Publication Year: 2019
India’s Persian desire – analysing India’s maritime trade strategy vis-à-vis the Port of Chabahar
Abstract: Since the turn of the century, India has seen itself as the dominant maritime power in South Asia and has aspired to project this power across the Indian Ocean Region. The principle of a “net security provider” has, thus far, been most applicable in South Asia and around its littorals, but it is West Asia that will really test India’s diplomatic and maritime capabilities over the course of the coming years. West Asia has a complex structure of diplomatic and strategic intricacies, that India has to manoeuvre through, in order to achieve its interests. Adding to this, India has had to adopt a careful balancing act juggling its West Asian interests with those that it has elsewhere. The roles of trade, strategy, and ideology have never been as intertwined as they are in the contemporary age, and this region and the challenges it poses is the most complex weave India that is likely to face as it pushes forward into a new age of international relations. This paper addresses the bilateral realities of India and Iran in the context of India’s maritime strategy, and the geostrategies of other regional players such as China and Pakistan. Full text available here.
Preview: India-Pakistan-China relations determine South Asia’s strategic stability. Recent Events and disputes have heightened regional tensions, and have drawn the world’s attention on the region’s potential for conflict. The fact that all three nuclear weapon states have long-standing border disputes has been used by the non-proliferation lobbies to consistently highlight South Asia as a nuclear flash point. The intractable Kashmir dispute continues to be cited as the potential trigger for any nuclear escalation. These concerns were brought to the foreas the world witnessed the two nuclear armed adversaries fight it out on the Himalayan heights of Kargil in May 1999. While India fought the war firmly, and displayed significant escalation control and management of international opinion, it must be acknowledged that both countries kept the conflict below the nuclear threshold, thus questioning the nuclear flash point theory. Full text available here.
Abstract: This paper highlights China’s views regarding CPEC and argues that stakes are very high for China in CPEC, and it is a project that must succeed if BRI is to go down in history as a success. However, CPEC’s success cannot be ensured without responding to the security challenge present in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which has the potential to jeopardise the CPEC and as a result the entire BRI. Hence, China is required to engage with both Pakistan and Afghanistan to ensure the long-term security of the CPEC. Building of CPEC and its further extension leaves India with limited options but augmenting economic, political and security concerns. Full text available here.
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a rise in China’s profile in South Asia. It is no surprise that Chinese experts have used terms, such as ‘new springtime’ in China–South Asia relations, ‘rediscovery of the strategic status of South Asia’ and ‘most relevant region with regard to the rise of China’. The objective of this article is to examine the nature and drivers of China’s South Asia policy, especially under the leadership of Xi Jinping vis-à-vis China’s policy towards the region in the past. It is not sufficient to only examine international factors or foreign and security policy in the context of the neighbouring region, such as South Asia. China’s ‘domestic periphery’ presents a significant threat to its national security. These areas are linked to neighbouring countries of South Asia and Central Asia. The announcement by Chinese President Xi Jinping of a ‘New Era’ or ‘third era’ in the history of Communist Party of China (CPC) represents a China which is known for its dictum ‘striving for achievement’ (fenfa youwei). This is different from the second era’s policy of ‘keeping a low profile and biding the time’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping. Of course, the name of Mao Zedong is synonymous with the first era beginning from 1949. Full text available here.
Abstract: This article assesses China–Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the period 2014–2018 and asks whether China has exercised distinct pressure on Pakistan to be a more constructive partner for Afghanistan. A central argument is that even as China has failed to alter Pakistan’s policies significantly in the short term it is still continuing to successfully build power and trust in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as with their neighbours to the north and west. This bodes well for China’s exercise of regional leadership in a long-term perspective. Full text available here.
Abstract: This study analyzes the debate on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program among
the Pakistani elites, who include scientists, strategists and politicians. The study
examines the nuclear doctrine that emerges from this, as well as the likely ways in
which it can impact peace and stability on the Indian subcontinent. It also underlines
the possible influence of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine on the nuclear doctrine of
other “unrecognized” emerging nuclear weapon states such as North Korea. After its
creation and independence in August 1947, Pakistan’s elites considered survival to
be the primary national strategic objective of the country in the harsh international
environment, especially with regards to India. This understanding shaped Pakistan’s
security policy in the early years, post August 1947. The three wars Pakistan
fought with India proved that the collective security policy and the anti-nuclear
weapons advocacy by Pakistani defensive realists was not the best strategy in the
prevailing security environment. In this backdrop, the Multan meeting in January
1972 initiated a fierce debate on whether a nuclear weapons program was the
best strategy for ensuring national security. The participants included defensive
realists, offensive realists, liberals and separatists. The offensive realists won the
debate, shaped Pakistan’s nuclear policy, and initiated its nuclear weapons program.
Separatists here refer to the sub-nationalist forces that seek political separation from
Pakistan. Full text available here.
Abstract: It is always a risky affair, especially for a weak state to strike the right balance while dealing with two great powers having serious conflicting interests in a particular region. For a country like Pakistan which remains dependent on foreign aid, running an independent foreign policy seems quite difficult. While Pakistan’s relations with China continued to remain smooth throughout history, its relations with the United States has been more of a roller coaster than a smooth ride but still both could never be too apart from each other because of various compelling reasons. Currently, China and Pakistan are extensively engaged in promoting their mutual economic and strategic interests that go against the U.S. interests. Therefore, in the case of a possible conflict between the United States and China, Pakistan might be trapped in a catch-22 because it cannot afford to infuriate the United States beyond certain limits. In such a trap, staying neutral might be even riskier. Slow and steady change in the status of Gilgit–Baltistan beyond a certain level for promotion of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would also be a serious trap. Pakistan could afford to lose economic benefits of the CPEC but it cannot afford to give up its claim over Kashmir which remains the “lifeline” for its survival. Pakistani Generals fighting on exterior fronts must therefore, make smart moves to ensure that at no stage should Islamabad be compelled to put all its eggs in one basket. Full text available here.
Abstract: The Sino-Pakistani relationship illustrates a truly relational identity. It involves two relational selves constituting each other, and the formation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) independently constituting each of them. Both the study and the presentation of this relational identity are only possible under an epistemology of relationality, as opposed to the epistemology of the self-interested actor. The article enlists the anthropological notion of post-Chineseness, which typologises relationality in accordance with how Pakistan and China identify each other in their strategic choice of relationship. It finds that China has moved from its expectations of Pakistan as being an owner of physical Chineseness, through hybrid Chineseness, and ultimately progressing to moral Chineseness under the CPEC. By contrast, Pakistan’s self-positioning vis-à-vis China has shifted from the ownership of physical Chineseness, via experiential Chineseness, to moral Chineseness. Among them, experiential Chineseness is the most relevant element in explaining the changing bilateral relationships under the epistemology of relationality. It is the spontaneous rise of intimacy, or friendship, made possible by the long-term process of a collegial working relationship. Full text available here.
Abstract: Intended as a pilot flagship project under the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has received relatively positive responses from actors in and outside the South Asian region. Islamabad, New Delhi, and Washington have offered their support to the project to varying degrees, because the financial commitments made by Beijing can help narrow the substantial funding gap for regional infrastructure connectivity. Nevertheless, enduring animosity and mistrust between India and Pakistan and growing strategic competition between Beijing and Washington present the biggest challenges to the project’s sustainable progress. Although the unfolding U.S.-China competition has not tangibly affected regional cooperation, as Washington’s enthusiasm for and investment in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) remain low compared with China’s down payment, the potential change in the balance of power in South Asia has triggered increasing concern from and collaboration between the United States and India. By highlighting the positive-sum logic of improved infrastructure interconnection as well as greater economic integration, and contributing to a more stable geopolitical environment in South Asia, Beijing can help alleviate the longstanding enmity between India and Pakistan and assuage Washington’s and New Delhi’s skepticism about its strategic intentions. Full text available here.
Abstract: The year 2015 marked the deadline for finishing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as the United Nations (UN) member states launched the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN 2030 Agenda encompassing 17 goals and 169 targets aims at eradicating global poverty, combating inequalities and utilizing natural resources in a sustainable manner so that “no one is left behind.” All stakeholders have committed to proceeding with the incomplete agenda of the MDGs and achieve the SDGs by 2030. Also in 2015, China initiated the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a collection of projects to develop energy, industry and communication infrastructure costing US$46 billion as a key part of the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).” This paper examines different components of the CPEC and explores the extensive convergence between the main goals envisioned under the CPEC and the universally accepted SDGs. It posits that if successfully implemented, the CPEC will contribute to achievement of various SDGs in Pakistan. While it is expected that the CPEC will enable the country to move forward on a number of SDGs, three goals are particularly relevant to the construction of the CPEC. The paper argues that there is immense potential for convergence, commonality, and division of labor for a host of bilateral and multilateral actors to enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development (SDG17), resolve political differences, participate in the CPEC, and contribute to the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda even beyond Pakistan in the broader South Asian region. Full text available here.
Abstract: South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world, with persistent India–Pakistan rivalry acting as a major stumbling block to regional cooperation through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Nonetheless, both India and Pakistan continue to experiment with multilateral arrangements and both became members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2017. While it is too early to predict the impact of the India–Pakistan rivalry on the SCO, dominant scholarship highlights the likelihood of a negative influence. This paper would like to present an alternative possibility – of the SCO providing opportunities for collaboration in the areas of security and counterterrorism, which in turn may positively influence Indo–Pak relations. Further, the likelihood of the Indo–Pak conflict negatively impacting the SCO is low primarily because, unlike SAARC, the SCO is led by China and Russia, who are actively invested in keeping the SCO influential to serve their key interest in challenging the dominant Western world order.
Abstract: Historically, India’s policy on Iran has been a balancing act between securing its interests as a counterweight to Pakistan, and ensuring its continued partnership with the US and other regional players. Yet confusion in India’s Iran policy became evident when Iran’s nuclear program began to draw international attention in the 1990s. More recently, India has attempted to reach out to Iran, reigniting trade relations and initiating new plans. Growing Indo- Iran relations are however a worrying sign for Islamabad, which is attempting a simultaneous expansion of ties with Tehran while continuing to resolve outstanding disputes. The central argument of this paper is that India’s relations with Iran are best understood through the prism of the intertwining of geo-economic and geopolitical considerations. Analysis has often separated these two factors, but there is evidence that a synergy exists — and that it is particularly visible when the Pakistani element is introduced. Often emphasising historical and cultural affinity, India and Pakistan have each sought politically and economically viable relations with Iran. Yet their bilateral political calculations and the current economic challenges have prompted a nuanced policy based on a careful balancing of geo-economics and geopolitics.
Preview: In this article, I argue that the Pakistan Army’s reluctance to use nuclear weapons in the past was neither caused by deterrence nor by a nuclear taboo. Rather, it has been a consequence of the military-utility principle that has served the Pakistan Army’s organizational interests. American scholars Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin Valentino explain that the military-utility principle is based on the “logic of consequences”: a decision is made by considering the objectives and the immediate efficacy of the weapon, strategy or tactic.Thus, the military-utility principle adheres to a relative, rather than absolute, degree of ethics, rationality and justice. In support of the morality argument, Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan write: “Strategists can imagine limited uses of nuclear weapons—a single detonation against a ship at sea or an isolated military target in the desert—that might meet stringent ethical and legal standards, but these are mostly imaginary scenarios, far removed from the real concerns of policy-makers and planners.” Based on this assertion, evaluating the use of nuclear weapons whether target selection is in cognizance with morality or ethical principles brings us closer to break the nuclear taboo.
Preview: Though Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons policy continues to remain ambiguous, it has been candid in admitting to have introduced tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), in spite of the concerns raised by the international nuclear non-proliferation community. Development of nuclear-capable short-range missile systems, rapid increase in production of fissile material for warheads, and the implementation of “full-spectrum deterrence” capture the importance that Pakistan now ascribes to TNWs in its national security calculus.
Preview: On January 9, 2017, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) announced that the country had successfully carried out the first-ever flight test of a nuclear-capable, submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM)—the Babur-3, a variant of the Babur-2 ground-launched cruise missile.With the introduction of the Babur-3, Pakistan seems headed toward adding a sea leg in the coming decade to complement a nuclear force structure that previously relied solely on land-based missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons.
