Publication Year: 2022
US-China Strategic Competition and Converging Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2022.2088126
Abstract: The 21st century’s central economic nexus will be centred on the Indo-Pacific region. Simultaneously, the intensifying US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific is deepening. Regional middle powers must negotiate this competition to ensure their interests remain intact. This article applies a realist framework to analyse the strategic alignment of Australia, Japan, and India in response to the great power competition. It examines the strategy each middle power is pursuing to protect their interests and the motivations behind their approaches. It finds a convergence in middle power interests centred on maritime behaviour, adherence to international law, and investment in regional institutions.
Publication Year: 2022
Lawships or warships? Coast guards as agents of (in)stability in the Pacific and South and East China Sea
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2022.105048
Abstract: Do coast guards generally promote good governance in the maritime domain, and are they a means of preventing conflict escalation? Sam Bateman argued that the use of ‘white hulled’ coast guard vessels was fundamentally less provocative than deploying gray-painted warships in contested waters. Thus, the use of ‘lawships’ instead of ‘warships’ could serve to de-escalate tensions. He also saw them as better able to pursue ends of oceans governance than naval vessels, for a range of reasons including the need for specialization. Nonetheless, there has been increasing concern that some coast guards are becoming a tool of ‘gray zone’ tactics: efforts to alter the strategic status quo short of armed conflict. China is often portrayed as using the China Coast Guard in such a manner. By contrast, the Australian Pacific Patrol Boats program – which gifts coast guard patrol assets to partner States – is often portrayed as an unqualified good. This paper examines both case studies in light of the Bateman thesis to conclude that the China Coast Guard may be more of a tool for de-escalation, or at least containment of tensions, than is commonly conceded and that the most obvious benefits of the Australian Pacific Patrol Boats program may have a strategic dimension.
Publication Year: 2020
Why Quasi-Alliances Will Persist in the Indo-Pacific? The Fall and Rise of the Quad
DOI: 10.1177/2347797020962620
Abstract: The rise of and increasing assertiveness by China presents a significant structural challenge in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). In an effort to retain the status quo, a number of states have signed-up to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). In support of FOIP, operational mechanisms have emerged—most importantly the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). The United States, Japan, Australia and India have come together in this informal format to exchange views on current security challenges and coordinate their strategic approaches. This article analyses both form and function of Quad and argues that both the diplomatic and military arrangements between Quad members are a direct response to ever-increasing Chinese assertiveness. Alongside a detailed empirical analysis of Quad, this paper addresses the question why Quad 2.0 will thrive although previous attempts at security networks failed. Balance of threat theory will illuminate why informal quasi-alliances vis-à-vis China are going to be the structural new normal for the IPR.
Publication Year: 2022
Enhancing Democratic Partnership in the Indo-Pacific Region
Abstract: This study builds on a report CSIS published in 2020 on ways the United States can partner with allies and partners to enhance democratic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region. This follow-on effort includes case studies on the democracy support efforts of Australia, Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan; comparisons of democracy support strategies; data on official development assistance (ODA) funding related to democracy broadly defined; and recommendations for ways the United States can coordinate democracy support initiatives in the region with like-minded partners as well as regional networks and institutions.
Publication Year: 2021
India and Australia in Indo Pacific: Dynamics of Defence, Diplomacy and Diaspora
Abstract: As the India-Australia relationship upgrades from 3Cs of Cricket, Curry and Commonwealth to 3Ds of Defence, Diplomacy and Diaspora, the evolving dynamics of the relationship have a huge potential for both the countries. The opportunities provided by the 3Ds are immense and are having incremental, clear and conclusive repercussions for the relationship. Based on Defence, Diplomacy and Diaspora and supported by specifics, India and Australia in Indo-Pacific provides an insight into the interplay between the three Ds and attempts to lend a prognostication for the bilateral relationship.
Abstract: China’s unprecedented economic rise and its growing military profile have transformed the threat matrix for India. China is challenging India’s interests in its immediate neighbourhood in multiple ways. Managing strategic challenge from China, therefore, has become a topmost foreign policy priority for India. The article argues that given the structural constraints of New Delhi-Beijing rapprochement, there is an urgent need for India to step up quadrilateral security cooperation with the U.S., Japan and Australia. The revival of the Quad reflects this growing consensus. However, India’s hedging approach – simultaneously balancing and engaging with China – may be politically expedient in the short run, but not without long-term adverse consequences. Full text available here.
Abstract: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD, hereinafter referred to as Quad), which had come into existence in 2007, ceased following the resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the withdrawal of Australia during Kevin Rudd’s tenure as Prime Minister. However, on the side lines of the 2017 ASEAN Summit, the subject of a structure that would facilitate peace, stability and development in the Indo-Pacific region which, is supposedly under threat due to China’s assertive behaviour, came up for discussions once again between leaders of US, Japan, Australia and India. The revival of the Quad (colloquially termed as “Quad 2.0”), after a hiatus of nearly a decade was viewed with concern by the Chinese media, which termed the grouping as a possible first step towards the formation of an “Asian NATO”. The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, however was more dismissive, comparing the idea of reviving the Quad to “foam in the ocean, destined to dissipate soon”. Against the backdrop of a globalised and intertwined economy, where economic interdependence appears to be the norm in deciding national interests, this paper examines the likely future trajectory of this grouping and attempts to determine which of the two assessments is more plausible. Full text available here.
Abstract: In this Maritime Century, the notion of “sea blindness” is an interesting development. There is a perception that Australia has long experienced a “sea blindness”, where the sense of the sea and surroundings is not generally apparent in Australians]. However, reference to “sea blindness” is not restricted to Australia’s circumstance alone. Britain’s “dangerously weak Royal Navy” and reliance on sea traffic elicited the phrase in 2009 when Britain’s policy-makers were branded as suffering “sea blindness” an accusation substantiated in relation to the need for security, vulnerability to interruption of supply, and a weakened naval force structure. A nationwide survey of Seafarers UK in 2011, suggested that the British public had an alarming ignorance of the island’s dependence on the sea and that “sea blindness” was a “huge problem”. Yet in 2017 a further opinion poll conducted by the UK Chamber of shipping confirmed that “sea blindness is a myth”. Does “sea blindness” exist in the Australian circumstance? An intimate appreciation of the Australian LNG trade could provide a publicly visible appreciation of Australia’s strategic maritime circumstance in relation to other sovereign interests. Full text available here.
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify potential energy security risks and opportunities of new renewable energy (RE) export projects such as transnational solar generated electricity. An energy security framework/index is sought, to facilitate analysis; and which shows promise for application to other electricity/RE export projects. A review of energy security literature identifies Sovacool and Mukherjee’s (2011) [1] comprehensive index as most suitable to apply to a case study project (in its early feasibility stage). The project proposes to export solar-generated electricity from the Pilbara, Western Australia to Java, Indonesia. Additions to the chosen index are proposed, strengthening its scope regarding human security, geopolitical/foreign policy, and materials risks. Analysis identifies key potential risks and opportunities, and gaps in the project’s currently scarce analysis. The project’s primary risks may arise in the regulation and governance dimension. These include Australia’s stalled energy politics; required new business and regulatory frameworks; and the under-developed Australia-Indonesia trade relationship, partly due to historical cultural differences. Questions arise regarding price stability, affordability, access and equity for Indonesians; reliability and resilience risks; and environmental impacts. While potentially positive outcomes may arise for local (Indigenous) Australian communities, more analysis is needed on whether Australian investment in exports should prioritize (or equalize) large-scale electricity grid infrastructure and/or distributed energy systems, when considering impacts on Indonesian communities. Ultimately, the expanded index can inform development of new transnational renewable energy and electricity projects, and improve forward-thinking on risk management. Full text available here.
Description: In recent years the narrative surrounding China’s “peaceful rise” has given way to a more ominous story of friction, ambition, and great-power rivalry. As Chinese foreign policy has grown more nationalist and assertive, its intensifying competition with the U.S. has assumed center stage. The impact on China’s neighbors, by contrast, and their evolving responses, have received comparatively less attention.
The Realist theory of international relations suggests the rapid accumulation of power by one nation-state will prompt its neighbors and peers to adopt Balancing strategies. They will strive to enhance their internal defense capabilities and forge new external security partnerships to hedge against this potential new threat. Have these predictions rung true? Are key Indo-Pacific capitals Balancing, and drawing closer to the U.S. as insurance against Chinese aggression? Or is China a new breed of rising power, challenging traditional theories of international relations in a newly-globalized, economically interdependent world?
Abstract: The concept of the Indo-Pacific plays a role of growing importance in the way the world is coming to terms with China’s power and assertiveness. This concept serves two related purposes: an objective definition of an Asia-centric strategic and economic system, spanning a two-ocean region and replacing the late-twentieth-century idea of the Asia-Pacific, and the foundation for a strategy of incorporating and diluting Chinese power within a multipolar order reflecting respect for rules and equal sovereignty.1 No one country or strategic thinker can lay claim to the rapid emergence of this concept. In fact, the Indo-Pacific is not such a new idea, with precursors of pan-Asian maritime connectivity going back to pre-colonial times. Moreover, a sense of this revived regional construct emerged through a process of interaction among policy establishments and strategic thinkers in a number of nations, including Australia, India, Japan, the United States and Indonesia, in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. It is notable, however, that Australia has been the most prominent and active proponent of this concept. Australia was the first country to formally introduce the Indo-Pacific as the official definition of its strategic environment in 2013. This has consistently been reaffirmed since, and elaborated in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper that provides a vision for Australia’s international relations. It is fair to say that the Indo-Pacific is now bipartisan orthodoxy in Australia. A likely change to a Labor government in 2019 is unlikely to shift this perspective. Full text available here.
Abstract: There is a growing understanding among maritime security practitioners of the importance of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as an essential enabler of maritime security. This article describes Australia’s efforts to develop an integrated national MDA system that brings together data and intelligence from a range of military and civil agencies and commercial sources to which a risk-based assessment is applied. This has become an essential tool to combat transnational maritime security threats in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. But inherent limitations of national MDA systems are also pushing Australia and other countries to cooperate in trying to improve MDA. This paper then examines ways in which Australia can promote MDA cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It considers the effectiveness and limitations of current and proposed multilateral information sharing arrangements in the region. It concludes that Australia should primarily focus on working with selected Indian Ocean partners to enhance information sharing and help develop integrated national MDA systems. Full text available here.
Abstract: This paper will analyze why and how US-Japan-Australia security cooperation developed in the 2000s, mainly from the allied perspective (Japan and Australia). Existing literature notes that the United States aimed to form an alliance opposing China from the start of the 2000s by strengthening relationships with its allies. In contrast, Japan and Australia’s perception of China was different to that of the United States. This especially applied to Australia, geographically distant from China, which prioritized strengthening its relations with China through diplomacy and trade over direct antagonism. Regardless of this, both Japan and Australia worked to strengthen security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia based on a strategy of “supplementing” the United States’ regional and global role by furthering cooperation between its allies in peacekeeping operations and non-traditional areas of security. The strengthening of security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia during the 2000s developed in order to maintain and enhance the United States’ presence based on the “hub and spokes” alliance system, rather than to directly oppose China. Full text available here.
Abstract: The year 2017 marked not only the 45th anniversary of the establishment of China-Australia diplomatic relations, but also significant turbulence in the relationship. While bilateral economic and trade relations, as well as people-to-people communication and cooperation continue to grow, a series of dramatic and negative events unfolded in Australia, advocating the so-called “China threat”, and instigated by anti-China sentiments. The recent anti-China backlash in Australia was caused by a combination of deep structural change in the current international system, and instability in Australia’s domestic politics. It is also the outcome of Australia’s dependence on the US-Australia alliance, while balancing between its own economic and security interests. It is worth noting that in comparison to the past, the current anti-China movement in Australia has been more profound and more focused, demonstrating new characteristics. This includes Australia collaborating with certain Western nations against China’s influence, as well as strategic warnings with more political and policy implications. Although Australia’s anti-China backlash will not have a fundamental impact on China-Australia relations, Australia’s anti-China stance and behavior is characteristic of an increasingly prevalent trend among the Western nations of concern about China’s rising influence, and new defense strategies against this. China must proceed with caution when dealing with the negative repercussions of this. Full text available here.
Abstract: Responses to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have been mixed. Many commentators have welcomed the opportunity for infrastructure development and projects to build economic, political and social connectivity across the region. Others have been openly critical or slow to formulate a clear position. In general, advanced economies have responded less positively than developing economies. This paper employs a constructivist approach to interpret responses to the BRI in advanced economies through analysis of commentary in the United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It identifies a diversity of responses within and among these economies and a strong ideational coherence in the frameworks used to assess the BRI. It is concluded that the reception of Chinese-promoted concepts in international affairs, like the BRI, remains challenging due to the dominance of liberal and realist assessments and the accompanying political values. This suggests a need for greater intellectual engagement and more substantial feedback between China and the advanced economies, so as to open the way for a long overdue regional conversation on how development is conceptualized and co-created in a region with diverse approaches to regional economic policy. Full text available here.
