Policy Alert #224 | February 25, 2021
Since the inauguration, President Joe Biden has spoken with the leaders of all major rising powers and initiated a new era of multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. According to Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the new administration sees the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which include the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, as “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region.” Top diplomats of the Quad met on February 18 and discussed security issues in the Indo-Pacific. During the meeting, the Quad agreed to “strongly” oppose any attempts by China to alter the status quo in the region by force. A day later, President Biden attended his first G7 meeting, after which G7 leaders said they would seek a collective approach to China to counter “non-market oriented” policies and practices.
Meanwhile, several interactions among the resident powers of the Indo-Pacific demonstrated noticeable changes in the diplomatic and security dynamics of the region. Security tensions between China and India eased as the two sides pulled back their troops from the disputed border near the Pangong Tso Lake area on February 21. At the same time, Indian and U.S. armies concluded the Yudh Abhyas bilateral exercise. China was expected to conduct a joint naval exercise with Russia and Iran in the Indian Ocean in mid-February but ended up not participating. Economic tensions between China and India also saw some improvement as India is expected to clear 45 investment deals from China.
In this Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ reactions to the shifting dynamics of the Indo-Pacific under the Biden administration.
China
On February 18, in response to a question about the U.S. renewing the Quad as a multilateral platform, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that “cooperation between relevant countries will be open, inclusive and win-win, benefit the world and regional peace and stability and act as a force for good, instead of being used to target any specific country.” At a forum held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 22, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s position on a number of sensitive issues, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet while urging “dialogue instead of confrontation and teaming up instead of ganging up.”
Moreover, Wang called for a “resumption of bilateral exchanges in all areas” between the U.S. and China, stating that “the people-to-people exchanges between the two countries should stay immune to the ups and downs in the political dimension of the relations.” In particular, Wang suggested that China hopes that the U.S. should “act as early as possible to lift its restrictions on Chinese educational and cultural groups, media outlets and institutions…remove its obstructions for U.S. subnational governments and social sectors to engage with China and encourage and support the resumption of normal exchange programs between universities, research institutes and of students.”
- In an op-ed for China Daily, a state-owned newspaper, Lan Jianxue, Deputy Director of the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, suggests that China has exercised restraint during the recent border tensions despite Indian provocations, and that the two sides should take further steps to settle the border disputes: “The Chinese side exchanged views with its Indian counterpart and agreed to work together to maintain a peaceful and stable border before working out a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem. India should follow China’s example of exercising restraint and depend on talks to settle the disputes.”
- In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Kishore Mahbubani, Distinguished Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute, argues that due to different geopolitical interests and vulnerabilities of its members, the Quad is unlikely to alter the future of the Indo-Pacific: “Fundamentally, they are in the wrong game. The big strategic game in Asia isn’t military, but economic… Over time, the different economic interests and historical vulnerabilities of the four countries will make the rationale for the Quad less and less tenable.”
India
On February 8, President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held their first phone call, during which the two leaders agreed to continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the Quad. Prime Minister Modi also vowed to elevate the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries.
- An editorial from the liberal Indian Express sees the recent Quad meeting as a demonstration of both Washington’s commitment for and New Delhi’s strategic interest in the Quad: “The real significance of the meeting was in the fact that the Biden national security team wanted to convene it within the first month of its tenure… India’s interest in the Quad is not tactical but profoundly strategic. For India the Quad is really about addressing the growing power imbalance with China that has manifold consequences for India’s security and prosperity as well its regional and international standing.”
In an op-ed for the center-right Times of India, Duncan Bartlett, Research Fellow at SOAS China Institute of University of London, proposes that amid the tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the rivalry between the U.S. and China, India should diversify its diplomatic strategy and establish closer relations with Europe: “Germany, Italy and South Korea were not great Trump supporters, and they are also being more circumspect on China… There are many sectors in which India and the EU have scope for closer cooperation, such as technology and healthcare. Even though the EU and India have expressed interest in closer trade ties, there has not been much tangible progress… India should study the Chinese approach. China has convinced the Europeans that their controversial investment deal creates a win-win outcome for both sides.”
Japan
President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ security commitment to Japan during his first phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on January 27. In addition to stepping up security cooperation with Australia and India for a free an open Indo-Pacific, the conversation specifically confirmed that U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan include the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, an island chain claimed by both China and Japan.
- An editorial from the business-focused Nikkei Asia Review warns that governments in Asia must be vigilant about the risk of unforeseen contingencies occurring near the Senkaku Islands as a recent Chinese law spells out the operational authority of its Coast Guard: “The intent behind China’s new law should not be overlooked… [President Xi Jinping] called for the protection of national sovereignty and core interests through legislation and law enforcement… Tokyo conveyed its strong concern about the law at a recent high-level meeting on maritime issues with Chinese officials.”
- In an op-ed for the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of International Politics at Keio University sees the world heading toward an era of division and warns against China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region: “This year, the Chinese Communist Party marks the centenary of its foundation. Its leadership, while looking back at how China became a unified country, may resort to the use of force against opponents inside and outside China with greater ease than before… If the leadership of China concludes that Japan’s national power is in decline and the influence of the United States in the region around the islands is waning, there will be a significantly increased possibility that China may try to alter the status quo in the area surrounding the Senkakus.”
Russia
Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Biden had their first phone call on January 26. According to Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, the two sides “confirmed that there are very deep differences but…these differences demand a rather intensive dialogue between the two countries.” More recently, President Putin spoke at the Russian Federal Security Service and warned about ongoing schemes to contain Russia. Without naming any specific country, Putin said that such policy is “aimed at disrupting our development, slowing it down, creating problems along the outer perimeter, triggering domestic instability, undermining the values that unite Russian society, and ultimately to weaken Russia and put it under external control.”
- In an op-ed for The Moscow Times, an independent newspaper based in Amsterdam and Moscow, Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, predicts that U.S. foreign policy under the Biden administration still sees Russia and China as the two major power rivals while both countries are likely to face a more united front of American allies: “This Western front, of course, is likely to be more unified on ideological issues than on issues of interest, but it will be harder for Moscow to play on inter-allied differences… President Biden himself has been a well-known quantity in Moscow since the days of Leonid Brezhnev: not a friend of Russia by any stretch of the imagination, but, as a Cold War veteran, a safe pair of hands.”
- In an interview with Sputnik News, a state-owned news outlet, Ching Chang, Research Fellow at Society for Strategic Studies in Taiwan, suggested that despite President Biden calling China the most serious competitor, Washington is likely to consult with regional stakeholders before making any serious decision: “No reckless decision on Iran or North Korea will be taken unilaterally by Washington before an understanding can be reached among regional stakeholders… As for the new interaction strategy for Biden, it will certainly be an adaptive plot since the reactions from Beijing will affect how the Biden government may further deal with Beijing.”
