Publication Year: 2021
Russia, China, and the Concept of Indo-Pacific
DOI: 10.1177/1879366521999899
Abstract: The newly minted concept of the “Indo-Pacific Region” (IPR) is generally seen as a response by the United States and its allies to China’s growing influence in strategically important areas of the Pacific and Indian oceans. However, the view of IPR as a single (U.S.-led) anti-Beijing front is simplistic and misleading, obscuring a variety of approaches by the region’s states. New Delhi has a strong tradition of non-alignment, whereas Tokyo is more interested in rules that restrict unilateral actions not only by China but also by other regional players, including the United States. Australian business is very cautious about frictions in trade relations with China. Beijing views the growing military activity of the United States off its shores, including in the South China Sea, as a threat to regional stability. According to the authoritative Chinese sources, the Indo-Pacific strategy of Donald Trump is part of broader efforts to prevent China from becoming a dominant regional and global power. At the same time, the development of Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) understanding of the Indo-Pacific region is less of a concern to Beijing, as the South-East Asian countries interested in balancing China and the United States are unlikely to fully join the fight against the “authoritarian threat.” As for Russia, it unequivocally rejects the military/power-based U.S. version of the IPR concept and is more amenable to flexible versions promoted by other players, such as Tokyo’s multilateral vision for the Indo-Pacific Region. In the end, the final response of Russia and China to IPR will thus be determined not only by U.S. actions but also by the behavior of other regional powers.
Publication Year: 2021
India, Russia and the Indo-Pacific: A Search for Congruence
Abstract: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s recent uncharacteristic statement of “India being an object of the Western countries persistent, aggressive and devious policy” to “engage in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies” has reignited the debate on India and Russia’s increasingly divergent outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Lavrov at the 2020 Raisinia Dialogue had expressed confidence of India “being smart enough to understand” the Western “trap” of the Indo-Pacific and “not get into it”.
The tone, tenor and timing of Lavrov’s December 2020 statement insinuates Russia’s apprehensions of a fundamental shift in India’s foreign policy playbook which traditionally has placed a premium on strategic autonomy, with Russia as one of its key pillars.
These developments have the potential to cast a shadow on India-Russia bilateral ties. The pertinent question is whether New Delhi and Moscow can find common ground in the evolving geo-strategic construct.
Publication Year: 2021
Russia in the Indo-Pacific: New Approaches to Russian Foreign Policy
Abstract: This volume zones in on Russia’s relations with the Indo-Pacific region through the lens of theoretical pluralism, presenting alternatives to the mainstream Realist view of Russia as a major power using geopolitical strategies to establish itself.
Russia in the Indo-Pacific is an understudied topic that needs a fresh perspective. Contributors to this volume are based across Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the USA, drawing on a range of multinational perspectives and theoretical approaches encompassing realism and liberalism, constructivism and the English school of international relations. Reflecting a trend of internationalization in the Russian study of IR, such theoretical pluralism could facilitate Russian contributions to emerging global IR theory.
Russia in the Indo-Pacific contributes towards a more intelligible common discourse in the Indo-Pacific, of interest to students and scholars of Sino-Russian relations, Indo-Pacific international relations, and international relations theory. It will also be of interest to policymakers and general readers following foreign policy and economic trends in the Indo-Pacific who want to better understand Russia’s role.
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive analysis of other countries’ foreign policies towards Taiwan.
Description: The issue of Taiwan is the single most difficult factor in the relationship between China and the United States. Any cross-straits conflict between China and Taiwan is likely not only to pit the world’s two leading powers against each other, but also to suck in many other countries. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of other countries’ foreign policies towards Taiwan. It considers the position of the United States and key regional powers including Japan and South and North Korea, examines the attitude of Russia and other countries which support China on this issue, and discusses the surprising policies of some smaller countries, which have recognised Taiwan’s independence. The book also relates the overall picture to various international relations theories.
Find the full book on Routledge.
Abstract: In the late 1990s, a new generation of reactor designs evolved from existing designs was touted as solving the economic problems that led to the collapse of reactor ordering after the Chernobyl disaster. It was claimed these designs would be cheap and easy to build because they would be simpler and use passive safety, modular construction and standardisation. The US and UK governments were convinced by this and launched reactor construction programmes. However, 20 years on, the claims have proved false and the US and UK programmes are in disarray. The last hope for the nuclear industry appears to be that Chinese and Russian reactor vendors, with powerful support from their governments, will take over, providing reactors that are cheap but meet the safety standards required in Europe and North America. However, these vendors and their designs are largely unproven in open markets. There is also little evidence that their reactors will be cheap, there are concerns about quality and safety culture and there are national security concerns that may deter customers. New technologies, such as radical new ones, Generation IV, and Small Modular Reactors are unproven and, at best, a long way from commercial deployment. Full text available here.
Abstract: Since 2009, after a largely dormant period since the Chernobyl disaster, Russia, through Rosatom, has come to dominate the world reactor export market with a new design it claims achieves equivalent safety standards to the latest designs from other vendors. In this paper we examine the structure of the Russian nuclear industry and the technology offered and the political backing that has allowed it to achieve this dominance. We review construction and operation experience with new orders since Chernobyl. We then examine the status of the large number of orders Rosatom has won, the estimates of construction cost and how they compare with those of its competitors. We then examine whether Russia and Rosatom will have the financial and supply chain capability to fulfil more than a small proportion of its order book. Finally, we draw lessons for countries that have placed or are considering placing orders for Russian reactors. Full text available here.
Abstract: The paper deals with the formation of a list of critical facilities in Russia’s gas transportation system in terms of energy security, and the substantiation of potential ways to minimize the negative effects of emergency situations on operation of these facilities. To date the lists of critical facilities in the energy systems have been formed on the basis of the performance analysis of certain facilities. The paper addresses the problem of identification of such facilities depending on their impact on overall operability of the system. This is accomplished by analyzing the level of negative impact caused by termination or disturbance of operation of a certain facility on consumers. The analysis employs the software “Russia’s Oil and Gas” (“ROG”). The principles of identifying critical facilities in Russia’s gas transportation system are demonstrated, specific examples are shown, and potential ways to mitigate the negative impact of emergency situations at such facilities on gas consumers are formulated. Full text available here.
Abstract: The fight for hegemony in Central Asia has existed for ages. Strategically placed between two nuclear powers—Russia and China—and geopolitically located at the heart of Eurasia, Central Asia has always remained in global limelight. Even after the disintegration of the USSR, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia never waned down, instead emerged as a grand chessboard for regional and extra-regional player for the immense opportunities it has offered in the form of widely untapped natural resources and geostrategic leverages. Importantly, it has emerged as the latest geological landscape for the energy crunch countries as potentially new and non-OPEC source of oil and natural gas. In the quest for energy security and diversity of supply sources by the energy consumers, the heartland region has witnessed a new great game in the scramble for resources. This accentuated struggle for oil and energy in the region has further led to aggressive foreign policy formulations and strategic calculation by countries like the United States, China, European Union, Japan, Israel, Iran, Pakistan and India, to which many now call as the New Great Game for not just controlling but administering the energy resources of the region. The bottom line of the New Great Game unlike the previous version is essentially played out around petropolitics and pipeline diplomacy. It is in this context this research article makes a modest attempt to examine the energy factor in the geopolitics of Central Asia and tries to figure out the position of India in the epic quest for oil in the traditional bastion of Russia and the new grand chessboard of China and the United States. Full text available here.
Abstract: China and Russia issued a joint statement on 8 May 2015 outlining the main approaches to linking the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) projects. Both parties believe that to build the ‘Belt and Road’ project, it is necessary to use economic integration laws and actively enhance the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SOC) in stimulating regional economic cooperation, promoting construction of the SREB and linkage to and cooperation with the EAEU, creating a Free Trade Area (FTA) in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) and simultaneously begin creating a similar FTA among China, Russia and Central Asia to gradually stimulate interstate trade and promote regional economic development, actively developing—along with an improved model of energy cooperation—infrastructure and related industry and strengthening business contacts and jointly promoting construction of the SREB. Full text available here.
Abstract: The paper evaluates Russia’s increased naval presence in the Asian–Pacific region,
considering the naval interactions with China, India, Vietnam, the Philippines
etc., an important component of Russia’s national strategy and maritime policy
in the region. By strengthening cooperation with the navies of these countries in
different parts of the world, Moscow demonstrates its political preferences and
military capabilities by checking the combat readiness of its own Navy, as well as
modernizing its strategy and tactics, taking into account the modern experience of
combat operations among the other fleets. It then presents a valuable opportunity for
Russia to defend its national interests while remaining a non-aligned and predictable
actor. By analyzing the dynamics, metrics and substance of Russia’s naval activities,
the author tries to clarify the strategic goals of the Russian and other countries’
navies, and also to define some qualitative characteristics, such as the level of
interaction between the Russian Navy and each of its partners, operational tasks of
the exercises, etc. In addition, Russia’s joint maneuvers not only maintain its status
as a great maritime power and raises its international authority but also may serve as
a balancing factor for the U.S. and Chinese navies to improve the security situation
in the Asia–Pacific. Full text available here.
Abstract: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear
proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This
paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the
UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these
assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective
security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions.
Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being
publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the
security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is
more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective
assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance
of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with
China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its
obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK
and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of
regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent
the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. Full text available here.
Abstract: In light of a second Kim–Trump summit this article reviews the posture of
Russia and China and suggests that not only do they have an alliance but that it
also includes to some degree North Korea. Moscow and Beijing have endorsed
Pyongyang’s negotiating posture and much evidence suggests a Russo–Chinese
alliance, albeit an informal one. Such an alliance possesses immense implications
for the ongoing efforts to find a negotiated path out of the Korean nuclearization
crisis and for regional security in general. But in the meantime the advent of such
an alliance imparts a quality of regional bipolarity to the Northeast Asian security
agenda that could obstruct further progress towards peace. Full text available here.
Abstract: This research discusses why Japan’s “Basic Defense Force Concept” adopted earlier was maintained amidst the widely-discussed demise of détente and the arrival of the “Second Cold War” between the United States and the Soviet Union entering the 1980s. From the perspective that perceives the Basic Defense Force Concept as a “beyond-the-threat theory,” the defense controversies that unfolded during the Second Cold War were waged between the Basic Defense Force Concept and criticisms of the Basic Defense Force Concept resembling the “counter-threat theory” based on the increasing threat recognition. As a result, the Basic Defense Force Concept was not abandoned, which probably might finish with the victory of the Basic Defense Force Concept against the “counter-threat theory.” However, that was actually not the case. The Basic Defense Force Concept began to coexist with the “Idea of Defense Force Reinforcement,” a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept that took prominence during the Second Cold War, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Early Achievement” and the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Change,” considered to be a competing theory to the Basic Defense Force Concept as well, due to the “Idea of Attached Table Revision and Concept Continuation.” Full text available here.
Abstract: The Chinese government actively engages in infrastructure diplomacy, with the state financing and constructing capital goods multilaterally under the Belt and Road Initiative and bilaterally in countries like Russia. There, Chinese infrastructure diplomacy is making inroads, especially in Russia’s transportation and energy sectors. New bridges and pipelines will soon link the two countries across the Amur River border. While some scholars see infrastructure diplomacy as dependent on bilateral relations, we argue that the type, location and scale of a project also affect its implementation. By analyzing government documents and media reports, we consider Chinese infrastructure projects in Russia across two categories – energy and transportation – and two locations – cross-border and interior – to answer three questions. First, what distinguishes bilateral cooperation in transportation infrastructure from bilateral cooperation in energy infrastructure? Second, how does cooperation on cross-border projects differ from projects located wholly within the recipient country’s territory? Third, what is the significance of the imagined scale of a project for its realization? We conclude that energy projects in a country’s interior are more likely to succeed than cross-border transportation projects. This finding suggests Chinese efforts to enhance infrastructural and “people-to-people” ties in cross-border locations may prove problematic. Full text available here.
Abstract: This paper draws on the notion of “geopolitical culture” as a conceptual tool for understanding debates over the formulation of foreign policy in contemporary Russia. To draw out the value of this concept, the paper explores the symbolism of territory as a means for restoring Russia’s status, respect, and power. However, in contrast to previous studies, it traces the ways in which a concession of territory has been promoted as a device for achieving Russia’s great power ambitions. More broadly, the paper seeks to stimulate a wider debate on reconceptualizing the relationship between territory and identity in Russia, at the same time as it places Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands at the heart of debates on the spatial imaginaries of the Russian homeland. By drawing on and advancing recent theoretical innovations in critical geopolitics, and recognizing the significance of the discourse of nationalism within these framings, the paper explores the nuanced and multiple story lines that constitute Russia’s geopolitical culture. Through this approach, intriguing and complex plot lines and unexpected twists are revealed, which have at times been obscured by nationalist-territorial-revanchist narratives on Putin’s Russia. It is suggested that such approaches can also provide insights for interpreting cases and contexts beyond Russia and Eurasia. Full text available here.
