Abstract: This article analyses the 2017 White Paper in its historical context: examining what it reveals about changes in the way the Turnbull government thinks about the international system and Australia’s role in it, and what it shows about continuities with the past.
Country or Region: Australia
Singh, Udai Bhanu
Abstract: Australia’s comprehensive strategic approach towards the Indo-Pacific region and a renewed interest in the Indian Ocean has served to rekindle its relationship with India. Australia’s recently released 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP 2016) demonstrates that a growing convergence in strategic approaches can be discerned as Australia looks West and India begins to ‘Act East’.
Satake, Tomohiko, and John Hemmings
Abstract: Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China’s economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers’ concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features.
Wallis, Joanne
Abstract: The term ‘arc of instability’ was first used in 1999 to describe the security challenges facing the South Pacific. It subsequently came to dominate Australian political discourse, although its veracity was critiqued. This article considers how Australia’s political discourse about the region has evolved since 1999 and what impact this has had on Australia’s relationships in the region. It begins by outlining why the arc of instability characterization emerged and how it contributed to the securitization of the South Pacific, which justified Australia’s policy of new interventionism in the region. It concludes by considering whether it might be time to recharacterize the region as an ‘arc of opportunity’. This recharacterization may shift the political discourse to focus on the South Pacific’s potential and opportunities, desecuritize Australia’s relationship with the region and diffuse concerns about continued Australian intervention by articulating a more cooperative approach.
Lockyer, Adam
Abstract: There is a growing consensus among defence planners that Australia is in need of a new defence policy that better suits the strategic realities of an emerging multipolar Asia. After assessing the implications of shifting regional power balances for Australia, this article advances the argument that Australia should redirect its attention back to its immediate north: the “Indo-Pacific Arc”. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have always been vitally important to Australia’s long-term security and, being the gateway between Indian and Pacific Oceans, their strategic value is set to dramatically increase in the multipolar Asia. Finally, this article develops the case for Australia to partner with its neighbors to stem the political and military influence of outside powers into the Indo-Pacific Arc.
Ranjan, Vishal
Abstract
The recent Australian decision to extend civilian nuclear cooperation to India, overriding its own long-term principled position, is no ordinary development. Taking that as a starting point, this article seeks to set out the context and rationale for an all-round and long-term closer relationship between the two countries. Arguing that such an Australian decision is not just a one-off gesture, but instead, it forms the basis for deeper strategic engagement, this article advances that the emergence of the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is part of a shared strategic vision between the two, with the Indian Ocean constituting the cornerstone of their common security policy. In view of India lately revisiting its fundamental foreign policy assumptions in an imaginative manner, the US ‘pivot’ coupled with the intermittent projection of a ‘democratic quadrangle’—also inclusive of Japan and the US—lends further gravitas to this growing bilateral dynamic.
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Park, Jae Jeok
Abstract
Security cooperation between South Korea and Australia has increased in recent years. What has been driving this increasingly enhanced security cooperation between the two states, which are about 7,500 km apart from each other? This article approaches the question from the angle of minilateral security cooperation, which has been growing in the Asia–Pacific. It is relatively easier to build minilateral security cooperation upon an existing bilateral alliance relationship or strategic partnership. This practice has been led in the Asia–Pacific by the United States, which has been maintaining the so-called hub-and-spoke alliance network and expanding its security interactions with non-allied states. It is in this vein that this article locates security cooperation between the two US allies, South Korea and Australia, in the larger context of the US-led minilateral security network in the Asia–Pacific. After observing that South Korea and Australia have been enhancing their security cooperation, the article looks into those states’ stances on the US attempt to facilitate security linkage among its Asia–Pacific allies. Then, the article examines the (un)desirability and (im)possibility of developing trilateral or quadrilateral security cooperation among South Korea, Australia, the United States and Japan. It claims that the expectation of a US-led minilateral security cooperation being developed is a key reason for the recent enhancement of bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Australia. Lastly, it discusses some issues to consider in further promoting South Korea–Australia security cooperation in the context of US-led minilateral security cooperation.
Phillips, Andrew, and Eric Hiariej
Abstract
Despite sharing many strategic interests, Indonesia and Australia have often struggled to forge effective security cooperation. In this article, the authors evaluate the ‘Bandung divide’ as a potential explanation for this difficulty. The ‘Bandung divide’ refers to the legacies of the 1955 Asian-African Conference, which saw Indonesia and Australia adopt different normative orientations towards the liberal international order, and divergent security strategies for South-East Asia. Having sketched the contours of the ‘Bandung divide’ and established its heuristic utility as a shorthand for the two countries’ divergent approaches to international order and regional security, the authors then evaluate its contemporary significance as a barrier to bilateral security cooperation in relation to two key challenges: Chinese revisionism in the South China Sea and transnational jihadist terrorism. Indonesia and Australia’s divergent approaches to regional security—themselves partially legacies of the ‘Bandung divide’—have prevented meaningful bilateral collaboration in engaging the South China Sea dispute. By contrast, the two countries have built an effective and heavily institutionalised counterterrorism partnership, proving that the ‘Bandung divide’ is not an insuperable barrier to cooperation. The highly restrictive circumstances that made this success possible nevertheless caution against unduly optimistic assumptions that the two countries will be able to forge a more comprehensive security partnership in the foreseeable future.
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Schreer, Benjamin
Abstract
In July 2014, Australia’s new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Shinzō Abe, elevated the status of bilateral ties to a ‘special strategic relationship’. Both sides also agreed on intensifying their defence technology cooperation, including in the submarine space. As well, Prime Minister Abbott called Australia a ‘strong ally’ of Japan. Yet, the prospect of a further strengthening of Australia–Japan defence relations has led to criticism by Australian strategic commentators. In particular, critics argue that closer strategic relations with Japan could damage Australia’s ties with a rising China. In a worst-case scenario, Australia might even become ‘entrapped’ in a Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this argues that a closer defence relationship is in Australia’s strategic interests in the face of China’s increasing challenge to the rules-based order in the region. China’s uncompromising position in the South China Sea and its more assertive behaviour have led to a greater congruence of threat and risk assessment between Australia and Japan. Indeed, Australia and Japan are increasingly facing a security dilemma vis-à-vis China, albeit to varying degrees. Therefore, for Australia, promoting Japan’s ‘security normalisation’ contributes to regional stability. As well, the article points out that closer strategic ties with Japan do not automatically come at the expense of Sino-Australia relations. China’s leverage to ‘punish’ Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour is limited, and concerns about ‘entrapment’ in a Sino-Japanese war are exaggerated. However, the more China exerts coercive diplomacy, the closer Australia–Japan defence relations are likely to become.
Satake, Tomohiko
Abstract
This article discusses how Japan and Australia could contribute to a liberal and inclusive order in the Asia-Pacific region. Critics argue that closer ties between Japan and Australia could undermine the stability of regional security, dividing Asia into ‘mutually hostile armed blocs’ consisting of US allies and China. Contrary to such a view, this article argues that deepening and enhancing Japan–Australia security cooperation could, if carefully managed, help to maintain an inclusive regional order based on institutions, norms and values, as well as a stable balance of power relations. In particular, the article contends that Japan and Australia can contribute to regional order by strengthening their ‘middle-power cooperation’ through regional capacity-building, institution-building, rule-making or norm-setting, and coalition-building, while supporting the US military presence in the region. It then concludes that, despite differing attitudes towards Beijing, Tokyo and Canberra can further contribute to the longevity of the current regional order by inclusive institutional architecture and liberal norms and values.
Rumley, Dennis
Abstract
This paper analyses two interrelated issues. The first is a description and discussion of Australian identity dilemmas and contested regionalisms as a backdrop to an understanding of Australia’s degree of engagement with regional security regimes. Throughout its post-colonial history Australia has been characterised according to three main geopolitical orientations – continental, geopolitical role and maritime. It is argued that Australia only came to fully realise its maritime orientation in policy terms towards the end of the Cold War period. The second issue in this paper evaluates arguments in favour of the need for an overall Indian Ocean Maritime Security Regime (IOMSR) and it is suggested that an inclusive model, built around energy security stakeholders, is much preferred from the viewpoint of long-term regional stability. This paper describes overall Indian Ocean (IO) regional security concerns and arrangements and then focuses on the nature of IOmaritime security and insecurity and the initiatives currently in place to deal with such issues. Five options for the creation of a new IOMSR are described and evaluated and Australia’s place within each of these is discussed.
Pollmann, M. Erika, and Alan Tidwell
Abstract
Australia, Japan and the USA are all facing dual pressures that require them to do more with less. Internationally, they deal with the challenge of managing China’s rapid rise. However, domestically, they must cut government spending and reduce government debt. With internal balancing effectively ruled out as a long-term solution, the three states are seeking ways to optimise external balancing, or cooperation with like-minded states. This article focuses on Australian motivations regarding the recent proposal for submarine cooperation with Japan, and places it in the context of longer trends that poise the USA, Australia and Japan for even greater trilateralism in the future. Australia’s proposal to buy submarines from Japan, should it go through, would cement Australia and Japan’s fledgling security relationship in steel and coin. For Australia, it would help it to overcome its undersea capability gap, and Japan could set a precedent to re-enter the global weapons market if all goes well. Furthermore, Australia can use defence-technology cooperation with Japan to signal to the USA the seriousness of its commitment to burden-share in pursuit of regional security and determination to politically support the USA’s ‘Pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific. However, domestic politics have begun to play an important role in Australia, with a ‘spill’ motion against Prime Minister Tony Abbott barely overcome by a backroom deal with the opposition to build the submarines domestically, and this is an important development to keep an eye on.
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Tyler, Melissa H. Conleym, and Aakriti Bhutoria
Abstract
Australia has a vital interest in preventing the Indian Ocean Region from becoming an arena of great power rivalry, including between India and China. The 2013 Defence White Paper clearly delineates the Indo-Pacific as an area of supreme importance to Australia. Developing a close strategic partnership with India is an important part of this strategy. However, there is a fundamental disconnect between Australian and Indian perceptions of the Indo-Pacific: on balance, Australia prefers to avoid being part of any formulation that could be seen as attempting to contain China and prefers an inclusive framework; by contrast, mainstream thinking in India has opposed the inclusion of China and is anxious about the growing visibility of China in the Indian Ocean Region. This means that Australia finds itself stuck in a cleft stick in managing China’s and India’s different views of the Indo-Pacific. This divergence in views leads to the potential for misunderstanding and conflict between Australian and Indian views.
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