Full text available here.
Yang, Yuan
Abstract: The ‘Thucydides trap’ exaggerates the risk of war breaking out between the rising power and the ruling power in the contemporary age. The greater challenge facing China and the United States is to avoid falling into the ‘Churchill trap’. That is, falling into a long-term confrontation by repeating the mistakes of the Cold War between the US and the USSR. Both the ‘old’ history of the ancient East Asian bipolar system and the current experience of Sino-US interaction in East Asia suggest that, in addition to hegemonic war and cold war, there is a third type of great power relationship between the two poles, which I call ‘co-ruling’, whereby rather than being geographically demarcated according to their respective ‘spheres of influence’, the two superpowers jointly lead all or most of the small and medium-sized countries in the system. The theoretical and case studies examined in the article imply that the ‘co-ruling’ mode will appear and be sustained at a time when the two superpowers’ foreign functions are differentiated (i.e. each of the two poles can only meet one of the indispensable needs of small countries, and the two needs that the two poles can respectively meet are different ones), when inter-great-power war is no longer a viable strategic option. The antagonistic and geopolitical colours of the Cold War ‘divided-ruling’ mode of power politics will be less strident in the ‘co-ruling’ mode, so offering an illuminating escape from both the ‘Thucydides trap’ and the ‘Churchill trap’. Full text available here.
Owne, Catherine
Abstract: Many studies have compared the Russian and Chinese projects currently underway in the Central Asian region, namely the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), both of which seek to increase integration with Central Asian states. Yet little attention has been paid to how these endeavors are perceived locally by Central Asians themselves. This article aims to fill this gap by presenting the findings of a comparative discourse analysis of perceptions of Russia and China in online Russian-language media in Kyrgyzstan. The research reveals that while Russia’s role in the region has been seen primarily in political terms and China’s role chiefly in economic terms, these perceptions are changing, and that a growing percentage of articles are devoted to economics in the case of Russia and politics in the case of China. Another finding from this research is that China receives a greater percentage of positive coverage than Russia. It is suggested that as two important poles in the emerging multi-polar world, China and Russia should ensure their respective projects complement, rather than conflict, with one another in the region. Full text available here.
Tillman, Henry, Jian Yang, and Egill Thor Nielsson
Abstract: The introduction of the “Polar Silk Road (PSR)” into the first comprehensive white paper on Arctic policy is a historic step for China’s Arctic engagement. Over the past few years, China has achieved policy synergies and launched industrial, scientific and technological cooperation with Russia and Nordic countries. With enlarged interests and enhanced capabilities, China is becoming a preferred partner for Russia and Nordic countries in a number of infrastructure, energy and transportation projects within the Arctic region. The PSR framework to advance Arctic cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) presents both economic opportunities and social as well as environmental challenges for Chinese enterprises to balance the utilization and protection of the Arctic. Full text available here.
Xu, Bo & Reisinger, William M.
Abstract: Russia’s growing energy cooperation with China is central to several of Moscow’s top foreign-policy objectives. Analyzing what drives Russia’s energy diplomacy with China can therefore shed important light on the dynamics of Russian foreign policy-making. We go beyond other recent studies of this topic by examining the role of domestic political influences and the countries’ bilateral interactions. We show that personalist elements influence both Russia’s policy-making and its diplomacy with China. The personalism has made it hard for Russia to coordinate the relevant decision-making institutions and get the most from its energy strength. The economic gains from recent energy deals, particularly to Russia’s Far East, have been less than expected, and Russia has met only limited success in achieving its foreign-policy priorities in the Asia-Pacific region. Moving forward, Russia must further institutionalize its decision-making process, limit the role of personalism, and better coordinate the activities of its energy firms with the goals of its central agencies and local governments. Full text available here.
Ahmen, Zahid Shahab, Sarfraz Ahmed, and Stuti Bhatnagar
Abstract: South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with persistent India–Pakistan rivalry acting as a major stumbling block to regional cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Nonetheless, both India and Pakistan continue to experiment with multilateral arrangements and both became members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017. While it is too early to predict the impact of the India–Pakistan rivalry on the SCO, dominant scholarship highlights the likelihood of a negative influence. This paper would like to present an alternative possibility – of the SCO providing opportunities for collaboration in the areas of security and counterterrorism, which in turn may positively influence Indo–Pak relations. Further, the likelihood of the Indo–Pak conflict negatively impacting the SCO is low primarily because, unlike SAARC, the SCO is led by China and Russia, who are actively invested in keeping the SCO influential to serve their key interest in challenging the dominant Western world order.
Weede, Erich
Abstract: Twenty years from now, the Chinese economy might be twice as large as that of the United States. Since great powers have always claimed spheres of influence, this raises the issue of what characteristics a Chinese sphere of influence might have. Currently, the Chinese sphere of influence is still rather fuzzy. But one might argue that North Korea is part of it. After all, the Chinese fought the Korean War in order to prevent all of Korea becoming part of the US sphere of influence. If one accepts that North Korea is part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then Kim Jong‐un’s nuclear weapons should become a Chinese concern instead of a US concern. If China wants a nuclear weapons power next door, and a joint missile defense effort by the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of it so be it. If China understands its national interest, as great powers have historically done, then it could undermine the North Korean regime more effectively than the United States could at much lower risks of escalation to a great war. Whereas the United States hesitates to recognize that North Korea is and should remain part of the Chinese sphere of influence, its economic sanctions against Russia risk driving Russia into China’s arms. Focusing on the incipient rivalry between China and the United States for global primacy does in no way imply advocacy of a hawkish US policy towards China. In the nuclear age, peace between rival powers should depend on two pillars: nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, or “peace by fear” and “peace by trade.
Brown, James D.J
Abstract: Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s anticipated trip to St Petersburg and Moscow at the end of May 2018 represents the culmination of his “new approach” to Russia. Unveiled two years earlier, this policy seeks to achieve a breakthrough in the countries’ long-standing territorial dispute by reducing Japan’s initial demands and offering incentives in the form of enhanced political and economic engagement. Having stuck resolutely with this policy despite criticism from the West, Abe now needs it to deliver, not least to boost his flagging approval ratings. This article highlights exactly what the Japanese leader hopes to achieve and assesses his prospects of success. Particular emphasis is placed on the proposed joint economic activities on the disputed islands and the specific legal obstacles that need to be overcome.
Yulmaz, Serafettin, and Olga Daksueva
Abstract: In this article, we examine the energy nexus in China–Russia strategic relations. We find that, over the past few years, the two countries have taken concrete steps to reinforce partnership in other strategic issue areas. Energy, in this respect, has been utilized as an effective policy instrument to deal with immediate challenges such as the Ukrainian crisis and the South China Sea disputes. We argue that cooperation in energy helps the two countries adopt common positions toward non-energy related issues and facilitate long-term deeper interaction. We thus maintain that energy will occupy an increasingly central position as China and Russia continue to seek to align their strategies more comprehensively against the backdrop of the evolving geopolitical environment by working to overcome existing disagreements and exploring new areas of cooperation.
Lee, Junghoon
Abstract: Multilateral approaches such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, the Four-Party and Six-Party Talks, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (established by the USA, Japan, and South Korea to solve North Korea’s issues and to build a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula) have achieved few accomplishments since the Cold War. Exceptions include the avoidance of deadly clashes during ongoing multilateral talks at the time of serious situations including the nuclear crisis in 1994 and the Bush administration’s attempt to strike on North Korea with nuclear weapons. The USA has hesitated to conduct kind military relationships with North Korea because they seem to strongly recognize the high risk associated with physical conflict. Additionally, the USA and its allies have experienced North Korea’s ability with nuclear weapons. Many which have attempted to target the USA during the later years of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Dealing with North Korea contributes to the knowledge of those involved in the Six-Party Talks regarding how to work with the USA and others. Are multilateral approaches still efficient under this situation? Even with a number of several types of proposals such as China’s recent dual-track approach or double suspension approach—also backed by Russia—there seems to be no certain attempt to collaborate on building a peaceful regime. This paper will examine why multilateral approaches to building a peaceful regime post Cold War on the Korean Peninsula have forwarded little to a contextual perspective of the changing regional circumstances.
