Type: Policy Briefs

June 2, 2022

With the looming presence of an authoritarian China and its deepening footprint in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. and India are aligning on how they equally value the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Challenges in this maritime region come from a variety of sources, and the two democracies have their connects and disconnects while combating them. What are the key traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats facing the Indo-Pacific? How do Indian and American priorities compare, and what are the prospects for working jointly to secure their interests and objectives bilaterally and otherwise?    

To address these questions, the Rising Powers Initiative (RPI) at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University and the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History, Christ University in Bangalore, invited a panel of leading experts, including Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director, Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, with commentator Gurpreet Singh Khurana, missile warfare specialist of the Indian Navy and author, currently a Visiting Professor at Naval War College (NWC), Goa. In addition, there were brief interventions by two other specialists, P.K. Ghosh, a former Senior Fellow at IDSA and Indian Navy veteran, and Subramanyam Raju, Head of the Center for Maritime Studies at Pondicherry University. Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs and Director of RPI, moderated the event. This Roundtable is the fourth segment in the project that commenced last year on U.S.-India relations between Christ University and George Washington University. See event recording on YouTube. 

The first session of the Roundtable covers traditional military maritime security concerns and responses. The second session concentrates on non-traditional security, which does not get as much attention despite its direct impact on Indo-Pacific populations. It covers human security issues or soft security such as climate change and ocean pollution. The purpose of the Roundtable was to draw out the top priorities of the U.S. and India and consider how they intersect, according to U.S. and Indian experts, respectively. 

 

Session I: Traditional Maritime Security Threats

Top Three Challenges: An American View

Michael Kugelman highlighted traditional maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific under three areas of concern. First is the growing presence and power of China. Kugelman comprehensively discussed how countries in the region and outside the area viewed China as a strategic competitor or a strategic threat. He explained that China is “deepening its coastal region footprint and increasing its power projections in the regional seas, creating a significant maritime security challenge.” China is also expanding its economic presence rapidly through infrastructure investment in the port development of several littoral states. Speculating on China’s military plans in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific, he pointed to Djibouti and the Solomon Islands as testaments to China’s growing maritime presence. 

This growing presence of China, Kugelman argues, is a significant intensifier of geopolitical competition, mainly with the U.S. and India. “Given that the Andaman Sea is such a key strategic space linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean near the Malacca Strait, and with the geographies at play, China’s growing maritime power in the Indo-Pacific is such a strategic concern for both the U.S. and India. It’s not just the strategic competitors scaling up their role there. But China’s presence in the region has major implications for trade, for Indian energy imports from the Arab Gulf, for instance, and for U.S. trade imports from East Asia. And for the U.S., China’s power has obvious implications for the security of its defense allies, namely South Korea and Japan”.

The second main challenge is territorial disputes in the region. China’s souring relations with Japan, Australia, and South Korea have reached a new low in recent years. Kugelman suggests this is due to China’s increasing provocative and muscular behavior to assert claims over disputed territories. While countries have been trying to muster a response, the nature of China’s provocations has made it challenging to hold Beijing accountable. China uses grey zone tactics, which fall short of acts that constitute belligèrent actions. Thus, Beijing capitalizes on these tactics to continue staging provocations and laying claims on disputed territories.  

Thirdly, he turned to maritime terrorism, which is viewed as a longer-term threat. Attacks on coastal targets and ships have rapidly increased, according to Kugelman. Sensitive targets such as busy ports, crowded checkpoints, or large vessels on the high seas could be attacked to have devastating impacts on trade. The 2011 attack on the Pakistani naval air base PNS Mehran and the 2015 terrorist attacks on a naval base in the Bangladeshi port city of Chittagong indicates how maritime terrorism is an added concern for states in the region.  

Additionally, Kugelman claims the significant presence of Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea has discouraged other Southeast Asian states from bringing in more of their security forces. This has encouraged terrorists to gain influence in the region. Terrorists have also started eliciting the help of pirates for illicit acts like robbery; for example, Abu Sayyaf, a militant organization, is benefiting from the partnership between terrorists and pirates. 

 

Possible Counter-Measures: Together and Separately 

“The long legacy of maritime cooperation between the U.S. and India is a good place to start,” Kugelman suggested. Joint naval exercises between the two biggest democracies in the Indian Ocean go back to the 1990s. In 2006, the two governments produced a short document called “The India-U.S Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation,” which set out bureaucratic structures for cooperation. Kugelman further talked about the various forms of bilateral dialogues on maritime issues and trade.  He describes how the recent two plus two meetings in Washington culminated with an agreement for India to join the Combined Maritime Forces and be a participant in efforts with the U.S. and others to strengthen security partnerships in the Western Indian Ocean region. These are creating enough precedent and scope for U.S.-India maritime cooperation.

Despite the U.S. and India having some differences in threat perceptions regarding the three aforementioned maritime challenges, the two countries are strategically aligned on China’s naval power and presence in the Indo-Pacific. Of particular convergence is the value both place on being proponents of a free and open Indo-Pacific. However, one “disconnect relates to what path India should follow to strengthen its capacity to play the type of net security provider that the U.S. wants it to, or would like to see it play.” 

Kugelman points out a divergence of interests regarding the geographical focus in the Indo-Pacific, with the U.S. being more focused on the Eastern areas and India on the Indian Ocean region. This creates a challenge for U.S. and India to align and approach the broader maritime security challenges in the Indo Pacific. Nonetheless, he concludes on the note of “reconciliation on this, and with the QUAD taking off, India, over time, would start shifting its interest towards the East in the Indo-Pacific as China nears the Andaman Sea region.”

 

Indian Side Weighs in on the Challenges and Cooperative Prospects

As discussant, Gurpreet Khurana took off from Kugelman’s comprehensive overview of the traditional threats in the Indo-Pacific and discussed the interlinkages, namely, how China’s emergence caused a shift in maritime security for the West from non-traditional to traditional. He identified the instances of Pakistani state support for the Mumbai terror attacks and the Houthi rebels attacking ships in the Red Sea from the shore; this type of threat could be a potential convergence of U.S. and India cooperation. In the context of China, Khurana agreed with Kugelman’s assertions about the increasing danger from Beijing. He points to the Chinese narrative about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how they view it as an unfair imposition on Asian values. He finds the maritime order in the Indo Pacific has established a new “modicum of order” which needs to be protected. 

On the different interpretations of net security by India and the U.S., Khurana explained how the Indian Navy’s former chief chose not to use “net security provider” and instead used the term “preferred security provider” because the Indian Navy was not comfortable with the concept of “net provider of security.” Thus, in the Indian Maritime Security Strategy document of 2015, there were clarifications that India was not only a net security provider but also well-positioned to become a net provider of security. Khurana also drew attention to freedom of navigation (FONOPS) and the differences between India and the U.S. regarding how to interpret UNCLOS. The U.S. has not yet ratified UNCLOS, which he says gives impetus to China “to drive a wedge between India, the U.S, and the other countries in the region.”

Further, Khurana addressed how India concentrates on groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The U.S. on the other hand focuses on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and AUKUS. India’s preferred forums are based on the concept of plurilateralism, which he argues gives a sense of security to smaller countries.

P.K. Ghosh dwells on crucial questions about our perception of the Indo-Pacific and what are India’s reach and sustainability on these issues. He appreciated how Kugelman addressed China, the elephant in the room. Concerning U.S.-India perceptions, he agrees with Khurana on the interpretation of UNCLOS and how there is a difference in understanding regarding FONOPS. Ghosh recommended studying the use of the maritime dimension to conduct terrorist attacks on land and maritime terrorism. He also proposed looking at chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and others as important traditional threats.

 

Additional Key Discussion Points  

Key questions that emerged concerned QUAD or AUKUS as a possible framework to respond to maritime terrorism threats; the possibility for QUAD to become an Asian NATO; and Russia’s ambitions in the Indo-Pacific.

Kugelman believes that maritime terrorism would not qualify as a major focus for QUAD. This is because public concerns such as emerging technologies, pandemics, and climate change, are more critical areas of focus. QUAD, additionally, is likely to focus on public goods delivery to try and counter Chinese efforts. He emphasized that the QUAD was not a security grouping and is not headed toward an Asian NATO. It would counter the increasing Chinese power, though not overtly.

Regarding Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific, Khurana explained how Moscow had its “hands full as its economy was in bad shape due to the situation in the Black Sea region.” He also noted how India has been pushing for the QUAD to have a softer focus and a more holistic approach to security.

 

Session II: Non-Traditional Maritime Security

Top Challenges: An American View

The holistic notion of security and the need to look beyond the traditional military strategies was taken up by Nilanthi Samaranayake in the second session on Non-traditional Maritime Security Challenges. Samaranayake highlighted two top challenges: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing or IUU fishing, natural disasters, and human-made disasters. 

At the U.S-India two plus two ministerial dialogue held on 11 April, the term “fishing” was mentioned, even if only once in a scientific context. Although it is a significant development, it simultaneously represents the limited interaction on this topic. But with QUAD as a trending topic, Samaranayake says one cannot dismiss “the potential area for growth in terms of bilateral cooperation” because IUU fishing was also explicitly mentioned in the QUAD ministerial statement in February in the broader context of international law, maritime security, and China. 

Samaranayake stated three points as to why this is important. Firstly, India plays a significant role in fishing in the Indian Ocean. It is the second-largest fish-producing country globally, accounting for more than six percent of global fish production. Secondly, many tuna supplies are sourced in the Indian Ocean. And there is a growing awareness that Indian Ocean yellowfin tuna stock has been overfished and subjected to fishing since 2015. Thirdly, there is some concern about European countries’ fishing activity in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Western Indian Ocean. It is estimated that 40 percent of the European Union’s tuna catch comes from the Western Indian Ocean. This comes as the European Union-controlled ships have hauled a greater share of the region’s yellowfin tuna in the region for the last three decades, leading to concerns about these fish stock levels.

Despite this indication of the statistics, Samaranayake pointed out how India remains non-signatory to the U.N. Port State Measures Agreement to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing. She describes India as a “vital actor and stakeholder in fishing, and given the sector’s role in bolstering regional food security and economic security, it may be a worthwhile topic for greater U.S.-India coordination and possibly for the QUAD at some point, considering the attention paid to China’s fishing activities in the Pacific waters.” Furthermore, with Australia, the United States, and very recently Japan being the signatories of this agreement, she recommends India to sign on to demonstrate QUAD unity on the topic.  

Regarding natural disasters and human-made disasters, Samaranayake described cooperation between India and the U.S. as more built-up than in fishing. Ranging from natural disasters such as cyclones and floods to human-made disasters, such as oil spills off Mauritius and Sri Lanka in 2020, the population living along the coastal areas in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly affected the most. Fortunately, the U.S. and India both have a significant history of conducting disaster relief operations in the region, both jointly and independently, taking the instances of the 2004 tsunami relief operations and the Mozambique cyclone in 2019. 

At the ministerial talks in April, the U.S. and India discussed the need for cooperation on climate and disaster management, resilience goals, and monsoon prediction and forecasting in the context of the Coalition for Disaster Resilient infrastructure. Samaranayake identified this as an important “way forward for cooperation.”

 

Outlook for Collaboration 

Some smaller Indian Ocean countries hold the view that E.U. states exploit their fishing resources. But on the positive side, one can draw a connection between the U.S. working with its European allies and India building ties with E.U. countries through the EU India Strategic Partnership roadmap, with France being a key partner for both the U.S. and India in a traditional security sense. Samaranayake shed light on how this is paving the way for formulating greater collaboration and cooperation in the non-traditional security realm as well. 

The shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific can be built on foundations like the Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR). Samaranayake agrees with Ghosh and emphasized that India’s leadership is becoming prominent through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and how this can foster multilateral cooperation across the region and coordinate with the United States to a much greater extent. She added that balance between navy-to-navy collaboration and non-military Coast Guard cooperation could be considered a more concerted and holistic approach.

 

The Indian View: Layers of Complexity

In Khurana’s commentary, he adds that one of the issues is that the U.S. is neither a member of IONS nor an observer. The U.S. has not been able to participate due to objections from Iran. However, the U.S. is a dialogue partner of the IORA as it works on HADR programs. Khurana pointed out that if India signs the Ports State Measures Agreement, it would have to follow stringent standards applied to Europe and the U.S. exporters; he proposes an open market policy that would enhance production standards and supply to increase competitiveness. He is however concerned about Indian producers and manufacturers competing in a global market because Indian producers lack the technology for deep-sea fishing and processing onboard. Khurana says, “If the U.S. said that it wanted to make India a great country, it would have to share technology, and we all rise with the rising tide.”

Raju centered his comments on ocean governance as it encompasses the topics of non-traditional security issues in the Indo-Pacific apart from terrorism, piracy, climate change, illegal fishing or disasters. Along with ocean governance, he concentrated on ocean health versus ocean wealth. Discussing the sustainability of resources from the seas, he argues how the concept of a blue economy is crucial as an alternative to access vital ocean resources. He also suggests that India and the U.S. cooperate to create a blue economy while addressing non-traditional security issues from the maritime domain. He further appealed to using the idea of India’s “Samudra Manthan,” suggesting that the two look at the state versus maritime threats rather than state versus state. 

 

Additional Key Discussion Points

Several key questions related to how to raise topics such as fishing and climate change to top-level diplomatic discourse, the role of civil society groups, and the impact of arms racing on the region’s non-traditional security priorities. 

According to Samaranayake, “civil society is a critical sector when we are thinking about agents of change that can result in effects at the national level of policy in both the United States and India.” She addressed the failure of the U.S. to ratify UNCLOS due to congressional dysfunction, U.S. domestic level challenges, and politics. She agrees that non-traditional security issues are getting less attention than traditional security issues. But, China’s active involvement in illegal fishing issues would bring greater awareness to IUU fishing. Therefore, she adds: “sometimes it needs the traditional security driver to help raise attention.”

Kugelman states that getting the attention of policymakers toward non-traditional issues was difficult until they realized how serious these issues were. But, because U.S. and India’s relations had significantly developed, there are many different dialogue mechanisms in place to collaborate on non-traditional security threats. He adds that he would “like to be optimistic even though it’s true that it will be tough to get these issues on the radar.” 

Overall, whether from a traditional or non-traditional maritime security viewpoint, the prospects for closer U.S.-India cooperation in the Indo-Pacific have never been better. Their bilateral efforts are only being strengthened via the growing number of minilateral and multilateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, where the two countries remain at the forefront. Most importantly, their shared interests are going well beyond a common concern about China’s growing presence in the Indo-Pacific neighborhood to address the tangible needs of the populations of the region. 

 

By Drorima Chatterjee and Ashwin Immanuel Dhanabalan, Post Graduate Scholars in International Studies at Christ University. 

 

This Policy Brief is a part of the ‘Shared Values and Worldviews in U.S.-India Relations’ project of the United States Government, George Washington University and Christ University. The opinions expressed here are solely of the  authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Government, George Washington University or Christ University.