Publication Year: 2020
Allied Decoupling in an Era of US–China Strategic Competition
DOI: 10.1093/cjip/poaa014
Abstract: The turn towards an openly competitive relationship between the United States and China today carries acute consequences for U.S. policy toward North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) and South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK). The military and economic requirements of enacting such a policy of competition with China complicates U.S. policy with its ally South Korea, as it exacerbates three core dilemmas that the ROK contends with regarding China. These dilemmas compel choices for a U.S. ally that must increasingly become zero-sum in nature where Seoul must make choices that alienate its patron ally or its neighbor. This article draws out propositions for how changes in U.S.-China relations impacts strategy on both sides of the Korean peninsula. The primary finding is that changes in the independent variable (U.S.-China relations) have opposing impacts on South Korean and North Korean strategic thinking (dependent variable). What might be considered opportunities afforded by U.S.-China relations to South Korea are seen as threats by North Korea. Conversely opportunities created by U.S.-China relations for North Korea register as threats for South Korea.
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive analysis of other countries’ foreign policies towards Taiwan.
Description: The issue of Taiwan is the single most difficult factor in the relationship between China and the United States. Any cross-straits conflict between China and Taiwan is likely not only to pit the world’s two leading powers against each other, but also to suck in many other countries. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of other countries’ foreign policies towards Taiwan. It considers the position of the United States and key regional powers including Japan and South and North Korea, examines the attitude of Russia and other countries which support China on this issue, and discusses the surprising policies of some smaller countries, which have recognised Taiwan’s independence. The book also relates the overall picture to various international relations theories.
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Abstract: Measures to ease tensions and prevent military conflicts adjacent to the Korean Peninsula Northern Limit Line (NLL) are an integral part of the ongoing reconciliatory efforts between the South and the North. Despite controversies over the validity of the NLL, it has served as a de facto maritime demarcation line in the absence of an agreed-upon maritime demarcation line under the Armistice Agreement. North Korea has persistently attempted to invalidate the NLL, while South Korea has supported the status quo of the NLL as a military demarcation line. The South and North have recently created a buffer zone across the NLL in the West Sea amid talks for North Korea’s denuclearization. Full text available here.
Abstract: North Korea’s military strategy can be difficult to decipher, but it should not be regarded as irrational or insignificant. Over the past decade, the North Korean regime has taken deliberate steps to increase its asymmetric military capabilities, giving credence to the argument that North Korea is engaging in offensive posturing, not simply defensive buildup. Full text available here.
Abstract: The years 2017–2019 have been remarkable in the long stand-off with North Korea,
as much for the drama of war-threats and then summits, as for the durability of the
North Korean status quo. Indeed, given all the sturm-und-drang of both hawkish
and then dovish approaches to North Korea since 2017, the greatest surprise is how
little both alternatives have accomplished ‘on the ground.’ This essay investigates
surprise—why is the North Korean status quo so persistent? Specifically, why
have the hawkish and dovish deviations from the status quo since 2017 so failed
to change much? Several hypotheses derived from levels of analysis theory in
international relations are suggested. In brief, a leader level analysis would focus
particularly on Trump’s personality—his swings of interest, his personalistic
bargaining style, his sloth, his chaotic staffing. A domestic analysis would identify
the divisions within both the United States and South Korea over policy toward
the North. And a structural answer would posit the value of nuclear deterrence
as the cause particularly of Trump’s failure to budge Pyongyang. Because North
Korean intentions, particularly Kim’s psychological preferences, are only poorly
discernible, assigning causal weight to each hypothesis is quite difficult so long as
the North’s opacity persists. Hence this essay focuses on concept and hypothesis
development while nonetheless laying out what evidence there is. Full text available here.
Abstract: In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s case of nuclear
proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This
paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the
UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these
assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective
security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions.
Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being
publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the
security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state’s concerns is
more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective
assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance
of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with
China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its
obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK
and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of
regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent
the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. Full text available here.
Abstract: This research examines the international relations between North Korea (the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) and Iran in the context of their
shared perception of a threat from the United States. We discuss the conventional
idea of the international relationship—the enemy of my enemy is my ally—to
explain Pyongyang–Tehran relations, evaluate its past and current relations, and
offer policy suggestions for the recent denuclearization approach toward North
Korea and Iran. Using newly discovered archival resources and political records, we
challenge the conventional idea that the two states share the same threat perception
in a consistent manner and suggest the level of their military cooperation changes
depending on the approach from Washington and the international community. This
research provides a more exact picture of the international relations North Korea
and Iran since the 1980s and of the link between their shared threat perception and
denuclearization debates. Full text available here.
Abstract: The main goal of this article is to explain the American failure of deterring North
Korean nuclear proliferation. Specifically, it examines the underlying reasons for
which U.S. inhibition policy toward North Korea has failed, despite the numerous
attempts by U.S. administrations (both Republicans and Democrats) to prevent
North Korea’s nuclear development. The central thesis of the article is that while
there were multiple reasons for the American failure of North Korean proliferation,
the most important ones were U.S. misperceptions about both North Korea’s and
China’s intentions and U.S. distraction by the war on terror. These factors, along
with Pyongyang’s shrewd strategies to manipulate Washington, Seoul, and Beijing,
played a key role in the emergence of a nuclear North Korea. Full text available here.
Abstract: In light of a second Kim–Trump summit this article reviews the posture of
Russia and China and suggests that not only do they have an alliance but that it
also includes to some degree North Korea. Moscow and Beijing have endorsed
Pyongyang’s negotiating posture and much evidence suggests a Russo–Chinese
alliance, albeit an informal one. Such an alliance possesses immense implications
for the ongoing efforts to find a negotiated path out of the Korean nuclearization
crisis and for regional security in general. But in the meantime the advent of such
an alliance imparts a quality of regional bipolarity to the Northeast Asian security
agenda that could obstruct further progress towards peace. Full text available here.
Abstract: China’s North Korea policy is a combination of China’s strategic goal toward
regional order including U.S.–China relations and tactical management over North
Korea’s crisis action. Since the post–Cold War era, China has preferred the status
quo as its regional strategy, which leads them to operate tactical management
over North Korea risk. North Korea risk consists of uncertainty, which means
uncontrollability of North Korea, and instability, which means the possibility of
collapse of the North Korean regime. These risks often play as a crisis of China’s
status quo strategy, so China is inclined to implement its North Korea Policy
to control these crises. The basis of China’ North Korea policy is engagement,
considering that China has to protect North Korea’s conventional and geopolitical
values. However, the engagement comes in different forms according to the
characteristics of the crisis. The one is coercive engagement, which appears when
North Korea’s uncertainty prevails over instability. The other one is inclusive
engagement, which occurs when North Korea’s instability is stronger than
uncertainty. This hypothesis can be applied to past and current situations. With this
point of view, it is possible to predict the future of China’s North Korea policy. Full text available here.
Abstract: Tensions flared for a time after North Korea’s fifth and sixth nuclear tests as well as
THAAD’s entry into South Korea. This paper extends the view that the root cause
of these issues is the lack of regional public goods (RPGs) on the Korean Peninsula,
and its insufficiency results from three major conflicts in the politico–economic
situation of the Peninsula. In order to resolve the issues and maintain lasting peace,
three specific aspects, i.e., in diplomacy, security and economy, are to be addressed
in carrying out the long-term mission of supplying RPGs to the Peninsula. For
effective operation and comprehensive management of the RPGs provision, an
integration platform with powerful commitments is called for, i.e., “Association of
Trans-Korean Peninsula Nations” (ATKPN) co-established by China, the United
States, and the two Koreas. Apart from the dilemma commonly identified in the
delivery of RPGs, the ATKPN also faces dilemmas specifically from the Northeast
Asian order. To overcome the ATKPN’s obstacles, concerted efforts are needed to
promote the institutionalization of Sino–U.S. “new type of great power relations,”
to transform the function of the alliance system, and to cultivate the awareness of
“common external threats.” Full text available here.
Abstract: Despite the Hanoi Summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, there has been no positive sign that the North Korea nuclear problem is being resolved. To advance the denuclearization negotiations, a new approach to denuclearization must be considered, which needs to meet two objectives simultaneously: to relieve North Korea’s concerns about its regime change and to practically eliminate its nuclear capability to fabricate additional nuclear weapons and refurbish existing nuclear weapons. The new approach should consider infrastructures that would be indispensable in implementing North Korea’s denuclearization processes and stopping any attempt to proliferate North Korea’s nuclear materials and technologies amid denuclearization. Accordingly, this paper proposes a new roadmap whose key concept is to first disable and, then, gradually but completely dismantle the lynchpin nuclear facilities within 10 years. Here, lynchpin facilities are defined as key facilities that are directly related to the production of nuclear materials or other materials used when fabricating and refurbishing the key components of nuclear weapons or which would have a fatal impact on maintaining North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. Additionally, this roadmap addresses corresponding measures for denuclearization activities. This roadmap consists of three sub-periods: the lynchpin disablement period, verification and dismantling period, and manifest threat removal period. This paper also identifies and incorporates into the roadmap the supporting infrastructure and possible corresponding measures to accompany the denuclearization steps. Full text available here.
Abstract: Despite the media attention to North Korean missile launches and American shows of force in 2017, war was never a realistic possibility. Deterrence and the costs of war are far too high for either side to seriously contemplate using force to resolve the Korean Peninsula standoff. Deterrence will also continue to hold into the future, barring some unforeseen circumstances. In this case, when war is not an option, what do countries do? What role does soft power play in diplomacy? States resort to hard power rarely and with great caution, precisely because the stakes are so high. But just because countries are not going to war over an issue does not mean it is unimportant. In this sense, exploring how countries compete or engage in the push and pull of diplomacy below the threshold of hard and military power is a relatively understudied phenomenon. For North Korea, it is clear that a long-term strategy of focusing on diplomacy abroad and economic reforms at home is following a push to nuclearize. Only by understanding this emerging North Korean strategy can the United States and South Korea craft appropriate strategies for dealing with this intractable problem. Full text available here.
Abstract: This paper analyzes the background of the nuclear stalemate between Trump and Kim in the Hanoi Summit and investigates various issues involving North Korean denuclearization, including a detailed roadmap and proper compensation for Pyongyang. The paper uses tree cardinal perspectives of analytical tools (the will of the leader, nuclear capability, and nuclear strategy) to critically assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and fathom Kim Jong Un’s stance on denuclearization. The United States reaffirms CVID/FFVD principles regarding North Korea’s WMD, while Pyongyang prefers an action-for-action method of denuclearization. Although Pyongyang has announced an end to its nuclear testing and has shut down nuclear facilities, experts question whether Pyongyang really is dismantling its nuclear program. Pyongyang’s hidden nuclear facilities and accumulation of HEU in numerous places, the complicated process of verification, as well as potential traps in the details of the denuclearization agreement pose a big challenge. In light of the current nuclear stalemate, President Moon’s mediating effort to bring Kim Jong Un back to the denuclearization table is imperative. Full text available here.
Abstract: Prudent leaders must always contemplate the unintended consequences of their foreign policy successes, particularly when those secondary consequences create negative externalities. In this article, I look at whether the unintended consequence of the South Korean government’s push for a peace declaration on the Korean peninsula could create the conditions by which the United States, led by an impulsive American president, could withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. I first document the rationale behind the South Korean government’s approach to peace diplomacy with North Korea. I then examine the concept of the peace declaration, which is different from a ratifiable treaty, and the “catch-22” of this declaration as it relates to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, I analyze how a superficial peace declaration will not address core national security concerns of either ally, and how it could create unintended consequences with regard to troop drawdowns. This research features an original and unique dataset that documents Donald Trump’s transactional view of U.S. military commitments to its allies over the past three decades. Full text available here.
