Abstract: This study aims to develop a strategy for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and to explore a desirable future of the United Nations Command (UNC) in the event that the Korean Peninsula peace treaty is signed. The study draws lessons learned from the inter–Korean dialogues and proposes a peace regime initiative consisting of North Korea denuclearization, transition of wartime operational control, a security regime in Northeast Asia and a peace treaty. There is a controversial debate regarding the dissolution or continuing presence of the UNC after a peace treaty. This article proposes the twenty nations involved to reorganize the UNC to consist of the UN Security Council P+5, the two Koreas, and thirteen nations as member states of the UNC in order to play a supervisory role in a peace treaty through the transformation of the Demilitarized Zone to a peace zone. The article makes a policy recommendation related to the UNC Reorganization Roadmap. The first phase is to consult with the United States on the future of the UNC after a peace treaty in the event of substantial progress of North Korea’s denuclearization. In addition, the ROK–U.S. should discuss and agree to the command relations between the future Combined Forces Command and the UNC in terms of armistice, wartime and contingency plans in the event of the transition of wartime operational control. The second phase is to recuperate the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) and consult with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the reorganization of the UNC for the Korean Peninsula peace treaty. The third phase is to reactivate the reorganized UNC in a supervisory role for a peace treaty. Full text available here.
Country or Region: North Korea
Zhang, Weiqi, and Dmitry Zinoviev
Abstract: How does the North Korean government view China? This study examines North Korea’s foreign policy on China by analyzing the strategic options of North Korean leaders and applying sentiment analysis to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reports about China. It is found that North Korea’s generally positive attitude toward China contains nuanced types of sentiments and that North Korean leaders have managed the expression of these sentiments in the media to achieve political goals at domestic and international levels. Our findings also suggest that, first, China may not be the key to the solution of the Korean nuclear issue. Second, Kim Jong Un was not a weak leader from the beginning of his rule. Rather he had acquired a substantial amount of authority before Kim Jong Il passed away. Based on our findings, an analysis of the future development of the North Korea–China relationship is also provided. Full text available here.
Woo, Seongji
Abstract: The foreign policy behavior of North Korea remains puzzling to many observers to date. This article aims to explain Pyongyang’s foreign behavior between 1995 and 2011 with a concept called the balance of dependence. Although it stood on the brink of collapse in the 1990s, the North Korean regime defied the odds and survived with the help of neighboring countries, namely South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. This article intends to explain Pyongyang’s foreign policy under Kim Jong Il by focusing on how it deliberately built a portfolio of dependence on its neighbors. I argue that North Korea’s foreign behavior had been attuned to the rise and fall of assistance from other nations. It sought to disperse its dependence among a host of potential sponsors in order not to be exclusively reliant on a single donor state, fearing restrictions on its political autonomy. As long as its neighbors are willing to help out, Pyongyang will continue to play one sponsor off the others while making progress with its nuclear and missile programs. Full text available here.
Tak, Sung Han
Abstract: In 2018, the Korean Peninsula has seen growing expectations of an era of peace due to the Inter–Korean Summit and the U.S.–DPRK Summit. Accordingly, the need for an accurate assessment of the size of the North Korean regular forces continues to grow in preparation for full-scale disarmament to include manpower reduction. However, researchers and institutions are coming up with different estimates in this respect. In 2016, the ROK Ministry of National Defense estimated the North Korean military to be 1.28 million strong. Also, Eberstadt and Banister believed the North Korean military end strength in the 1980s was 1.25 million, whereas Lee Suk in 2008 assessed the number to be in the range of 1.04 to 1.16 million.
To estimate the end strength of the North Korean regular forces, this research used the ROK military’s personnel data to build a model for estimating the size of the ROK military. The model multiplied the number of annual draftees by 21 months (1.7 years), after which those discharged early were excluded. The consequent estimate proved to be highly accurate, with its margin of error at ±2 percent. Based upon this basic model, this research multiplied the number of annual draftees in North Korea by the number of years in service (10 years), after which those promoted to officers and those discharged early were excluded. The resulting number was the estimated end strength of the North Korean military.
This research assesses the size of the North Korean regular forces to be 1.05 million (or in the range of 0.99–1.11 million) servicemen in 2018. Therefore, previous assessments (Eberstadt and Banister, Lee Suk, ROK Ministry of National Defense) seem to have produced overestimates. In the future, the end strength of the North Korean regular forces is likely to decline to 0.87 million until 2031 due to the decreasing size of the North Korean population. The North Korean government is also likely to make efforts to maintain its military end strength by increasing draft rates or the number of women serving in the military. However, if North Korea pushes too long and too hard in its effort to maintain its military end strength, it may face significant socio-economic problems. Therefore, the two Koreas will both benefit by continuing the momentum for peace and reconciliation, as reducing the military end strength on both sides of the border will mitigate. Full text available here.
Hastings, Justin V., Haneol Lee, and Robert Kelley
Abstract: North Korea claims to have detonated a hydrogen bomb twice as of 2017. While any North Korean claim should be greeted with skepticism, it is important to assess whether North Korea actually has the technical capacity to deliver on its claims. If North Korea believes that it has the capacity to build a hydrogen bomb, this is likely to color its behavior and its negotiating strategy with the United States and other countries. Using new data about research subject areas and co-authoring networks taken from North Korean academic journals, we can gain entrée into the opaque North Korean scientific establishment, and the progress (or lack thereof) it has made in processes related to the development of different types of nuclear weapons. We argue that a core group in North Korea has long had an interest in scientific research on lithium industrial processes that would be relevant to hydrogen bombs, although with detours. This interest has been ongoing since the mid-1990s, and peaked several years before North Korea’s first claimed hydrogen bomb test. Based on this assessment, it is within North Korea’s capability to produce a boosted fission device, and possibly a two–stage thermonuclear device. As a result, we conclude that North Korea is likely not bluffing when it says that its nuclear program has reached maturity. Full text available here.
Lee, Choongkoo
Abstract: To North Korea, the denuclearization plan of the Korean Peninsula is the first of its reactions to the American nuclear issue, and a regional ban on nuclear weapons that the country concerned can propose in order to deal with the regional nuclear issue. North Korea had already shown an interest in the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in 1954; however, it began to assert the establishment of a NWFZ in the Korean Peninsula by applying the concept to their security environment in 1976, in which it started its activities as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.
The implementation of North Korea’s denuclearization policy on the Korean Peninsula unfolded in 1986, as North Korea authorized its plan for the denuclearization of the Peninsula as an immediate objective of its diplomatic activities. That is, North Korea pursued the establishment of a denuclearized zone on the Peninsula with the goal of managing its relationship with the Soviet Union and strengthening diplomacy of the Non-Aligned in 1986. Even though North Korea’s traditional claim for denuclearization of the Peninsula no longer served as an immediate task after 1994, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis was resolved, it re-emerged at the policy-level due to the 9.19 Joint Statement in 2005. Such re-authorization as party discourses was influenced by the engagement of the United States and South Korea, and active persuasion by China. It is noted that the denuclearization policy for the Korean Peninsula was re-authorized as party discourses of North Korea even after their declaration of nuclear–state status.
Though this assertion towards denuclearization of the Peninsula remained as party discourses even after the suspension of the Six–Party Talks, it is yet unclear whether their willingness to pursue this policy has once again been reinforced at the higher levels amid the recent situation of the inter–Korean and U.S.–North Korea dialogues. It is inevitable that the diplomatic solution for the North Korean nuclear issue shall begin by reinforcing the denuclearization argument in North Korea. It is time to draw the international community’s coordinated engagement to make North Korea choose denuclearization more clearly. Full text available here.
Ohm, Tae-am
Abstract: The Republic of Korea, now more than ever, faces more security challenges, strategic dilemmas, and policy tasks. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, after consolidating his power base internally and with his nuclear and ICBM programs completed, has begun negotiations with President Donald Trump of the United States to guarantee his regime security. Although a reconciliatory atmosphere within inter–Korean relations continues cautiously after the PyeongChang Winter Olympics and the Panmunjom Inter–Korean Summit, many issues remain before tensions disappear from the Korean Peninsula. The U.S.–DPRK Summit in Singapore resulted in an overall direction of “efforts” to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem. However, Korean people, well aware of North Korean behavior in the past, are in no hurry to predict its resolution. The trade war between the United States and China, being a global power struggle at its core, might become fiercer until it reaches climax. The Trump administration has ended sequestration—a legacy from the Obama administration—and significantly increased its defense budget, while slashing foreign aid and demanding that major allies, such as NATO member states and the ROK, take on a bigger burden of shared defense costs. The United States seeks to cement its superpower status for the future. China is undertaking some countermeasures, i.e., continued defense investments; a second sea trial for its aircraft carrier, which is a part of a wider program to acquire ten aircraft carriers by 2049; building military bases on artificial islands in the South China Sea; strengthening its economic and military partnership with Russia; and dramatically expanding its cyber forces. As the growth of Chinese military power has become a concern for countries in the region, the ROK confronts a particularly notable strategic dilemma. This is because inter–Korean relations, the ROK–U.S. alliance, and ROK–China relations are intricately overlapping in all areas. For the ROK, the security alliance with the United States continues to be a critical security asset. Full text available here.
Wang, Hui
Abstract: The appearance of nuclear weapons has posed unprecedented threats of war to mankind. With joint efforts of the international community, a series of international norms and arrangements have been gradually established, mainly involving nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, as well as non-proliferation of nuclear arms ,effectively influencing nuclear activities among sovereign states, warding off the outbreak of nuclear war, and limiting the number of nuclear states. Since the beginning of the 21st century ,the international strategic environment has undergone major changes. Mankind has entered a new age when nuclear and missile technologies have been proliferated in an accelerated way, with Iran’ s nuclear capability steadily growing, the DPRK obtaining nuclear weapons by successfully breaching the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and non-state actors becoming the major subjects to proliferate nuclear technology and nuclear materials. Since coming into office, Trump has thoroughly negated the policy proposition of a nuclear-free world advocated by Obama, insisting on building a powerful missile defense system, developing new forms of strategic weapons, producing low-yield nuclear warheads, and withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear agreement. Trump’ s policy adjustment has much weakened the nuclear taboo and the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has initiated a new round in the race toward cutting edge nuclear weapons technology, thus undermining strategic stability among major powers, all highlighting historic limitations of the international nuclear order. Full text available here.
Li, Jun
Abstract: Actively taking the opportunity of participating in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympic Games held last February, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a fierce diplomatic offensive: in March,Kim Jong-un,Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party,paid a visit to China; in April, the DPRK-ROK summit was held;and the DPRK and the US also announced that they would hold a summit in early June.Kim Jong-un has made positive moves, particularly on the nuclear issue:when visiting China, he affirmed that the DPRK would remain committed to denuclearization of the peninsula; at the Third Plenary Session of the 7th National Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, he announced the termination of nuclear testing and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches, as well as the abjuration of the nuclear testing site in the north; and later on, he affirmed with Moon Jae-in, President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), that the common goal of a nuclear free peninsula would be realized through denuclearization. This series of diplomatic moves by the DPRK has taken the world by surprise. The DPRK government’s motivations are both internal and external.In their attempts to preserve and deepen the hard-won peace, and make it a true turning point in their history, the DPRK is obviously faced with multiple challenges, and a lot of work has to be done on the nuclear issue in particular. Full text available here.
Lin, Limin
Abstract: Out of concern over nuclear weapons proliferation, the worry over DPRK nuclear testing is overwrought. The author sees the situation from the viewpoint of a geopolitical game in a non-proliferation mask. To attempt a geopolitical game using non-proliferation is wrongly directed,but this is the main reason the issue fluctuates and deadlocks occasionally. To solve the situation once and for all, the international community needs to recognize its geopolitical nature and cure the problem accordingly. Since DPRK leader Kim Jong-Un crossed the border April 27 to meet South Korean President Moon Jae-in, the destiny of the Korean Peninsula is, as it should be, in the hands of the Koreans, not Chinese or Americans. Full text available here.
Li, Jun
Abstract: In 2017, the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula has been marked by ongoing crises.However,the situation is one of conflict without complete break. There is neither dialog nor mitigation in the overall situation,nor is there strong condemnation leading to the military conflict. However, with increasingly fierce competition among countries related to the Korean Peninsula, uncertainty and complexity becomes increasingly obvious. Full text available here.
Lee, Inyeop
Abstract: Why has North Korea been unable to implement serious economic reforms like those of China? By tracing the process of economic reform in China, this paper argues that the improvement of national security, especially as a result of diplomatic normalization with the United States, was an essential precondition for successful economic reform and growth. It reduced the fear of an open‐door policy and eased domestic control as well as reallocation of resources from the military to economic development. Furthermore, diplomatic normalization with the United States lifted economic sanctions, and allowed access to global markets, foreign direct investments, and membership in major international economic organizations. However, North Korea has technically been at war with the United States for the last 66 years. Therefore, it maintains very tight control of its population and spends a substantial portion of its GDP on the military. It has also been under severe economic sanctions and does not have access to the global economy. The possibility of any meaningful economic reforms in North Korea will depend on its success in improving national security by resolving the nuclear issue and normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States.
Cao, Wei, and Qian Liu
Abstract: This article challenges the stereotype that North Korea’s foreign policy is difficult to predict and thus can only be subjected to ex post study. Based on the naive Bayesian method, we establish a short‐term prediction model for North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests using international news reports from North Korean media between 2006 and 2018 as a dataset. The test results show that the overall accuracy rate of the model’s predictions of North Korean historical activity is greater than 80%, and its robustness is strong. To solve the problem of relatively delayed data collection, we use the Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (SARIMA) time series analysis method to simulate the values of feature sets. The estimated data are statistically reliable, and the prediction accuracy is high. This study proves that although the DPRK is extremely closed, it is possible to make relatively accurate predictions of its behavior using appropriate methods. The modeling approach in this paper can provide inspiration for developing general approaches to national behavior prediction.
Ko, Sangtu
Abstract: The North Korean nuclear problem has remained unsolved for 25 years. A variety of approaches can be used to resolve the problem, ranging from economic incentives to dialogues, sanctions, and military strikes, but sanctions appear to be the most plausible solution as a realistic method. Still, the question remains how to make sanctions against North Korea more effective. This article focuses on a regional approach to international cooperation and suggests that a regional security arrangement should be established in Northeast Asia to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Today, the international order is undergoing change. Globalization is in retreat. Under these circumstances, international problems seem to be solved most effectively through regional cooperation. Northeast Asia has no significant regional cooperation arrangements. A successful regional cooperation requires two elements. First, the South Korean government needs to utilize the North Korean nuclear problem, redefining it as a threat to regional peace; such a shift in threat recognition would elevate the importance of a regional solution. Second, the process of building a regional arrangement needs institutionalization. The existing regional dialogues can hardly help solve the nuclear problem. In this sense, it is necessary to recalibrate the Six‐Party Talks as an institution implementing sanctions as resolutions adopted in the UN Security Council.
Weede, Erich
Abstract: Twenty years from now, the Chinese economy might be twice as large as that of the United States. Since great powers have always claimed spheres of influence, this raises the issue of what characteristics a Chinese sphere of influence might have. Currently, the Chinese sphere of influence is still rather fuzzy. But one might argue that North Korea is part of it. After all, the Chinese fought the Korean War in order to prevent all of Korea becoming part of the US sphere of influence. If one accepts that North Korea is part of the Chinese sphere of influence, then Kim Jong‐un’s nuclear weapons should become a Chinese concern instead of a US concern. If China wants a nuclear weapons power next door, and a joint missile defense effort by the United States, Japan, and South Korea because of it so be it. If China understands its national interest, as great powers have historically done, then it could undermine the North Korean regime more effectively than the United States could at much lower risks of escalation to a great war. Whereas the United States hesitates to recognize that North Korea is and should remain part of the Chinese sphere of influence, its economic sanctions against Russia risk driving Russia into China’s arms. Focusing on the incipient rivalry between China and the United States for global primacy does in no way imply advocacy of a hawkish US policy towards China. In the nuclear age, peace between rival powers should depend on two pillars: nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence, or “peace by fear” and “peace by trade.
