Asia Report #63 | August 1, 2024
In 1979, the landmark Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed into law by the United States Congress, defining the substantial relations between the USA and Taiwan. This year marks 45 years since this historic piece of legislation was signed, which has guided bilateral relations, the USA’s posture towards China, and greater regional policymaking.
To delve deeper into the interpretation of the Taiwan Relations Act, its future, and its role in cross-strait relations, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies hosted a Roundtable on Taiwan Relations Act@45 Years and Counting. The video of the Roundtable can be found here.
The event began with opening remarks from Alexander Tah-ray Yui, Representative for the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States. The speakers discussing the Taiwan Relations Act included Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang of Adelphi University, Ryan Hass of Brookings and Raymond Kuo of RAND Corporation. It was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, GWU.
Understanding the Taiwan Relations Act
Representative Alexander Yui led the session by highlighting the ‘dark times’ that Taiwan underwent as a result of being forced to leave the UN in 1971 due to the People’s Republic of China garnering enough international support to be considered the rightful representative of China rather than the Republic of China, as well as the US establishing diplomatic ties with mainland China. He credited the passage of the TRA by US Congress in 1979 as a primary driver in allowing Taiwan to thrive economically and politically, leading to peace and stability in the region. According to Yui, had it not been for the TRA, Taiwan would not have had the space to undergo its political transformation into a full-fledged democracy, and would not have become the economic powerhouse that is now the United States’ eighth largest trading partner.
The Taiwan Relations Act can be considered one of the three pillars of US relations with Taiwan according to Vincent Wang, along with the Three Communiqués between the US and People’s Republic of China and the Reagan Administration’s Six Assurances. As a result, diplomats can emphasize that US relations with Taiwan are being carried out as per domestic law.
The Longevity of the Taiwan Relations Act
Formulating legislation as delicate as the TRA was an undoubtedly complex challenge and according to Wang, the big question facing Congress was “How do you maintain and arguably enhance relations with an entity you no longer recognize, in order to maintain a substantive relationship?” This major consideration led to what Wang credits as the longevity and success of the TRA, which can be attributed to specific key factors- flexibility, congressional equilibrium and its transitory nature.
Raymond Kuo pointed out that the initial draft under the Jimmy Carter administration lacked the main hallmarks of the modern Taiwan Relations Act. According to Wang, the Taiwan Relations Act was designed to deal with a pragmatic, diplomatic conundrum, hence it matters more how the TRA was interpreted and implemented rather than stipulated, providing the TRA with its unique flexibility. The TRA must be recognized as a transitory arrangement and Wang highlighted that there exists no restriction in the TRA against the US President one day formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation if they choose to establish diplomatic relations.
On the other side of the coin, the TRA also does not restrict Taiwan, should it ever choose to willingly unify with mainland China. Furthermore, the TRA was able to come to fruition due to the presence of a very rare Congressional equilibrium at the time. Wang pointed out that while most people would agree that foreign policy is primarily within the executive purview, the US Congress has shown an unusual interest and commitment to Taiwan.
Interpretation and Evolution of the Taiwan Relations Act
Over the years, there have been efforts to strengthen or weaken the Taiwan Relations Act. All speakers agreed that if the TRA were to be considered either a floor or a ceiling, the former would be more suitable, considering its flexibility and hence the room to grow. Although the TRA is not an explicit security guarantee, the US has stated on multiple occasions that it would defend Taiwan if it were attacked unprovoked, and would maintain the capacity required for the same.
Ryan Hass pointed out that the TRA is considered enormously successful in Washington DC, receiving rare bipartisan support and credited by the Biden administration with giving the United States government the tools it needs to pursue the overall objective of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The flexibility of the TRA suggests that the framers of the Act recognized that it is not the USA’s role to resolve cross-strait differences, and that neither side of the Taiwan Strait is likely to welcome the United States if it attempted to mediate any such efforts.
Hass also noted that some members of Congress have expressed uneasiness that China’s threat to Taiwan is growing, although it is divided on how the US can best respond in the context of the TRA. For some members of Congress, it means that the United States should be more explicit in saying that it would come to Taiwan’s defense if it was ever attacked; for others it means more preemptive threats and military build up to prevent China from pursuing unification through force. The Biden administration has engaged in some pushback against pressure to take significant action by arguing that conflict is not imminent, and that if the US is seen taking actions that can be perceived as altering the status quo, it will raise the risk for other countries to feel comfortable working alongside the US on issues related to Taiwan.
According to Kuo, the TRA does not hold the same degree of flexibility it did in the past, primarily due to the relative power decline of the US and a shift in the military balance in cross-strait relations. An ideal position for the US in the TRA is a more powerful one than the present, which he believes would encourage other countries to align with the US or replicate its Taiwan position.
The Future of the Taiwan Relations Act
All the speakers unanimously agreed that the Taiwan Relations Act has been successful, particularly considering variations in its interpretation over time. However, the TRA is not a perfect piece of legislation. Wang suggested that the TRA needs an update, particularly in terms of lending more support to US efforts to strengthen Taiwan’s economic resilience and its approach to China’s grey zone tactics.
Raymond Kuo argued that although the TRA serves as a good model for deliberating, debating and developing foreign policy while combining the legislature and executive, it is important to consider whether or not the TRA ought to be made stronger. If so, Congress would have to play a key role, as US-China and US-Taiwan issues are too complex to be left to individual negotiators.
According to Hass, the US will likely continue to build upon the foundation laid by the TRA, continuing to adjust its approach depending on the ebbs and flows of the cross-strait relationship. This view is based on the argument that conflict in the region is not around the corner, and a rejection of the notion that the threat to Taiwan is solely a military problem. In the same vein, Kuo stated that the TRA cannot be viewed in isolation from the underlying political and military dynamics that support it.
By Riddhi Likhe, M.A. Candidate in International Affairs, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
