Policy Alerts – Page 3 – Rising Powers Initiative

New Indo-Pacific Dynamics under Biden and Reactions from Rising Powers

Policy Alert #224 | February 25, 2021

Since the inauguration, President Joe Biden has spoken with the leaders of all major rising powers and initiated a new era of multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. According to Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the new administration sees the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which include the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, as “a foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region.” Top diplomats of the Quad met on February 18 and discussed security issues in the Indo-Pacific. During the meeting, the Quad agreed to “strongly” oppose any attempts by China to alter the status quo in the region by force. A day later, President Biden attended his first G7 meeting, after which G7 leaders said they would seek a collective approach to China to counter “non-market oriented” policies and practices.

Meanwhile, several interactions among the resident powers of the Indo-Pacific demonstrated noticeable changes in the diplomatic and security dynamics of the region. Security tensions between China and India eased as the two sides pulled back their troops from the disputed border near the Pangong Tso Lake area on February 21. At the same time, Indian and U.S. armies concluded the Yudh Abhyas bilateral exercise. China was expected to conduct a joint naval exercise with Russia and Iran in the Indian Ocean in mid-February but ended up not participating. Economic tensions between China and India also saw some improvement as India is expected to clear 45 investment deals from China.

In this Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ reactions to the shifting dynamics of the Indo-Pacific under the Biden administration.

China

On February 18, in response to a question about the U.S. renewing the Quad as a multilateral platform, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that “cooperation between relevant countries will be open, inclusive and win-win, benefit the world and regional peace and stability and act as a force for good, instead of being used to target any specific country.” At a forum held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 22, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated Beijing’s position on a number of sensitive issues, including Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and Tibet while urging “dialogue instead of confrontation and teaming up instead of ganging up.”

Moreover, Wang called for a “resumption of bilateral exchanges in all areas” between the U.S. and China, stating that “the people-to-people exchanges between the two countries should stay immune to the ups and downs in the political dimension of the relations.” In particular, Wang suggested that China hopes that the U.S. should “act as early as possible to lift its restrictions on Chinese educational and cultural groups, media outlets and institutions…remove its obstructions for U.S. subnational governments and social sectors to engage with China and encourage and support the resumption of normal exchange programs between universities, research institutes and of students.”

In an op-ed for China Daily, a state-owned newspaper, Lan Jianxue, Deputy Director of the Department for Asia-Pacific Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, suggests that China has exercised restraint during the recent border tensions despite Indian provocations, and that the two sides should take further steps to settle the border disputes: “The Chinese side exchanged views with its Indian counterpart and agreed to work together to maintain a peaceful and stable border before working out a mutually satisfactory solution to the border problem. India should follow China’s example of exercising restraint and depend on talks to settle the disputes.”
In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Kishore Mahbubani, Distinguished Fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute, argues that due to different geopolitical interests and vulnerabilities of its members, the Quad is unlikely to alter the future of the Indo-Pacific: “Fundamentally, they are in the wrong game. The big strategic game in Asia isn’t military, but economic… Over time, the different economic interests and historical vulnerabilities of the four countries will make the rationale for the Quad less and less tenable.”

India

On February 8, President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held their first phone call, during which the two leaders agreed to continuing close cooperation to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation, territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the Quad. Prime Minister Modi also vowed to elevate the bilateral strategic partnership between the two countries.

An editorial from the liberal Indian Express sees the recent Quad meeting as a demonstration of both Washington’s commitment for and New Delhi’s strategic interest in the Quad: “The real significance of the meeting was in the fact that the Biden national security team wanted to convene it within the first month of its tenure… India’s interest in the Quad is not tactical but profoundly strategic. For India the Quad is really about addressing the growing power imbalance with China that has manifold consequences for India’s security and prosperity as well its regional and international standing.”

In an op-ed for the center-right Times of India, Duncan Bartlett, Research Fellow at SOAS China Institute of University of London, proposes that amid the tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the rivalry between the U.S. and China, India should diversify its diplomatic strategy and establish closer relations with Europe: “Germany, Italy and South Korea were not great Trump supporters, and they are also being more circumspect on China… There are many sectors in which India and the EU have scope for closer cooperation, such as technology and healthcare. Even though the EU and India have expressed interest in closer trade ties, there has not been much tangible progress… India should study the Chinese approach. China has convinced the Europeans that their controversial investment deal creates a win-win outcome for both sides.”

Japan

President Biden reaffirmed the United States’ security commitment to Japan during his first phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on January 27. In addition to stepping up security cooperation with Australia and India for a free an open Indo-Pacific, the conversation specifically confirmed that U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan include the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, an island chain claimed by both China and Japan.

An editorial from the business-focused Nikkei Asia Review warns that governments in Asia must be vigilant about the risk of unforeseen contingencies occurring near the Senkaku Islands as a recent Chinese law spells out the operational authority of its Coast Guard: “The intent behind China’s new law should not be overlooked… [President Xi Jinping] called for the protection of national sovereignty and core interests through legislation and law enforcement… Tokyo conveyed its strong concern about the law at a recent high-level meeting on maritime issues with Chinese officials.”
In an op-ed for the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun, Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of International Politics at Keio University sees the world heading toward an era of division and warns against China’s rising assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region: “This year, the Chinese Communist Party marks the centenary of its foundation. Its leadership, while looking back at how China became a unified country, may resort to the use of force against opponents inside and outside China with greater ease than before… If the leadership of China concludes that Japan’s national power is in decline and the influence of the United States in the region around the islands is waning, there will be a significantly increased possibility that China may try to alter the status quo in the area surrounding the Senkakus.”

Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Biden had their first phone call on January 26. According to Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, the two sides “confirmed that there are very deep differences but…these differences demand a rather intensive dialogue between the two countries.” More recently, President Putin spoke at the Russian Federal Security Service and warned about ongoing schemes to contain Russia. Without naming any specific country, Putin said that such policy is “aimed at disrupting our development, slowing it down, creating problems along the outer perimeter, triggering domestic instability, undermining the values that unite Russian society, and ultimately to weaken Russia and put it under external control.”

In an op-ed for The Moscow Times, an independent newspaper based in Amsterdam and Moscow, Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, predicts that U.S. foreign policy under the Biden administration still sees Russia and China as the two major power rivals while both countries are likely to face a more united front of American allies: “This Western front, of course, is likely to be more unified on ideological issues than on issues of interest, but it will be harder for Moscow to play on inter-allied differences… President Biden himself has been a well-known quantity in Moscow since the days of Leonid Brezhnev: not a friend of Russia by any stretch of the imagination, but, as a Cold War veteran, a safe pair of hands.”
In an interview with Sputnik News, a state-owned news outlet, Ching Chang, Research Fellow at Society for Strategic Studies in Taiwan, suggested that despite President Biden calling China the most serious competitor, Washington is likely to consult with regional stakeholders before making any serious decision: “No reckless decision on Iran or North Korea will be taken unilaterally by Washington before an understanding can be reached among regional stakeholders… As for the new interaction strategy for Biden, it will certainly be an adaptive plot since the reactions from Beijing will affect how the Biden government may further deal with Beijing.”

Rising Powers React to the New Era of U.S.-China Relations

Policy Alert #223 | February 12, 2021

Since the inauguration of President Joe Biden, Washington has been talking tough, expecting “extreme competition” between the U.S. and China in the coming years. In a speech at the State Department, President Biden presented his outlook on U.S. foreign policy and stated that the U.S. would “confront China’s economic abuses; counter its aggressive, coercive action; push back on China’s attack on human rights, intellectual property, and global governance.” But Biden’s Press Secretary Jen Psaki’s statement that the Biden team would exercise “strategic patience” toward Beijing left some wondering.

In response to the new rhetoric from Washington, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi, Director of the Office of Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, told Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that the U.S. should “rectify its mistakes made over a period of time and work with China to uphold the spirit of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation, focus on cooperation and manage differences” while also stressing that “the two sides should respect each other’s core interests and choices of political system and development path, and manage their domestic affairs well.” Following Yang’s narrative, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Cui Tiankai highlighted the need for bilateral cooperation between China and the U.S. “vis-à-vis the emerging or the existing global challenges, like climate change” during a CNN interview.

The meaning of Washington’s “patience” may have been on display newly adopted strategic patience is most notable when President Biden waited until February 10 – after having talked to all major world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi – to make the first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the eve of Chinese Lunar New Year. During the call, Biden confronted Xi over all major issue areas between the two countries, including trade and economic practices, democratic crackdown in Hong Kong, human rights abuse in Xinjiang, assertiveness toward Taiwan, and the preservation of a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The first month of diplomacy under President Biden has already signaled a new era of U.S. policy toward China. In this Policy Alert, we will examine how the Rising Powers are responding to the prospects of U.S.-China relations under the new U.S. administration.

China

An editorial from state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times tries to put the delayed phone call between Biden and Xi in a more positive light:

“The White House release also said at the beginning that Biden shared his greetings and well wishes with the Chinese people on the occasion of the Lunar New Year. This was widely interpreted as a gesture that Biden showed respect for President Xi and China. It seems that he was using such goodwill to balance the tough messages the new US administration sent in recent days and various interpretations on those messages.”

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Wang Xiangwei, former Editor-in-Chief of South China Morning Post, proposes that Washington and Beijing could begin mending bilateral relations by taking small steps in reversing the tit-for-tat policies of the Trump era:

“[N]either side is likely to make any significant pre-emptive gesture as both believe the ball is in the other’s court… Given the complex circumstances, both countries can revitalize bilateral links by starting small, as recently suggested by Kurt Campbell, a veteran American diplomat who has become Biden’s Indo-Pacific coordinator… [B]oth countries could reverse the tit-for-tat expulsion of journalists, ease visa restrictions and reopen closed consulates. Doing so would be a clear way of showing goodwill.”

In an op-ed for Global Times, Yuan Zheng, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow of the Institute of American Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, expects enduring competition between the two countries and suggests that Beijing should take the initiative in shaping U.S.-China relations:

“US scholars have predicted that Biden will not make any major improvements in China-US relations during the first half year of his tenure. China should be prepared for this… China should take the initiative in shaping China-US relations. If bilateral relations fail to make further progress, perhaps China can find a breakthrough on the multilateral front.”

Japan

An editorial from the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun sees China’s recent heightening of military pressure toward Taiwan as a signal aimed at warning the Biden administration not to interfere in the Taiwan issue:

“China’s intimidation of Taiwan is an act that shakes the security of East Asia as a whole. It is unreasonable for China to claim that the U.S. response to China’s actions is ‘interference in domestic affairs.’ A sense of urgency over China’s self-righteous behavior, including the deprivation of liberties in Hong Kong and the actions of turning the South China Sea into a military stronghold, is widely shared in the United States regardless of party affiliation. The Xi administration should be aware of the fact that this series of actions has become a regional threat.”

An editorial from the center-right The Japan Times argues that China’s assertiveness in defending its own interests explains the Biden administration’s reluctance to respond to China’s call for a cooperative bilateral relationship:

“[China’s model of cooperation] rested on three pillars: no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation…Problems arise when those principles become concrete; when, for example, “mutual respect” is applied to specific problems. In practice, this has meant that China is not to be criticized. Ever. And when Beijing expresses an interest in a dispute, that stake is to be considered paramount and accorded due deference.”

In an op-ed for the left-leaning Mainichi Shimbun, Bill Emmott, former Editor-in-Chief of The Economist, foresees that U.S. foreign policy in Asia under the Biden administration is likely to resemble Japan’s existing China policy:

“Politically, [Biden] has to talk tough. But in practice, I doubt if he will really choose to be confrontational. His position will be more like Japan’s: to engage, to accept the reality of Chinese power but also to defend America’s national interests strongly whenever necessary… [T]he real U.S. goal in the region must be one of balancing Chinese power, of maintaining America’s presence so as to prevent Chinese hegemony from developing; and to assist that by ensuring that countries in the region see America as having legitimacy in its actions and intentions, ideally a greater legitimacy and trust than China does.”

India

An editorial from the pro -BJP government The Pioneer suggests that President Biden’s tough posture during the recent phone call with President Xi is a sign of Washington aiming to reestablish the U.S. as a global leader:

“[T]he US was firmly back in the seat as the global leader, a position that it had by and large relinquished during the Donald Trump regime…Biden made it clear to President Xi Jinping that Big Brother would henceforth take a tough line on human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, coercion of Taiwan and assertive actions in the region.”

In an op-ed for the liberal Hindustan Times, Harsh Pant, a Professor at King’s College London and the Director of Studies at Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, questions the strategic clarity of Biden’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific amid the urgency of countering China’s rising regional dominance:

“On Russia, there is no clarity on what Washington can do apart from its rhetorical flourishes. In Myanmar, America’s sanctimonious calls for sanctions and isolation will only make China a more potent player. On China, where actually America’s leadership has been pretty strong under Trump, platitudes won’t work anymore. In the Indo-Pacific, regional powers have to respond to China’s rise in real-time. They have little time or patience for Biden’s inability to articulate a coherent China policy.”

In an op-ed for center-right Times of India, Bharat Karnad, Emeritus Professor in National Security Studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, sees the strategic competition between the Washington and Beijing as a driver for more Indo-U.S. cooperation, but expresses skepticism on whether New Delhi is capable of taking full advantage the opportunities:

“After all, the US knows the Indian government buckles easily under flattery or pressure and Indian negotiators habitually give up a lot in return for little as long as India is patted for being a ‘responsible state’ and the carrot of an albeit non-veto permanent seat in the UN Security Council is dangled.”

China and India Compete in Vaccine Diplomacy

Policy Alert #222 | January 29, 2021

As COVID-19 cases surpass 100 million globally, the successful distribution of vaccines is the only solution that allows the world to truly recover from the pandemic. According to a vaccine database managed by Duke University, governments around the world have purchased more than 7 billion vaccine doses as of January 2021, among which 4.2 billion were bought by high-income countries. Even though they only represent about 16% of global population, high-income countries are holding 60% of all COVID vaccines. Most of these countries are holding more vaccines than their populations, while some have enough to cover their populations several times over. For instance, Canada has purchased enough vaccine doses to cover more than five times their population, whereas the UK ranks second by holding enough for three times their population. In contrast, most middle and low-income countries lack the capability to develop vaccines themselves and are scrambling to secure the remaining vaccine supply. This global inequality of vaccine distribution thus offers an opportunity for China and India – two of the handful of countries that are capable of exporting COVID vaccines – to enhance their soft power and geopolitical influence through the provision of vaccines for countries in need.

In this Policy Alert, we examine the ongoing Sino-Indian competition in vaccine diplomacy and compare the success of their global distribution efforts.

China as Global Pharmaceutical Supplier, India as Global Vaccine Producer

China is the world’s largest pharmaceutical supplier, whereas India is the largest vaccine producer. It is no surprise that both countries – especially China, who has been criticized for its lack of transparency during the initial COVID outbreak – see the pandemic as an opportunity to extend their soft power and geopolitical influence. In China, there are three COVID vaccines that have been developed and ready to be exported. The first vaccine comes from private company Sinovac. At the higher end, testing in Turkey shows that the Sinovac vaccine is 91.25% effective, whereas at the lower end, a report from Brazil reveals an efficacy rate of 50.5%. The second Chinese vaccine is developed by state-owned Sinopharm, which is yielding an efficacy rate of 79%. The Chinese government plans to distribute free shots of Sinopharm vaccines for all of its citizens. Finally, the vaccine from privately-owned CanSino has also reached its final stage of testing, but the efficacy rate has yet to be published.

India has two vaccines that are ready for distribution. The first is Covishield, which is licensed from Oxford University and AstraZeneca and produced by the Serum Institute of India, the largest vaccine manufacturer in the world. The original Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine has an efficacy rate between 60% and 90%, while the testing of the Indian model shows an efficacy rate of 70.42%. The second Indian vaccine is Covaxin, which is indigenously developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research and the National Institute of Virology. Covaxin is still undergoing its late stage trials and the efficacy rate is yet to be published.

The headline efficacy rates of vaccines – especially China’s Sinovac – have received a lot of media attention and require careful consideration. The official result from Sinovac’s Brazilian testing is 78%, but one report revealed that the headline rate drops to 50.4% when “very mild” infections are included in the calculation. It remains unclear how the “very mild” cases are defined, while it is also unclear if Sinovac’s 91.24% result in Turkey follows the same standard, and whether the efficacy rates of other existing vaccines include “very mild” cases. As the result, direct comparison of headline efficacy rates can be challenging, especially when Chinese data lacks transparency.

Trends in Distribution of Chinese and Indian Vaccines: China Selling, India Donating

Unlike the Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines, which have adopted a new RNA technology and require extremely low temperatures for storage, Chinese and Indian vaccines utilize the traditional viral vector method, which is apparently less effective, but the lower cost of production and distribution makes it the best option for middle and low-income countries around the world. The following Chinese and Indian vaccine distribution data are extracted from a database run by Duke University and supplemented by media sources.

As of January 28, 2021, China has donated vaccines and/or entered agreements of vaccine purchases with the following countries:

Sinovac
Country Doses Donation or Sale
Azerbaijan 4 million Sale
Brazil 100 million Sale
Chile 60 million Sale
Indonesia 125 million Sale
Malaysia 14 million Sale
Mexico Unknown Sale
Philippines 25 million Sale and 500k Donation
Thailand 2 million Sale
Turkey 50 million Sale
Ukraine 1.8 million Sale

Sinopharm
Country Doses Donation or Sale
Morocco 10 million Sale
Pakistan 1.7 million Sale and 500k Donation
Peru 38 million Sale
Serbia 1 million Sale
UAE 3 million Sale

CanSino
Country Doses Donation or Sale
Indonesia 15 million Sale
Mexico 10 to 35 million Sale
Malaysia 10 million Sale
Pakistan 20 million Sale

As of January 28, 2021, India has donated vaccines or entered agreements of vaccine purchases with the following countries:

Covishield (Oxford-AstraZeneca):
Country Doses Donation or Sale
Bangladesh 2 million Donation
Bhutan 150k Donation
Brazil 2 million Sale
Caribbean 500k Donation
Maldives 100k Donation
Mauritius 150k Donation
Morocco 2 million Sale
Myanmar 1.5 million Donation
Nepal 1 million Donation
Nicaragua 200k Donation
Oman 100k Donation
Pacific Islands 200k Donation
Seychelles 50k Donation

Competition in Vaccine Diplomacy: An Indian Edge

China first attempted to generate soft power by exporting PPE at the beginning of COVID pandemic, but Beijing’s initial effort blundered due to the inconsistent quality of Chinese-made equipment. As COVID vaccines are readied through expedited development, both China and India seized the opportunity to engage in vaccine diplomacy.

Comparing vaccine distribution, it is clear that there is a huge difference between the Chinese and Indian approach to vaccine diplomacy. Even though Chinese vaccines have a much wider outreach, they are almost exclusively distributed through purchase agreements instead of donations. Interestingly, the only Chinese donations are to the Philippines and Pakistan, both significantly associated with China’s ongoing disputes in the South China Sea and the Ladakh/Kashmir regions respectively. In contrast, India adopts a different strategy of vaccine diplomacy by first targeting its immediate neighbors, followed by its extended neighborhood and smaller island countries around the world. The main difference between the two countries is that Indian vaccines are almost exclusively distributed through donation – a strategy known as the Vaccine Maitri (Vaccine Friendship).

The most notable competition of vaccine diplomacy between China and India happened in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh initially planned to purchase vaccine from China’s Sinovac, but the deal apparently fell apart when the Chinese company asked Dhaka to share the cost of clinical trials. This created an opportunity for India to step in and offer a donation of 2 million doses. Similarly, China promised a batch of donations to Myanmar during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit on January 12, but has yet to fulfill the commitment as India stepped in to donate 1.5 million doses. Moreover, Chinese and Indian media have also traded accusations against each other’s vaccine diplomacy. Chinese media and netizens questioned India’s ability to manufacture high-quality COVID vaccine after a fire broke out at a plant of India’s largest vaccine maker. Meanwhile, Indian media accused China of using the vaccine agreements to put pressure on the Turkish Parliament to ratify a treaty that allows the extradition of Uyghur dissidents.

In the initial round of vaccine distribution, it seems India has gained an edge in vaccine diplomacy through its Vaccine Maitri. Although China has signed purchase agreements with a larger number of countries, Beijing’s ability to fulfill its vaccine commitment is the country’s greatest challenge, especially when outbreaks are surging within China. India has committed to less countries, and its donation of vaccine shipments are gradually being fulfilled. However, as total COVID cases continues to rise while new variants of the virus are spreading around the world, India is also facing tremendous pressure to distribute vaccines within the country. For both China and India, vaccine diplomacy may ultimately be successful only if production is able to exceed the domestic demands of their huge populations.

Rising Powers React to the Storming of U.S. Capitol

Policy Alert #221 | January 19, 2021

After two months of misinformation and failed lawsuits against the result of the 2020 Presidential Election, President Donald Trump’s denial of electoral loss has culminated in the storming of U.S. Capitol by his supporters on the day when Congress was scheduled to certify the outcome of Electoral College. President Trump’s incitement of the riots on January 6, 2021 shocked political leaders around the world and seriously undermined the leadership of the U.S. among liberal democracies. In this Policy Alert, we examine how the Rising Powers react to the appalling storming of the U.S. Capitol.

China

During a daily press briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying went to great lengths to try and compare the rampage at the U.S. Capitol to Hong Kong protestors at the Legislative Council in 2019: “[U.S. officials] all condemned [what happened in the Capitol] as ‘a violent incident’ and the people involved as ‘rioters,’ ‘extremists’ and ‘thugs’ who brought ‘disgrace.’ Now compare that with what the Hong Kong violent protesters were called, like ‘a beautiful sight’ you brought up and ‘democratic heroes.’ They said that ‘American people stand with them.’ What’s the reason for such a stark difference in the choice of words? Everyone needs to seriously think about it and do some soul-searching on the reason.”

In an op-ed for the South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Paul Freeland, an Editor of the South China Morning Post, argues that serious discussions about the Capitol riots, President Trump’s Twitter ban, and the siege of Hong Kong Legislative Council have been crowded out by “cheap talks” from key political actors:
“Otherwise intelligent, capable people have made transparently cynical arguments aimed at advancing their political interests and hoodwinking the rest of us. This cheap talk is overwhelming public discourse…There are genuine concerns over the influence of ‘big tech’ and social media platforms, and there are flaws in US and Hong Kong democracy that need addressing. Instead of having those substantive discussions, though, bad-faith actors flood the zone with superficial point-scoring and shameless dissembling.”
In an op-ed for the state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times, He Zhijiao, a research fellow of the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, proposes that the events at the Capitol may weaken the prospect of better relations between the U.S. and Europe under the upcoming administration:
“The divergences between Europe and the US are in not only policies but also ideas. These have evolved from notions of global governance to political systems and beliefs – despite the fact that Europe and the US have common Western democratic values…The Capitol riots might contribute to the reconstruction of trust or further alienate relations between the US and Europe. Either way, the event will distract the Biden administration, whose handling of US domestic conflicts and divisions is crucial for US-Europe coordination.”
In an op-ed for Global Times, Su Hao, the founding director of the Center for Strategic and Peace Studies at the China Foreign Affairs University, explains how the storming of the Capitol embodies the long-lasting social and political division within the U.S.:
“This is because of the deep divisions, in terms of politics, society and race. With the decline of the number of white Americans and rise of other races, racial tensions are becoming more acute. As the minority holds the majority of the wealth and the middle class is shrinking, the widening wealth gap has been escalating social divisions…[S]uch divisions may exist for a long time, posing a hidden threat to the country’s social stability, especially when it is triggered by certain incidents.”

India

In response to the storming of U.S. Capitol, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a tweet: “Distressed to see news about rioting and violence. Orderly and peaceful transfer of power must continue. The democratic process cannot be allowed to be subverted through unlawful protests.”

An editorial from the pro-BJP government The Pioneer suggests that what transpired at the Capitol demonstrates the need of electoral reform in the U.S.:
“Part of the fault lies in the convoluted American election system where different States are given the Electoral College votes based on the weightages decided decades ago… The rest of the democratic world, which largely follows the first-past-the-post system that has its own flaws, cannot understand how a voter in the sparsely populated agrarian state of Wyoming has his or her vote count as almost double that of a voter in the most populated State of California. The US electoral system is broken and it needs to be fixed urgently, particularly as the country faces off against a rival across the Pacific Ocean once again.”
In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Gyanendra Pandey, a Professor and the Director of Interdisciplinary Workshop on Colonial and Postcolonial Studies at Emory University, compares the storming of the Capitol to the destruction of Babri Masjid mosque by Hindu extremists in India three decades ago:
“These actions expose a too-long-tolerated White supremacist and Hindu supremacist hubris – a sense of entitlement about their god-given right to rule in India and the US… [T]he dissimilarities may mask a more fundamental point of convergence – We are a great [Christian or Hindu] country, governed by a great constitution. We put the constitution in place…That founding document is pronounced stolen the moment it fails to ensure the Brahmin’s/white man’s god-given right-to-rule his promised land.”
In an op-ed for the Indian Express, Suhas Palshikar, the Chief Editor of Studies in Indian Politics, highlights the conditions of executive coups by comparing the attempted takeover of the Capitol with Indira Gandhi’s infamous “emergency” dictatorship:
“Executive coups are a product of a triad: Constructing a constituency of willing mobs, corrosion of institutions and producing a political establishment unconcerned with democratic norms… So, where do India’s executive coups differ from Trump’s? Indira Gandhi’s coup used institutions more effectively than Trump, but despite all her populism, her resort to mobs as instruments of takeover was very limited. While she could easily rein in her own party, she had to face an uncompromising Opposition and take recourse to preventive detention.”

Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga did not directly comment on the storming of U.S. Capitol but told reporters that he hopes the U.S. “will go from conflict to unity under Biden, the next president.” Similarly, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato made a reserved comment by saying that “Hopefully the difficult situation faced by U.S. democracy can be overcome, and stability and harmony will be restored as the country moves toward a peaceful, democratic presidential transition.”

An editorial from the progressive Asahi Shimbun proposes that in the aftermath of the Capitol breach, the U.S. must immediately kickstart the process to regain public trust in the democratic institution:
“The future of American democracy will depend, to a large extent, on whether the people will remain conscious of the urgency of the situation… The Chinese government, which has been under fire over its crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, has made sarcastic comments on the political turmoil in Washington… Despite a decline in its global influence, the United States is still expected to play the leading role for ensuring stability in the world order. To do so, the country needs to demonstrate afresh the innate resilience of its democracy.”
In an op-ed for the center-right The Japan Times, Jan-Werner Mueller, a Professor of Politics at Princeton University, urges that President Trump’s incitement of the insurrection must be met with necessary punishments:
“If there is no punishment for the insurrection at the Capitol, congressional Republicans will again be signaling their own complicity in the crime. The message will be that this, too, is acceptable: A sitting president may indeed incite violence against one of the republic’s three political branches…The crucial step is not just to remove Trump but to ban him from politics for life. Though this step entails a permanent restriction of an individual’s basic political rights, many democracies nonetheless allow for such a possibility.”
An editorial from liberal leaning The Mainichi recommends a broad debate on the powers and responsibilities of the social media platforms in the aftermath of the riots:
“[T]here is growing debate over whether current laws that, as a general rule, protect social media companies and their ilk from legal responsibility for harmful user-generated content should be revised. Japan as well is looking to revisit current rules exempting social media platforms from responsibility for slanderous speech posted by users… However, the river of information that runs through their platforms every day is vast, and the companies alone will not be able to eliminate all the harmful posts polluting it on their own… We need to broadly examine and debate exactly what we want the internet discussion space to be.”

Russia

Russian deputy U.N. Ambassador Dmitry Polyanskiy compared the Capitol riots to the protests in Ukraine in 2013 while citing the moment when then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland offered food to protesters: “Quite Maidan-style pictures are coming from DC. Some of my friends ask whether someone will distribute crackers to the protesters to echo Victoria Nuland stunt. My guess is that chances are meagre, there is no US Embassy in Washington!”

In an op-ed for government-funded RT, Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian President and Prime Minister, highlights the flaws of the U.S. electoral system and the serious global consequences of U.S. political instability:
“Elections in this country, especially when there is a transfer of power from one political force to the other, can trigger significant changes in the global economic development, seriously affecting the existing institutions of international law and global security system…The problem is that the rest of the world finds it increasingly ‘inconvenient’ to work with such a country, as the US becomes an unpredictable partner. This unpredictability gives other states, regional associations and military political organizations cause for concern. It would be nice if the US political establishment realized this responsibility…We do not want the US to have problems. And for practical reasons: such problems create waves of instability all around that overflow us as well. The problems of the United States can only be solved by the Americans themselves along with the good governance of the country.”
In an op-ed for the nationalist Pravda, Michael Pravica, a Professor in Physics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, warns about the questionable power of censorship by big tech companies in the U.S.:
“[W]e see pseudo-intellectual ‘journalists’ and other ‘professionals’ desperately try to justify the destruction of Parler and permanent banning of President Trump and hundreds of other conservative voices from Twitter and other social media with glee…As a scientist, every modicum of data I receive from my experiments is critical to better understand natural phenomena. Just because you don’t ‘like’ some data is not a reason to discount it. You never discount data without a really good reason.”

How Are Rising Powers Sizing Up Biden Foreign Policy Picks?

Policy Alert #219 | December 18, 2020

Although President Donald Trump has yet to concede the 2020 election, the Electoral College voted on December 14 and confirmed the Biden-Harris victory. Meanwhile, President-Elect Joe Biden has been announcing his picks for key cabinet positions in the upcoming administration, including Secretary of State candidate Anthony Blinken, Secretary of Defense candidate Lloyd Austin, National Security Advisor candidate Jake Sullivan, and U.S. Trade Representative candidate Katherine Tai.

In this Policy Alert, we review how the Rising Powers are reacting to the Biden’s cabinet candidates for the upcoming administration.

China

An editorial from state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times believes that the key to Biden’s China policy lies in how determined his administration will be in committing to multilateralism and demonstrating the U.S.’s desire to return to international rules broken by the Trump administration:

“The core of the change is the unilateral mind-set of the ‘America First’ policy. This mentality influences all U.S. foreign policies…The Biden administration needs to restore normal competition in China-U.S. relations. Through communication and by discussing rules with China, it also needs to make sure that the two sides’ competition stays under control.”

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California, argues that Taiwan’s concern about the Biden administration rethinking U.S.-Taiwan policy in favor of better relations with China is misguided:

“Biden penned an important op-ed titled ‘Why America Must Lead Again.’ [January 2020] Although Taiwan went unmentioned, Biden argued that ‘the United States does need to get tough with China’ by ‘build[ing] a united front of US allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors’…And his actions since then, for instance by enthusiastically supporting US arms sales to Taiwan or tweeting congratulations to ‘President Tsai’ upon her re-election (reflecting Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty), have been consistent over time.”

A commentary in South China Morning Post foresees that Biden’s USTR candidate Katherine Tai, the chief enforcement lawyer on China trade issues during the Obama administration, is an excellent candidate who is expected to share incumbent USTR Robert Lighthizer’s hawkishness on trade issues against China:

“[I]nterviews with more than 10 former colleagues and interlocutors reveal a razor-sharp legal mind, with encyclopedic knowledge on a decade’s worth of China trade issues. She also enjoys popularity across the spectrum of Democratic Party constituents, and also on both sides of the US political divide…‘For the Biden team, that hits on a critical area – to be able to say she worked on these tough cases and brought along our allies. And that’s the kind of tough but cooperative message they are trying to get out there,’ said James Green, who was minister counselor for trade affairs at the US embassy in Beijing while Tai was at the USTR in Washington.”

In an op-ed for Global Times, Sun Chenghao, a research fellow with the Institute of America Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, expects that as Biden inherited the key foreign policy advisors from the Obama administration, U.S. foreign policy will maintain the alliance-focused strategy of the Obama years, but the attention will be directed toward the U.S.-China rivalry:

“Blinken said Trump has weakened American alliances, abandoned US values and gave China a green light to trample on so-called human rights and democracy. This reflects the reality that the Biden administration will underline human rights and democracy, and will create an ideological alliance by uniting its allies such as Europe, Japan and South Korea in a bid to pile pressure on China…On issues including global governance, climate change and the Iran nuclear deal, Biden is very likely to continue Obama’s philosophy. But when it comes to relations with China, he may incorporate some of Trump’s ideas.”

India

A commentary in the liberal Indian Express predicts that with Blinken as Secretary of State, U.S.-India relations will become a high priority and continue to strengthen under the Biden administration:

“Blinken talked about the Obama administration making India a ‘major defence partner.’ This epithet was the first time a US administration gave anyone outside its traditional partners…’In a Biden administration, we would be an advocate for India to play a leading role in international institutions and that includes helping India get a seat on a United Nations Security Council,’ he said.”

In an op-ed for The Tribune, Sandeep Dikshit, a former Member of Parliament, suggests that although the bilateral relations are expected to deepen between two countries in the upcoming administration, human rights in India is likely to remain under pressure from the U.S.:

“Prime Minister Narendra Modi is unlikely to get a free pass on the CAA and the NRC. He may also be nudged from his hard-line position of not talking to Pakistan and asserting that all that remains to be discussed on Kashmir is handing over the occupied part to India…[The Indian American Muslim Council] wanted Blinken, whom it briefed in April this year on the CAA and the NRC, to pursue modifications in both laws to end the ‘inherent anti-Muslim bias’.”

A commentary in The Print sees Anthony Blinken as a strong interlocutor for New Delhi as the Biden administration aims to build on strategic gains made under the Trump administration:

“Considered to be Biden’s ‘alter ego’, former deputy secretary of state Blinken is expected to continue maintaining the strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, keeping an eye on checking Chinese aggression in the region…Biden administration’s focus on leveraging the partnership with India at the level of the ‘Quad’ is likely to come at a later stage, work on the Indo-Pacific and attempts to get more countries under the framework will begin immediately.”

Japan

A commentary in the center-right The Japan Times expects that under the advice of Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration is expected to prioritize U.S. allies in East Asia and help mend bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea:

“Blinken, a veteran diplomat and former point man on promoting trilateralism between Washington and its allies in Seoul and Tokyo, is widely expected to devote significant attention to the South Korea-Japan relationship…Sullivan, who also held top positions in the State Department and White House under President Barack Obama, is likely to be eyeing ways to bring like-minded U.S. allies such as Japan closer after four years of Trump’s ‘America First’ push.”

A commentary in the business-focused Nikkei Asia Report argues that despite having a similar team of diplomats from the Obama years, the Biden administration will be facing a greater challenge in Asia-Pacific because geopolitical landscape in the region has changed drastically:

“The issues of the region have changed exponentially since the team was last in power. The sprawling TPP agreement Blinken helped craft has gone on without the U.S., which effectively forfeited its leadership in regional trade when Trump abruptly withdrew. And the recent signing of the RCEP without American participation is seen as a wake-up call for Washington…[C]onditioning political relations on democracy could be alienating to exactly those states that the U.S. would like to rally to its banner in the regional competition with China: states like the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand.”

A commentary in The Japan Times worries that Secretary of Defense candidate Lloyd Austin could be a signal of the U.S. paying less attention in security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region:

“[T]he glaring omission of any discussion of China or the Indo-Pacific region [in Biden’s announcement of Austin’s candidacy] — which the Biden camp has said will be a top foreign policy priority for his administration — risked sending an alarming message to regional allies such as Japan amid hopes for a continued U.S.-led charge confronting an increasingly assertive Beijing…Prior to Biden’s announcement, Japanese defense and diplomatic officials had said they were taking a wait-and-see approach with Biden and his Cabinet picks, though some have privately voiced concerns that the incoming administration could be less willing to confront Beijing.”

Russia

In an op-ed for government funded RT, George Szamuely, a senior research fellow at Global Policy Institute in London, predicts that by picking Anthony Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the Biden administration will have more global interventions and regime-change operations, resembling the Clinton and Obama years:

“Blinken’s outlook is that of a career US interventionist, as is that of Sullivan. The opinions of other countries are worth considering only if they coincide with the views of US policymakers…A Blinken-run foreign policy will unquestionably mean abundant use of the familiar regime-change weapons in the US armory: bombs, cruise missiles, weapons shipments to jihadist and neo-Nazi groups to wage proxy wars, economic sanctions, fake “civil society” projects. As for the vaunted ‘international organizations’ that Blinken supposedly champions, their role will be to sign off on US projects.”

A commentary in state-owned Sputnik News criticizes Lloyd Austin’s role as a board member of Raytheon Technology and suggests that Austin’s apparent close ties with the defense contractors means that the U.S. is unlikely to reduce arms sales to its security partners around the world:

“If his selection is ultimately confirmed, this would give an arms manufacturer official direct oversight of the nation’s $750 billion annual defense budget…This may also clash with Biden’s own policy pledges. During his primary campaign, the former vice president promised to suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia and drop US support for the monarchy’s continued bombardment of Yemen.”

A commentary in RT suggests that Russian officials are relieved by Biden’s pick for Secretary of State because Anthony Blinken is seen as the more favorable candidate compared to other possible alternatives, including Susan Rice:

“Blinken is considered to be ‘sane’ by Moscow, as opposed to Rice, who an official called ‘possessed.’ In particular, one official noted Blinken will have ‘a negotiating mandate’ and ‘direct access to the president,’ in contrast to representatives of the Trump administration, who did not always reflect the position of the leader.”

Rising Powers React to the Busiest Diplomatic Season of 2020

Policy Alert #218 | December 1, 2020

Against the rising level of COVID infections around the world, November has been an eventful month for multilateral diplomatic engagements. Leaders and representatives of Rising Powers met virtually at a slew of international summits, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits on November 10 and 30, the East Asia Summit (EAS) on November 14, the signing of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on the sideline of ASEAN Summit on November 15, the Brazil-Russia-India- China-South Africa (BRICS) on November 17, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on November 20, and the G20 Summit on November 21.

In this Policy Alert, we highlight the Rising Powers’ most notable reactions to the outcomes of the busiest diplomatic season this year in November.

China

At the SCO summit on November 10, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated China’s firm opposition to “interference by external forces in the domestic affairs” while also warning against unilateralism and calling for more multilateral cooperation: “The international community now faces a major test with choices to be made between multilateralism and unilateralism, openness and seclusion, cooperation and confrontation.”

After the signing of RCEP, the world’s largest free trade agreement including 15 participating countries and accounting for about 30% of global GDP, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang praised the agreement as “a monumental achievement in East Asian regional cooperation, but more important, a victory of multilateralism and free trade.” At the APEC summit, President Xi welcomed the signing of RCEP and announced that China “will favorably consider joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).”

An editorial from the state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times suggests that India would benefit from more economic cooperation among SCO member states: “If India can put aside its political differences with some member states and promote economic exchanges within the multilateral framework, there will still be considerable room for economic cooperation between India and other SCO member states.”
A commentary article in South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, warns that the signing of RCEP, which is expected to cut as much as 90% of tariffs among its member states, is likely to generate a severe impact on the economy of Taiwan: “[T]he economic ministry has acknowledged that Taiwan’s petrochemical, steel and machinery industries may be affected by the trade agreement…The RCEP trade deal is also a blow to Taiwan’s ‘New Southbound Policy’ which has sought to reduce the island’s economic reliance on mainland China by actively boosting engagement with many of the very countries that have now joined the RCEP.”
In an op-ed for Global Times, Jorge Heine, a professor at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies and a Wilson Center global fellow, foresees that a potential integration between RCEP and CPTPP will bring Asia-Pacific to the center of world affairs: “Asia and Australasia are moving ahead with regional economic integration, while the North Atlantic countries continue to wallow in protectionism and arcane disputes about how to finalize Brexit…[W]e could look at the possibility of a merger between the RCEP and the TPP11, that would be a real game-changer.”

India

At the SCO summit on November 10, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi raised the linkage between the challenge of territorial disputes and the prospect of economic cooperation: “[I]t is unfortunate that repeated attempts are being made to unnecessarily bring bilateral issues to the SCO agenda, which violate the SCO Charter and Shanghai Spirit…India believes that to enhance connectivity it is important that we move forward while respecting one another’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

At the East Asia Summit, Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar commented on the importance of adhering to international law and respecting territorial integrity while condemning “actions and incidents that erode trust” in the South China Sea. A day after the signing of RCEP Jaishankar criticized free trade agreements without making a direct reference to RCEP: “In the name of openness, we have allowed subsidized products and unfair production advantages from abroad to prevail…The effect of past trade agreements has been to deindustrialize some sectors. The consequences of future ones would lock us into global commitments, many of them not to our advantage.”

In an op-ed in the liberal The Indian Express, Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to ASEAN, expects that under Chinese pressure, ASEAN is unlikely to produce a coordinated effort to address security issues in the region, and that India should pursue its interests in the Indo-Pacific region bilaterally: “The India-Japan-Australia and India-Australia-France agreements to pursue value chains in the region can draw sustenance from these documents and move ahead with interested ASEAN countries since, like China, India too will now put priority to bilateral relationships with select ASEAN countries.”
In an op-ed for The Tribune, Shyam Saran, former Indian Foreign Secretary and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, warns that India’s conservative policies toward multilateral trade agreements could undermine its overall Indo-Pacific strategy: “We have looked upon free trade and other regional economic arrangements through the prism of imports into India. The aspect of India’s market access to other large markets is often ignored…An Indo-Pacific strategy without a policy of deep engagement with ASEAN and East Asian countries would lack credibility. It cannot just be premised on closer security arrangements with friendly partners in the region. It must have a strong and vibrant economic dimension as well.”

Japan

At the East Asia Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga expressed concerns about the territorial disputes in the region: “In the East China Sea, activities that violate Japan’s sovereignty continue, and in the South China Sea, there have been actions that increase tensions such as ballistic missile launches and further militarization of the features, and claims that are inconsistent with the UNCLOS.”

At the APEC summit a few days later, Prime Minister Suga restated Japan’s interest in further advancing free trade in the region based on the foundation of RCEP and CPTPP and reiterated the call to establish Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, a Japanese vision to integrate all 21 APEC member economies.

In an op-ed for center-right The Japan Times, Kuni Miyake, President of the Foreign Policy Institute, research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies, and a special adviser to Prime Minister Suga’s Cabinet, casts doubts to the prospect of China joining CPTPP and assures that China’s participation, though highly unlikely, would not pose a threat to Japan: “[T]o be accepted as a new member, China needs to fundamentally change its restrictive trade practices, laws and regulations…If Beijing wishes to join a new TPP, it is welcome to join after it changes its current trade regulations to meet CPTPP requirements…If China transforms itself into a real free trading nation without “Chinese characteristics,” its inclusion in the group is always welcome.”
An editorial from the progressive Asahi Shimbun expresses disappointment on India’s absence in RCEP and proposes that Japan should encourage the U.S. to return to the path of international cooperation: “Japan should continue tenacious efforts to persuade India to enroll itself by supporting the country’s efforts to nurture domestic industries…Japan should do more to help restore the WTO’s ability to establish and enforce international rules by pressing the United States to return to the policy of pursuing and respecting multilateral trade frameworks.”

Russia

At the SCO summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted the rising level of security cooperation among SCO member states and hoped that the trend will continue to develop: “[F]oreign policy and military cooperation between the SCO states has intensified significantly…We consider this undertaking to be useful and hope that such extended meetings of natural partners will become regular.” In addition, President Putin also castigated foreign meddling in SCO member states: “Belarusians are entitled to a chance to sort things out calmly and take the necessary steps on their own. The same is true of the recent events in Kyrgyzstan and the political struggle in Moldova.”

A commentary article in the nationalist Pravda Report proposes that international organizations like the SCO could counterbalance the potential hawkish policies against Russia under the upcoming Biden administration: “Russia cannot resist this onslaught on the East single-handedly without joining efforts with other Eurasian states that have no wish to find themselves among the powerless vassals of the United States…In the context of deep transformation of international relations and associated risks, the SCO appears as one of the important pillars of a new world order based on the rule of international law, equal and indivisible security, respect for civilizational diversity and sovereignty.”
In an interview with state-owned Sputnik News, economist Michael Roberts argues that the potential trade gains with RCEP member states will compensate for China’s deteriorating economic relations with the U.S.: “The gains in trade and income from the RCEP over the next decade will go a considerable way in compensating China for the losses in trade and incomes from the U.S.-China tariff and technology war…We can expect to see trade between the US and China drop sharply over the next decade. That reflects the growing nationalist reaction in China to what it perceives as a pernicious attack on its economic and political interests by America.”

How Are Rising Powers Responding to Results of the 2020 U.S. Election?

Policy Alert #217 | November 12, 2020

After four days of vote counting, news organizations on Nov 7 declared Democratic candidates Joe Biden and Kamala Harris as the winners of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Although incumbent President Donald Trump refused to concede to Biden and vowed to legally challenge the result of the election, leaders around the world, including French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, have congratulated Biden and Harris on their victory.

Given Biden’s track record as Vice President during the Obama administration, world leaders await drastically different U.S. policies compared to President Trump. What are the expectations of the Rising Powers on the upcoming leadership of Biden and Harris? In this Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ reactions to the results of the 2020 U.S. Election.

China

Consistent with its pre-election attitude, China has been cautious with official comments in the aftermath of the U.S. election. President Xi Jinping has yet to congratulate Biden on his victory. On Nov 5, Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng responded to a U.S. election question at a press conference: “China’s attitude toward the bilateral relations is clear and consistent. Although there are differences between the two countries, they also have extensive common interests and room for cooperation. We hope that the next U.S. government will meet China halfway; uphold the principles of non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation; focus on collaboration; manage differences; and push forward bilateral ties along the right track.”

During a regular press conference on Nov 9, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin answered a question on Biden’s victory: “ [W]e noticed that Mr. Biden has declared election victory. We understand the presidential election result will be determined following the U.S. laws and procedures. We always believe China and the United States should strengthen communication and dialogue, manage differences on the basis of mutual respect, expand cooperation based on mutual benefit, and promote the sound and stable development of China-U.S. relations.”

An editorial from South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, predicts a potentially bitter but more pragmatic and predictable relationship between the U.S. and China under Biden: “There is good reason for reticence; anti-Chinese sentiment has bipartisan support among American lawmakers and there is a possibility that the new president could take an even tougher stance. As a seasoned politician, though, Biden knows the importance of diplomacy and cooperation and on that score, there is at least the likelihood that ties between the two most important economies will return to a more predictable and even-keeled course.”
An editorial from the state-owned nationalist tabloid Global Times warns that Biden will remain tough on China as U.S. strategy toward China has shifted fundamentally under Trump: “Most analysts believe that the high-intensity conflicts launched by the Trump administration, including the trade war, have reset the general environment of China-US relations and changed the US elites’ thinking toward China… China should not harbor any illusions that Biden’s election will ease or bring a reversal to China-US relations, nor should it weaken its belief in improving bilateral ties. US competition with China and its guard against China will only intensify.”
In an op-ed for Global Times, Su Xiaohui, the deputy director of the Department for International and Strategic Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, foresees that there will not be any military conflict between the U.S. and China under Biden, but the U.S. will maintain its military posture in the region: “Biden has said that Russia is the biggest threat to US security, and characterized China as a competitor rather than an adversary. It is safe to say that the US has no will to have a war with China… Regardless of who is selected as the new defense secretary, he or she will emphasize China’s challenge and US’ absolute supremacy in regions such as the Asia-Pacific. Hegemony lies behind US’ habitual military actions.”
In an op-ed for Global Times, Dong Yifan, a research fellow with the Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, suggests that Biden will try to repair transatlantic relations, but Europe has become more independent under Trump: “The EU will not try too hard to follow Washington after Biden takes office, because European countries still have their own control over foreign relations. In recent years, the EU has been stressing the importance of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty. It does not want to be easily manipulated by major powers.”

India

Indian leaders responded quickly to Biden’s victory. In a Twitter post, Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Biden soon after the election was called on Nov 7: “Congratulations @JoeBiden on your spectacular victory! As the VP, your contribution to strengthening Indo-US relations was critical and invaluable. I look forward to working closely together once again to take India-US relations to greater heights.” On a separate post, Modi praised Harris: “Heartiest congratulations @KamalaHarris! Your success is pathbreaking, and a matter of immense pride not just for your chittis, but also for all Indian-Americans. I am confident that the vibrant India-US ties will get even stronger with your support and leadership.”

Besides Prime Minister Modi, other Indian political leaders also lauded the Biden-Harris victory. Ruling BJP General Secretary Ram Madhav praised the two country’s strong bipartisan bilateral relationship based on principles of democracy, mutual benefits, and global peace, whereas Sonia Gandhi, President of the opposition Congress Party, praised that the victory would work to heal the division among the people and called Harris “a beloved daughter of India.”

An editorial from the liberal The Indian Express points out that the Biden’s moderate approach will define U.S. domestic and foreign policy: “Biden has never been a crusader for political causes. His defining qualities were ideological flexibility and the capacity to adapt to the changing political circumstances… By simply not being Trump, Biden begins with a huge political advantage at home and abroad. How he turns that opportunity into effective policy outcomes remains to be seen.”
An editorial from the pro-government The Pioneer suggests that a new Biden administration is unlikely to be different for India because U.S. policies are guided by national interest and strategic concerns: “[T]he Biden-Harris team is as wary of China and committed to supporting India as a bulwark State… India could benefit with Biden planning to resume US’s position at most global alliances and UN bodies that Trump had walked out of while pursuing his brand of protectionism and nationalism.”
In the business-oriented Economic Times, journalist and commentator Seema Sirohi suggests that India will have to work harder to be happy with the Biden administration, with the state of Indian democracy likely to come under more scrutiny, and some possible re-adjustments on Pakistan and China: “Bottomline: Both Pakistan and China have room to play, plant seeds and exploit the Dems’ tendency to debate.“
In an op-ed for The Indian Express, C. Raja Mohan, the director of Institute of South Asian Studies at National University of Singapore, argues that the Indian debate on U.S.-Indian relations is narrowly focused on the elections, and that India should pay more attention to the inner-workings of policy making in Washington: “Russia and China have invested quite heavily in academic and policy research on the US… India went the other way. Just as relations with the US began to take off, India shut down a premier institute – the American Studies Research Centre at Osmania University, Hyderabad.”

Japan

In a Twitter post, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga congratulated Biden and Harris on Nov 7: “Warm congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris. I look forward to working with you to further strengthen the Japan-US Alliance and ensure peace, freedom, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.” On the same day, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi also said on Twitter: “Congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris. I look forward to working closely with the new administration to further promote Japan-US relations and to overcome challenges the world faces.”

In addition to sending blessings, Prime Minister Suga held phone talks on Nov 12 with Biden regarding the U.S. commitments to the security alliance with Japan. Speaking to reporters after the call, Suga said the Biden administration made clear that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation would apply to the Senkaku Islands, but the readout from Biden’s transition team confirmed the President-elect’s commitment to the U.S.-Japan security alliance without mentioning the islands by name.

An editorial from the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun hopes for a stable relationship between the two countries under Biden while emphasizing the importance of the security alliance: “Biden has indicated that he intended to focus on the alliance, and senior officials from the administration of former President Barack Obama are expected to take up pivotal diplomatic posts. A high-ranking Japanese Foreign Ministry official confided that he felt “much more at ease” than four years ago.”
An editorial from the progressive Asahi Shimbun expects that Biden is facing the challenge of restoring reconciliation domestically and rebuilding the global order internationally: “Biden should understand that he has a historic duty to correct the course of the world’s leading power… The world will watch closely whether his policy actions will lead to the United States’ return to multilateral cooperation, as the international community is hoping for, and end the ‘America First’ agenda of the Trump administration.”
In an op-ed for the business-focused Nikkei Asia Report, Ryan Hass, the Chair of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, argues that while the rise of China is the greatest challenge to U.S. foreign policy in Asia, Biden’s policy toward China will not be identical to the Obama administration since the geopolitics in the region has changed in the last four years: “Biden’s views on China are responsive to the increasingly competitive nature of the U.S.-China relationship… Biden has declared that developments in Xinjiang represent acts of genocide. He has spoken with moral clarity on Hong Kong. He has highlighted the importance of Taiwan. And he has vowed to resume the past practice of presidential meetings with the Dalai Lama… Biden’s top advisers generally are skeptical of China’s ambitions.”

Russia

Similar to China’s caution, Russia has been reluctant to make official comments on the Biden-Harris victory while citing the ongoing legal process. On Nov 9, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: “Obviously, you can see that certain legal procedures are coming there, which were announced by the incumbent president – therefore this situation is different, so we consider it correct to wait for the official announcement.”

In contrast, Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who is currently recovering from poisoning in Germany, applauded Biden and Harris on their victory: “Congratulations to @JoeBiden and @KamalaHarris on the victory and to the Americans on defining the new leadership in a free and fair election. This is a privilege which is not available to all countries. Looking forward to the new level of cooperation between Russia and the US.”

In an interview with the official state-owned news outlet TASS, Former President of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his wishes on the recovery of mutual trust between the U.S. and Russia: “I hope that Joe Biden will strive to normalize relations and recover trust between our countries. I am confident that this is in the interest of both America and Russia… This is the place of the US in global politics: relations with America are important to everyone, to every country. I am confident that Russia needs good relations with the US as well, but not at any cost, of course.”
In an interview with TASS, Russian Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov warned about Biden’s potential hostility toward Russia: “Speaking about Biden, he is a globalist and Russia’s main enemy. They set out a task to destroy and suffocate Russia… They are continuing the old barbaric policy in Ukraine still, they are viciously stifling [them] in brotherly Belarus. This is the deep state, it is propped by the military. Even though Trump changed them a few times, but their anti-Russian policy did not change.”
In an op-ed for the government-funded RT, Glenn Diesen, an Associate Professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, identifies the alleged meddling of U.S. elections by Russia as conspiracy theories driven by domestic U.S. politics: “Former US Ambassador to Russia and leading Russiagate conspiracy theorist Michael McFaul sees yet another conspiracy in Putin’s failure to congratulate Biden, and suggests that Americans doubting the legitimacy of Biden are playing into the hands of the Russians… Moscow’s patience in terms of holding off congratulations should be interpreted as an effort to respect the democratic institutions of America, and its own normal protocols. There is no history of the Kremlin congratulating a US election winner before their opponent concedes.”

What Are the Rising Powers’ Expectations as the 2020 U.S. Election Approaches?

Policy Alert #216 | October 30, 2020

After four years of President Donald Trump’s unconventional foreign policies, the 2020 U.S. Election has become the most anticipated political transition closely followed by all major powers around the world. With COVID infections surging in most countries, the results of the Presidential and Congressional election on November 3 not only lead to significant political impacts globally, but also generate serious consequences on the prospect of post-pandemic recovery.

In this RPI Policy Alert, we examine the Rising Powers’ expectations as the election day is around the corner.

China

An editorial from People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of China, urges the U.S. to stop making an issue out of China during the election:

“The US can neither achieve lasting unity by ‘making’ foreign enemies at the expense of America’s own interests nor deceive the public for a long time by playing a dangerous game of misleading the world about its relationship with China, as truth will come to light sooner or later. It should be noted that the extreme words and deeds of the US for grabbing attention and gaining private profits will harm the country’s future.”

In an op-ed for Global Times, a nationalist tabloid, Wei Zongyou, professor at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that regardless of who wins in November, the next administration will continue to be tough on China. Wei also expects that a potential Biden administration will be tough on economic and human rights issues, but more open to climate change cooperation and people exchanges between the two countries:

“While Biden does not agree with the Trump administration’s approach to China-US economic relations, especially with the latter’s using of tariffs to cope with trade imbalances, he also emphasizes ‘fair trade.’ Biden also claims, ‘Economic security is national security.’ He has vowed to enforce economic foreign policy for the middle class to safeguard US manufactures and jobs. Moreover, he aims to protect US intellectual property, technology, and supply chain security.”

A commentary article in South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, predicts that Biden’s White House will be more favorable for the Chinese economy for two reasons:

“At the very least, markets might conclude that a Biden White House will be less wedded than Trump to steel and aluminum tariffs, perhaps to tariffs in general. If so, that would have positive implications for China’s economy and its exporters, especially if accompanied by a change of tack in the way Washington seeks to engage with Beijing on key issues.”

In an op-ed for South China Morning Post, Ian Storey and Malcolm Cook, research fellows at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, foresee that although the hard-line U.S. strategy toward China in Southeast Asia is likely to remain unchanged no matter who wins, U.S. policy execution in the region will be less unpredictable under a potential Biden administration:

“Overall, America’s image in Southeast Asia has suffered over the past four years. In its annual survey of regional elite opinions in January 2020, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute found that 49.7 per cent had little or no confidence that the United States would “do the right thing” internationally, while 77 per cent believed America’s engagement with Southeast Asia had declined since Trump took office. Three-fifths agreed that a change of leadership in the November 2020 US presidential election would increase their confidence in America’s position in the region.”

India

In an op-ed for the left-leaning The Hindu, T.P. Sreenivasan, former Ambassador of India and Governor for India of the IAEA, criticizes President Trump’s unpredictable foreign policies and disengagement from multilateral institutions, which he argues has undermined the post-war international system. Sreenivasan also sees no change in bilateral relationship between India and the U.S. no matter who wins the election:

“In the international arena, the Trump administration’s biggest disservice was the undermining of the post-war architecture of peace, which was built brick by brick by the U.S. and its allies. The UN, which is at the center of multilateralism, has been weakened to the extent of being paralyzed… the U.S. threw the baby out with the bathwater when it withdrew support from the World Health Organization (WHO). This left China as the champion of the WHO.”

An editorial from the business-focused Economic Times forecasts further bilateral cooperation between India and the U.S. in security, technology, and public health:

“Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), satellite surveillance, cybersecurity, robotics and materials are integral parts of emerging strategic capability. Equipping powers that are committed to a common goal in all areas of strategic capability is an integral goal of continuing, multifaceted dialogue between countries such as India and the US.”

In an op-ed for the liberal Indian Express, Amitabh Mattoo, Professor of Disarmament Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University , argues that the rise of a belligerent China is the main reason why the relationship with the U.S. is the most important of India’s bilateral ties, and that both parties in the U.S. favor engagement with India:

“Balancing is the most challenging and confrontational option and is likely to be the preferred option of the Trump Presidency. India is not in a position to balance China on its own, and balancing (soft and hard: economic, diplomatic and military) would demand building a coalition with the US and other “like-minded” states.”

In an op-ed for Indian Express, Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution, points out that U.S. foreign policy under the new administration will have more significant implications for India. Madan emphasizes that U.S. policy toward China and American leadership in the world will be two of the most consequential factors:

“For the Indian government, the Trump administration’s more hawkish view of China has been welcome. It broadly converges with Indian concerns about a rising China’s actions and intentions. And it has facilitated, if not driven, the Trump administration to assign India an important role in its strategic framework, including through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept… If Trump wins, India will carefully consider three elements: Whether Trump stays the course or again pivots on China, which officials remain in or join the administration, and how Beijing responds to a Trump victory.”

Japan

In an op-ed for the center-right The Japan Times, Kuni Miyake, president of the Foreign Policy Institute and research director at Canon Institute for Global Studies, suggests that U.S. policy toward China remains the central concern for Japan. Miyake adds that while President Trump has been unpredictable toward China, U.S. policy has traditionally been consistent and he does not expect a potential Biden administration going back to engagement with China:

“Washington’s China policy is consistent. It has been a combination of “engagement and deterrence” for the past few decades and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future. The only difference is the priority. In his second term, U.S. President Barack Obama shifted his emphasis from engagement to deterrence.”

A commentary article from the left-leaning The Mainichi worries that no matter who wins in November, bilateral trade negotiations with the U.S. will remain a demanding challenging for Japan:

“The schedule and style of talks may differ substantially depending on who emerges the victor, but both President Donald Trump and Democratic challenger Joe Biden are likely to push for greater market access to Japan as they focus on protecting American industries and jobs to revive the U.S. economy hit by the coronavirus pandemic.”

A commentary article from The Japan Times proposes that if Trump wins a second term, Japan would need to focus on building stronger ties with other democracies around the world:

“[D]emands by the U.S. that Tokyo take an adversarial stance toward Beijing, as opposed to objecting to specific problematic behavior, is an approach that creates immense difficulties for Japan and ultimately is unsustainable… these moves may prompt Japan to seek coordination and solidarity with other partners such as the European Union, Australia, India and even South Korea, which currently remains embroiled with Japan in a row over historical and trade issues.”

Russia

In response to Biden’s comment on Russia being the greatest security threat to the U.S. and its allies, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said:

“It’s not right, we strongly disagree with that assertion. We can only regret that hatred against Russia is being spread this way and our country is depicted as an adversary.”

Facing U.S. allegations of election interference, Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergei Naryshkin emphasizes that Russia is not planning to meddle in the US presidential election and wishes less confrontations in the U.S. society:

“I would like to emphasize that the degree of calm when holding the US election is also affecting Russia. I mean that two US political camps tend to turn to very unfair propaganda too often, although propaganda is mostly unfair. But the stronger the confrontation between them, the more the propaganda machines of the Republican and the Democratic camps use lies and a myth of Russia’s alleged meddling in the election, Russian aggression and Russian threat, which is not true. We don’t need this.”

Responding to a question on the potential domestic turbulence of the U.S. election, Naryshkin foresees that the upcoming U.S. election could be destabilizing for the country:

“The risks you are mentioning do exist. It is not a secret. We and the whole world in general do not need additional turbulence, no one needs domestic political instability [in the US], considering that the US is a nuclear power. Therefore, we will be hoping for the best.”

In an op-ed for the government-funded RT, Glenn Diesen, a professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway and an editor at the Russia in Global Affairs journal, warns that Biden’s perception of Russia as the greatest security threat is based on emotion and outdated ideology, which creates concerns about the future of European security:

“Russia’s alleged effort to restore the Soviet empire similarly lacks coherence. The accusation evokes familiar and powerful Cold War connotations that can mobilize political support and resources among NATO states… Moscow is not led by communists seeking to rid the world of capitalism. Russia has neither the interest nor capacity to control a foreign population that does not want to live within Russian borders.”

In an op-ed for the independent, Dutch-based The Moscow Times, Tatyana Stanovaya, a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that while it is generally believed that the Kremlin favors Trump over Biden, Russian elites may see some benefits under a potential Biden administration:

“[T]here are those in the Russian elite who see more problems from Trump’s presidency than advantages. These people include a sizeable proportion of the diplomatic service and other experts who advise the authorities on foreign policy issues, but who don’t take part in the decision-making process. As far as they are concerned, the increased unpredictability and reduced professionalism of U.S. politics under Trump is a threat not only to the U.S. state, but to the entire global community, including Russia.”

RPI acknowledges support from the Carnegie Corporation and MacArthur Foundation.

Rising Powers Evaluate the Quad’s Future

Policy Alert #215 | October 14, 2020

In the first week of October, the Quad – a strategic forum that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – held its second-ever foreign ministers meeting in Japan. Despite the anticipation of the meeting’s potential progress in transforming the Quad into an “Asian NATO,” the ministerial meeting in Tokyo did not lead to any joint statement nor significant deepening of security cooperation, while the U.S. stood out as the only participant who made specific remarks targeting China at the meeting.

Due to President Trump’s COVID diagnosis, Mike Pompeo had to cut visits to Mongolia and South Korea from his Asia trip, but the U.S. Secretary of State took the opportunity in Tokyo to rally support from Washington’s closest allies in the Indo-Pacific for a deeper collaboration against China’s regional influence and to accuse China of covering up and worsening the pandemic. Secretary Pompeo stated that it is “more critical now than ever that we collaborate to protect our people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption and coercion,” pointing to recent Chinese activities in the East and South China Seas, the Mekong region, the Himalayas, and the Taiwan Strait.

In contrast, Australia, Japan, and India made no specific mention of China or the Communist Party of China by name. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne emphasized that the Quad “has a positive agenda” and that the region should be “governed by rules, not power.” Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that the goal of the Quad should be “advancing the security and the economic interests of all countries having legitimate and vital interests in the region.” Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi expressed interest in expanding multilateral cooperation with European countries, stating that it is “important to cooperate with as many nations as possible that share these basic values and common rules.”

In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers on how they evaluate the Quad’s future role in the Indo-Pacific amid the rising level of geopolitical competition in the region.

China

Before the Quad meeting, Beijing clearly iterated its concern of China being the center of attention. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin commented on the Quad meeting by advocating against “forming exclusive cliques” while insisting that “multilateral and plurilateral cooperation should be open, inclusive and transparent.” Wang also added, “Instead of targeting third parties or undermining third parties’ interests, cooperation should be conducive to mutual understanding and trust between regional countries.”

After the meeting, the Chinese Embassy in Japan released a statement criticizing Secretary Pompeo. The statement accused Pompeo of “repeatedly fabricated lies about China” and “maliciously manufactured political confrontation” and reiterated Beijing’s position of urging Washington to “abandon the Cold War mentality and ideological bias.” Subsequently, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying repeated that “organizing closed and exclusive cliques will not help enhance mutual trust and cooperation,” while she also emphasized that Beijing wishes “relevant countries will bear in mind the common interests of all countries and mankind and focus on beating the virus with collective efforts while creating a peaceful environment and cooperation opportunities for regional and global economic recovery.”

In an op-ed from the nationalist tabloid Global Times, Xin Qiang, the deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, questions Washington’s effectiveness in gathering the support from the Indo-Pacific region to balance China: “Although the US has made great efforts to woo its allies to check and balance China, its effect is limited. These countries have gradually been aware of US unreliability – breach of promises, flouting international rules, and ignoring international obligations. They cannot depend on such a country to commit to alliance obligations.”
A commentary article from South China Morning Post, an independent newspaper based in Hong Kong, points out that although India and Australia were not enthusiastic about the Quad when the forum was first established in 2007, the two countries have been stepping up in recent years while also improving their bilateral relations: “India and Australia appear to have not only warmed up to the idea of the Quad, but also to each other, even as both have individual concerns about upsetting China.”
In an op-ed from the nationalist tabloid Global Times, Zhang Jiadong, the director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, argues that China should support a free, open, and inclusive regional order and that China needs to be “more scientific” in positioning its relationship with the world, especially in terms of values: “China should emphasize its commonness with Chinese characteristics in world civilization. Only in this way will the U.S. efforts to establish an anti-China alliance system under the banner of ‘differences in value and culture’ not be widely recognized and supported. Then China can change the current unfavorable situation.”

India

Since the September sideline meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) September gathering in Moscow, the tensions between India and China have been de-escalating as both sides agreed to disengage troops at the disputed border. At the ministerial meeting in Tokyo, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar avoided mentioning China and its ruling party and suggested the Quad should emphasize the “security and the economic interests of all countries having legitimate and vital interests in the region.” While not directly targeting China, Minister Jaishankar made the point that, “As vibrant and pluralistic democracies with shared values, our nations have collectively affirmed the importance of maintaining a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.”

An editorial from the left-leaning The Hindu highlights Washington’s intention of turning the Quad into a full-fledged military alliance of countries against China and proposes that the Indian government “should not downplay the import of such openly stated intentions” as New Delhi has thus far charted its course based on strategic autonomy: “Mr. Pompeo’s words could well be bluster borne of politics ahead of the U.S. elections, but they point to an interest in bringing India into bilateral tensions in the Indo-Pacific, while inviting the Quad to take a role in India-China tensions as well. The Modi government has rebuffed such suggestions, and any shift would be unwise now.”
An editorial from the center-right The Times of India praises the Quad meeting as a movement toward the formalization of the platform in light of growing Chinese assertiveness and advises New Delhi to step up the security partnership as a low-cost way of balancing Beijing. The editorial also suggests that the security partnership should be expanded to other East Asian nations to create a platform that can resist China’s bullying: “China does hold the strategic-security-economic advantage in one-on-one scenarios with most countries in the Indo-Pacific. Beijing’s insistence on bilateral dealings to resolve issues exemplifies this point. Which is why having a multilateral or plurilateral platform to counterbalance China is far more effective. And the Quad can be the nucleus of such a platform.”
An editorial from the pro-BJP government The Pioneer accuses China as an avaricious maximalist who sees India as a thorn in its flesh. The editorial remains uncertain about the prospect of the Quad evolving into a security alliance like NATO, while it specifically promotes stronger bilateral relations between India and Australia: “China’s recent belligerence despite gifting the world the pandemic that has ripped the global economy to shreds, driven millions into poverty and destabilized the global system means that the Quad is not just sending a message to Xi and other Chinese Communist Party members. It is also telling the rest of the world that four large and successful democracies are willing to stand up to Beijing’s bullying and that other nations can take shelter behind them…Australia, too, has spearheaded the campaign to unveil the conspiracy behind the Wuhan virus and is at the receiving end of Chinese hit back at its economy, there is a shared concern. India has to map out a strategy of opening doors of cooperation in relation to its Andaman and Nicobar Islands with Australia.”

Japan

The rising tensions between China and the U.S. present a serious diplomatic challenge for Japan’s new Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. Similar to the remarks from Australia and India, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi avoided echoing Secretary Pompeo’s direct criticism against Beijing, but instead emphasized Japan’s interest in multilateral cooperation by advocating the potential inclusion of France and Germany in the Indo-Pacific dialogue. In addition to the Quad meeting, Minister Motegi and Secretary Pompeo met on the sideline and reinforced the significance of U.S.-Japan bilateral relations as a cornerstone of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific under the Suga administration.

An editorial from the progressive Asahi Shimbun urges that the Quad should not be a tool for the United States’ battle with China over global hegemony when their rivalry is becoming increasingly intense and acrimonious: “The reality is that many countries, including members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, are not willing to clearly take sides with either Washington or Beijing. The only way for other countries to deal with China is to seek coexistence based on cooperation while trying to discourage Beijing from taking actions to challenge the existing order and making long-term efforts to extract change from the Chinese government.”
An editorial from the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun stresses the importance of multilateral cooperation in the promotion of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as China attempts to unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea: “It is important for Japan, based on the Japan-U.S. alliance, to cooperate with Australia, India and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to urge China to exercise self-restraint… European countries, including Britain, France and Germany, also have an increasingly high opinion of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision. This may be due to growing wariness over China’s hegemonic behavior.”
In an op-ed for the center-right The Japan Times, Stephen Nay, a senior associate professor at International Christian University and a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo, sees the Quad meeting as an important step in creating an institution that will bring critical public goods to the Indo-Pacific to accelerate its development, promote stability and establish a rule-based order. To achieve such goals, however, Stephen believes that the U.S. needs to constructively maintain economic, diplomatic, and security engagements in the region while incorporating Southeast Asian states, as well as the EU and Canada, into the Quad: “The problem with the Quad as it is currently conceived by the Trump administration is a formulation that will garner little support by its current members and saliently by Southeast Asian states, the countries that are at the geographic center of the Indo-Pacific and the countries that have the most to lose if the Quad is an institution that is primarily an anti-China grouping… Working with current Quad partners, the EU, and other countries such as Canada with an enduring interest in international development, resources should be pooled and or coordinated to building infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and strengthening the resilience and diversity of supply chains in the region.”

Rising Powers and the Afghan Peace Process: How Do They See the Pros and Cons?

Policy Alert #214 | September 30, 2020

Peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government resumed in the second week of September, signaling the next iteration of complex negotiations against the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic. Since assuming office, President Donald Trump has been vocal about his commitment to pulling troops out of Afghanistan and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to Doha to launch the latest talks. If successful, all American military personnel will leave Afghanistan by spring of 2021.

Challenges to a successful outcome is manifold: turmoil of Afghan domestic politics, intrusion from the broader region, and the inconsistent foreign policy of the United States on Afghanistan. Prior attempts to negotiate a roadmap to peace in Afghanistan include a series of meetings between China, the United States, and Russia in 2019, in which the major world powers notably convened without involving Afghanistan itself.

This year, more attempts were initiated for the peace process, which include the plan signed by the United States and Afghanistan on March 1st, stipulating an immediate cease-fire and a commitment by the Taliban that Afghanistan would not serve as a base for terrorist activities against the United States. Further talks for peace were scheduled to begin on March 10 but were paused over the issue of prisoner exchange. As talks subsequently resumed, however, Afghan Senior Vice President Amrullah Saleh was targeted in a convey bombing in Kabul, presumed to be by the Taliban.

With the consistent level of violence in Afghanistan, there is concern that President Trump’s plan to withdraw American troops will add to the region’s instability. Failure of any agreement brokered by the United States leaves room for other rising powers such as China and Russia to influence future negotiations and outcomes even if the process is now ostensibly intra-Afghan. In this RPI Policy Alert, we ask how the Rising Powers are reacting to the on again, off again peace talks on Afghanistan and how they view their interests being served.

China

China consistently supports the peace progress while expressing a clear interest in the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region. After the signing of a peace deal between the U.S. and Taliban in February, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated: “China welcomes the signing of this agreement between the US and Taliban, which we believe will play a positive role in promoting a political settlement of the Afghan issue. China firmly supports a broad and inclusive peace and reconciliation process that is “Afghan-led and Afghan-owned”… Foreign troops should withdraw in an orderly and responsible way so that the situation in Afghanistan will experience a steady transition with no security vacuum for terrorist forces to seize upon and expand themselves.”

Following the announcement of intra-Afghan peace talks in September, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin welcomed the progress emphasizing that the progress is Afghan-led: “Both parties of the intra-Afghan negotiations are brothers. After all these years of twists and turns, they finally came to the negotiating table and opened a new chapter in the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan … China always respects the independent choice of the Afghan people, firmly supports the “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace and reconciliation process, and will continue to be a supporter, mediator and facilitator of the process as always.”

A commentary article from the independent Hong Kong based South China Morning Post suggests that the peace progress in Afghanistan is important for China for two main reasons First, peace in Afghanistan is crucial for the stability of China’s neighboring Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Second, the level of violence seriously affects the outlook of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region. In the article, Andrew Small, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, questions China’s ability to generate a large impact on the peace progress: “China is treading carefully in its Afghan diplomacy, and although it has been willing to act as a host, it has neither the capacity nor the will to act as an active mediator for intra- Afghan talks.”

India

India has elevated its engagements in the peace process. In June 2020, India’s Official Spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs Anurag Srivastava expressed concern about terrorism in Afghanistan, as well as the connections between terrorists and Pakistan: “We note with serious concern reference in the Report to the continued presence of the senior leadership of the UN designated terrorist organization Al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan; as well as a large number of foreign terrorist fighters, including up to 6500 Pakistan nationals, operating in Afghanistan. Besides, UN designated entities like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, operating from Pakistan controlled territories facilitating trafficking and imparting training to other terrorists in Afghanistan.”

During the intra-Afghan peace talks in September, India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar participated via videoconference, while an official delegation led by Joint Secretary J. P. Singh represented India in person, which marks the first time India participated in an official gathering involving the Taliban. Following the event, Minister Jaishankar tweeted five goals of the peace process: (1) be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan- controlled, (2) respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanista, (3) Promote human rights and democracy, (4) ensure interest of minorities, women and the vulnerable, and (5) effectively address violence across the country.

A press release from India’s Ministry of External Affairs highlights India’s support to the economic development projects in Afghanistan and expresses support to the progress of intra-Afghan peace talks: “India’s policy on Afghanistan had been consistent. India believes any peace process must be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled, has to respect the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and preserve the progress made in the establishment of a democratic Islamic Republic in Afghanistan.”

An editorial from the center-right Times of India argues that India should reach out to and work with the Taliban: “India enjoys huge goodwill among the Afghan people because of its development works in Afghanistan. Plus, Taliban isn’t exactly a monolith with multiple Pashtun tribes and factions. In fact, many within Taliban have been wary of Pakistan and make common cause with Pakistani Pashtuns in opposing Islamabad’s oppressive policies. Also, an Afghan peace deal would see Pakistan lose its leverage with the US, which India can capitalize on to realign geopolitical interests.”
In an op-ed the left-leaning The Hindu, D. Suba Chandran, Professor and Dean of the School of Conflict and Security Studies at the National Institute of Advanced Studies in Bengaluru, suggests that the differences between the three main actors in the peace talks – the Afghan government, the Taliban, and the United State – are likely to pose serious challenges to the progress of the negotiations: “If the road from Kabul to Doha was tough, the return would be even tougher and more complicated. It is also possible that the Doha-Kabul journey could be a road to nowhere.”

Russia

While Russia has publicly supported the peace talks and noted it is in the interest of all parties to resolve the conflict, in a February press conference, the Foreign Ministry Spokesperson warned about the credibility of the United States: “One cannot rely on Washington’s statements of intentions. This is pointless and inexpedient. All US statements on troop withdrawals were changed in short- or medium-term perspective as regards the numbers of withdrawn troops, dates of withdrawal or the fact of withdrawal as such. This is why it is useless to rely on such statements. The United States has a national tradition – to change its statements all the time.”

An article from the independent, Dutch-based The Moscow Times shows that Russia wishes to have an increasing role in the peace talks: “Moscow snubbed the Afghan government, sources said, to ensure the participation of the Taliban who refuse to hold talks with Ghani’s representatives to end the 17-year-old Afghan war, branding them puppets of the United States.”
An article from the state-owned Sputnik News highlights India’s involvement in the peace talks, which demonstrates the rising geopolitical competition between China and India in the region: “In an attempt to counter India’s growing interest, the Imran Khan-government has aimed to enhance its trade outreach to Central Asia with the help of the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan.”

Japan

To support the peace talks, Japan has offered cultural grant assistance to Afghanistan to help repair landmark sites damaged by Taliban violence. In February 2020, Japanese Ambassador to Afghanistan Suzuka Mitsuji and UNESCO Representative to Afghanistan Jordan Naidoo signed documents promising Japan’s donation of 423 million yen to repair the giant Buddha statues of Bamiyan Valley that were damaged in a 2001 bombing.

An editorial from the center-right The Japan Times warns about the security consequences of U.S. troops pulling out of Afghanistan and suggests that Japan could play a larger role in the peace process if necessary: “Tokyo’s involvement will intensify if news reports are correct and the Taliban expects Japan, and other Asian and European governments, to guarantee implementation of any peace agreement between the group and the United States. That could ensnare this country in a deeply unstable situation. Japan should be ready to assume that risk, but it must be aware of the dangers from the outset.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

How Are Rising Powers Viewing Shinzo Abe’s Legacy?

Policy Alert #213 | September 9, 2020

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the country’s longest-serving prime minister, announced that he would resign from the position due to his worsening condition of ulcerative colitis – the same disease Abe has been battling for decades and ended his first stint as PM in 2007. Abe’s abrupt resignation comes at a time when Japan faces various uncertainties at home and abroad.

Domestically, Japan is challenged by an ongoing threat of COVID, the economic downturn caused by COVID, and the task of preparing for the upcoming Tokyo Olympic games. Internationally, there is a rising level of Chinese assertiveness in the region, intensifying geopolitical and economic competitions between the U.S. and China, and the uncertainty of future U.S. policy amid the upcoming Presidential election.

How do the Rising Powers perceive Abe’s political legacy and the absence of his leadership in the future? In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers’ reactions to Abe’s sudden resignation.

Japan

The most pressing challenge for Japan’s ruling LDP is to elect Abe’s successor. Among the competition, Abe’s right-hand man Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga is seen to be the likely winner as he wins backing from powerful factions within the party. At news conferences and media interviews, Suga pledges to continue the economic reforms of “Abenomics” while promising to overhaul the health ministry.

The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun praises Abe’s rehabilitation of unstable politics as the greatest achievement of his administration. Abe has promoted a larger role for Japan in regional security while improving relations with the international community. The editorial criticized Abe’s pandemic response and highlight the need of a smooth power transition amid the COVID crisis:
- “At a time when Japan faces a national crisis over an infectious disease, political stability must not be undermined. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is required to select a new leader as soon as possible to avoid confusion.”
The progressive Asahi Shimbun argues that Abe’s diplomacy lacks substance, while it emphasizes his failure in producing substantive outcome with the U.S., Russia, the two Koreas, but makes no specific comment on diplomatic relations with China:
- “The administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which is the longest running in the history of Japan’s constitutionalism, created a “poster boy” for the country’s diplomacy. But that did not produce matching results. Despite the plethora of slogans set forth by the administration, substance took a backseat to glib staging of personal ties between national leaders.”
In an op-ed for Nikkei Asian Review, a center-right business newspaper, former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull commends Abe’s shared effort with him to revive the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the U.S. decided to pull out under the Trump administration. Turnbull gave kudos for Abe’s championing of the Quad in the face of regional security challenges posed by China and North Korea:
- “When President Donald Trump pulled out of the deal, almost everyone, including Shinzo, thought that the deal was dead. I argued that the remaining eleven nations should proceed without the Americans. My political opponents said I was pursuing a futile vanity project. […] Despite all that by January 2017, meeting in Sydney, we had agreed to keep the deal alive. And Shinzo then set to work, as I did, to persuade the remaining TPP countries to stick with the deal.”

China

China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian made the following remarks on Abe’s resignation during the Ministry’s regular press conference:

“In recent years, China-Japan relations got back to the right track and achieved new progress. Leaders of the two sides reached important consensus on building a bilateral relationship in keeping with the new era. We speak positively of Prime Minister Abe’s important efforts in this process and wish him a speedy recovery.

We stand ready to work together with the Japanese side to stay committed to the principles and spirit established in the four political documents and deepen anti-epidemic and socioeconomic cooperation to ensure the sustained improvement and development of China-Japan relations.”

An editorial from state sponsored China Daily warns about Japan potentially entering a period of “deep uncertainty.” It focuses on the economic consequences of Abe’s departure and the uncertainty of the fate of Abenomics:
- “The prospects of Abe’s departure had prompted broad concerns over his signature Abenomics, which includes monetary easing from the Bank of Japan, fiscal stimulus through government spending, and structural reforms to jolt the economy out of the stagnation that has gripped Japan for more than two decades.”
In an op-ed for the Global Times, a nationalist tabloid under the People’s Daily, Wang Wen, a professor and executive dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China argues that China’s view of Abe has shifted dramatically from a “a political clown who fell from power like a meteor” to a “a respectable Japanese politician.” Wang suggests that the fundamental cause behind such transformation is the change in relative power between China and Japan under the Abe administration. Wang also argues that the shift in power “does not mean China should look down on Japan” and that China can still “draw lessons from this neighbor.”
- “One of Abe’s most popular stories in China happened when he was asked why he appears so jolly when he fawns over US President Donald Trump. He said that a wise man mends his ways and he does not mind losing face for the sake of the country and its people. This pragmatic answer has won favor in China.”
A commentary article from the independent Hong Kong based South China Morning Post opines that Sino-Japanese relationship would remain stable if Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga becomes Abe’s successor. Citing comments from Hu Lingyuan, director of Fudan University’s Centre for Japanese Studies in Shanghai, the article argues that Suga has been Abe’s cabinet secretary for over seven years, which makes him a transitional figure who can inherit Abe’s policies
- “Abe has made significant contributions to the improvement in China and Japan relations. As someone picked by Abe to be the cabinet secretary, the most important cabinet role, his fundamental ideologies and attitude towards China should be similar.”

India

In response to Abe’s resignation, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted:

“Pained to hear about your ill health, my dear friend @AbeShinzo. In recent years, with your wise leadership and personal commitment, the India-Japan partnership has become deeper and stronger than ever before. I wish and pray for your speedy recovery.”

A commentary article from the left-leaning Hindu praises Abe’s promotion of Indo-Pacific cooperation, and his effort to establish the TPP. The Hindu also highlights Abe’s push for more cooperation among the Quad and a larger security role for Japan in Indo-Pacific. It credits Abe for better relations with Russia while putting a heavy emphasis on improving relations with China:
- “He also pitched for Japan to become “a guardian of the global commons” particularly in an increasingly contested maritime domain, and to work closely with “like-minded democracies”, such as the United States, India, Australia and South Korea.”
An op-ed in the liberal Indian Express by Swati Rao, professor at Aligarh Muslim University, gives mixed reviews, commending the improving economic cooperation between India and Japan, but emphasizing the failure of Abenomics to improve the Japanese economy:
- “A controversial leader, Abe strove to change Japan’s defence strategy and tried to revise its pacifist constitution and revive Japan’s economy with Abenomics (the nomenclatural inspiration for our Modinomics). He delivered consequential agreements, such as multilateral trade agreements in the Pacific (the CPTPP) and the Atlantic (the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement), as well as the Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership.”
In an op-ed for the liberal-leaning Mumbai think tank Gateway House, former Indian Ambassador to Germany Gurjit Singh argues that India and Japan solidified their partnership under the Abe administration. Abe’s resignation has casted uncertainty not only in Japan’s future role in the Quad, but also in Japan’s future economic cooperation with India:
- “The biggest casualty of the focus to find a replacement for Abe, could be the cooperation of the Quad and the Indo Pacific since these engagements are still experimental and ongoing. It is unclear how much of Quad related policy is embedded in the Japanese system. A new Prime Minister will be more diffident. This could be a loss. If the new dispensation tries a charm offensive with China, then the outright support for India may also diminish.”

Russia

President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov told news agencies that “Shinzo Abe really made an invaluable contribution to the development of bilateral Russian-Japanese relations” and Russia hopes Abe’s successor “will be equally committed to further developing Russian-Japanese relations.”

In an op-ed for the government-funded Russian news network RT, Stephen R. Nagy, senior associate professor at International Christian University and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs, emphasizes Abe’s successful maneuvers in dealing with leaders of the U.S. and China, but highlights his failure in Japan’s relation with South Korea. Nagy also argues that the successor of Abe will continue to forge a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia and Putin.
- “In fact, Japan views Russia as a critical partner in the future to counterbalance China’s influence in the region and as a strong partner in developing a more peaceful, prosperous and stable Northeast Asia. Any new PM will have the same broader strategic priorities vis-à-vis Russia.”
A commentary article from the nationalist Pravda Report claims that the territorial dispute in the northern island is the main reason Abe was unable to reach a deal with Russia, and that the two countries are unlikely to conclude a peace treaty in the near future.
- “In general, there was no progress reached in Russia-Japan peace treaty talks. The issue has been shelved yet again. As for possible successors to Shinzo Abe as prime minister, almost all of them share a much stance. For example, they name the secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba or the sitting Defense Minister and former foreign minister Taro Kono. They consider Shinzo Abe’s stance on the negotiations with Moscow too soft.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

China’s Growing Pains the Rising Powers

Policy Alert #212 | July 17, 2020

In responding to criticism over its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, China has adopted a new, more assertive “wolf warrior diplomacy,” but it has also taken a more aggressive stance in its territorial disputes. Simmering tensions since May on their Himalayan border came to a head on June 15th, when a violent clash between Chinese and Indian forces broke out in disputed territory in the Galwan Valley. The brawl resulted in casualties for the first time in 45 years, with twenty Indians killed and an undisclosed number of Chinese deaths. A fourteen-hour marathon meeting of commanders from both sides was held on July 14th, and relations between the two countries appear to be getting a reprieve. Nevertheless, the violence turned attention to other altercations China has been party to in recent months: a Chinese survey ship was in a month-long stand-off in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, a Chinese vessel rammed a Vietnamese fishing ship and China instituted a unilateral fishing ban in the South China Sea, and both the Philippines and Vietnam protested a new wave of Chinese claims on disputed islands. In response, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a stronger stance against Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In its 2020 White Paper, the Japanese Ministry of Defense pointedly criticized China for agitating in disputed waters in the East China Sea during the pandemic. While Russia has managed to stay out of any direct conflicts, it was nevertheless caught in the awkward tension between the two other key members of the BRICS at their trilateral “RIC” meeting.

In this RPI Policy Alert, we take stock of the Rising Powers’ temper amidst the turbulence in the Indo-Pacific.

CHINA

Following the phone conversation between Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Spokesperson Zhao echoed China’s confidence that the two sides “can properly deal with the current situation, jointly uphold peace and stability in the border areas, and ensure a sound and steady development of bilateral relations.” In response to a press inquiry regarding the bans on Chinese apps and the announcement that Chinese companies would be barred from road construction projects in India, Spokesperson Zhao argued that such action “hurts India’s interests.” In response to a request for comment on Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the border area on July 3rd, Spokesperson Zhao warned that “Neither side should make any move that may complicate the border situation.” China’s account of the June 15th incident was added to the transcript of the Foreign Ministry’s June 19th regular press conference. When questioned about Japan’s White Paper on July 14th, which asserts that China has continued to agitate the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, Spokesperson Zhao retorted: “Japan’s Defense of Japan 2020 white paper is fraught with bias against China and false information. China has already stated its solemn position. As a responsible major country firmly committed to pursuing a neighborhood diplomacy of building friendships and partnerships with its neighbors and upholding a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, China has been safeguarding, building and contributing to world peace, stability and prosperity. At the same time, China is unswerving in upholding its sovereignty, security and development interests.”

In an editorial, the government-supported China Daily speculated that the Indian government “ignite[d]” the situation at the border to justify an economic decoupling from China. The Daily warned, “[T]he reality is that Indian people benefit from Chinese imports, as they are what India needs to improve its people’s livelihoods and to facilitate its economic development. […] The rising tensions will distract India’s focus from its pandemic prevention and control work and economic development, which will create risks and uncertainties for the entire region.”
The nationalist Global Times similarly turned its attention to the economic consequences to the tension: “India cannot replicate the US’ [sic] overbearing approach to China. India will suffer more losses if it launches a trade war against China, and the Indian people’s livelihood, which has been supported by Chinese products, will bear the brunt.”
In response to the US State Department’s policy announcement, the Global Times claimed that the US was only motivated by its own seeming decline: “It is China’s rise, which directly benefits the Asia-Pacific, that has made the US feel uneasy about losing its leadership role in the region. […] Countries in the region are well aware that the US is only using them as pawns in its game with China, while China wholeheartedly wishes to promote peace and stability in the region, and seek common development with all of them.”
In an op-ed for the independent, Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, professor of international relations at Griffith University in Australia Kai He, contextualized China’s spat with India against other conflicts emerging in the South China Sea and international distrust of its role in the pandemic: “If you feel as a person that everyone is against you, before blaming others you might want to ask what’s wrong with your behaviour. […] Wolf warrior diplomacy might serve some of the domestic audience in the short-run, but it will damage China’s reputation and status in the long term.”

INDIA

Following the most recent Meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs on July 10th, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that it was “reaffirmed that both sides will ensure complete disengagement of the troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility in the border areas in accordance with bilateral agreements and protocols.”

While the Ministry conveyed reports of peaceful disengagement, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a seemingly different stand. In an address to the nation on June 17th, Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed that the deaths of Indian soldiers at the border would not “be in vain”: “India’s integrity and sovereignty is supreme for us, and no one can stop us from defending it. Nobody should have any iota of doubt about this. India wants peace. But on provocation, India will give a befitting reply.” On July 3rd, Prime Minister Modi visited the border towns of Leh and Nimu to meet with Indian troops. In his speech to wounded soldiers in Leh, Prime Minister Modi praised the soldiers for their efforts: “I have come to salute you all today. You have fought bravely! […] The way you stood up to the powers, the world wishes to know who are these brave-hearts?” In none of the speeches did he specifically mention China, but anti-Chinese sentiment has been displayed by other arms of the Indian government. On June 30th, the Department of Telecommunications ordered internet operators in India to block fifty-nine Chinese apps, including social media platforms TikTok and WeChat. Minister of Road Transport and Highways Nitin Jairam Gadkari announced on July 1st that Chinese firms would no longer be allowed to bid on road construction projects. The Bureau of Indian Standards and the Trade Ministry have reportedly begun investigating how to impose both tariffs and non-tariff measures to slow the import of Chinese goods, including tougher and more frequent inspections. On July 15th, the Ministry of Defence announced that in addition to the thirty-three fighter jets it is purchasing from Russia, the government approved the purchase of defense weapons and equipment up to $39.9 million.

The liberal Hindustan Times took account of a growing strategic debate in the country and concluded that “Whether India desires it or not, it will end up as one of the frontline states which will have to step up to contain Chinese power, not because of a third power, but because its own interests are at stake.”
The center-right Times of India called for the government to “bridge the vast power gap with China,” and to abandon big talk for action: “India’s obsession with populist politics[…] doesn’t help here as it distracts from the real task of growing India’s economy and military might.”
The pro-government Daily Pioneer argued that the whole episode is part of a larger effort by President Xi to demonstrate China’s capabilities to the region: “[H]e meant to warn India about becoming too pro-American and not forget its economic dependencies yet. Internationally, he knew he could not win the game of perception. He, therefore, played his strengths in the neighbourhood as leader of an Asian century. But without some congruencies [sic] with India, the second biggest Asian power, if not compliance, China would not be able to convince others.”
In an op-ed for the liberal Mint, Harsh V. Pant, professor of international relations at King’s College London and director of studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, called for the government to “drop all sentimentality for a clear-eyed assessment of Beijing’s logic of power”: “What India and the world are facing is not an ordinary rising power troubled by the shackles of the existing global order. We are facing an expansionist authoritarian state bent on shredding the international system to pieces to create an order in its own image.”
In an op-ed for the liberal Print, professor of international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University Rajesh Rajagopalan argued that it was time for Indian to abandon its belief that domestic economic development is a substitute for security policy: “Security policy cannot be based on the hope or plans of long term economic development. Such thinking is based on the potentially fatal assumption that the country will face no unmanageable security challenges in the decades that it will take to become wealthy and strong. Unless there are other means of keeping security threats at bay in the meantime, or unless a country is extremely fortunate, this is a highly risky strategy.”

JAPAN

On July 14th, the Japanese Ministry of Defense released its annual White Paper on Japan’s security environment. In the full Japanese report, the government criticized China for continuing to challenge the status quo in the East China Sea territorial dispute in the midst of the pandemic, although that assertion was not included in the English digest version.

In an editorial in May, the business-oriented Nikkei Asian Review criticized China for “exploit[ing] the global crisis” and called for other countries in the region to push back: “Southeast Asia, Japan and the U.S. must make clear that exploiting the global crisis to harass rival claimants with the goal of taking de facto control of the region is simply not acceptable.”
The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun similarly condemned China’s “coercive behavior.” Against the background of the Ministry of Defense canceling the planned installation of the Aegis Ashore land-to-air missile defense system in the north, the Yomiuri urged the government to expand its defense footprint in the East China Sea: “It is hoped that deterrence will be enhanced by deploying units to remote islands in a planned manner.”

RUSSIA

Following the incident in the Galwan Valley, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Maria Zakharov expressed Russia’s hope for resolution: “We hope that these two states, as responsible members of the international community, will be able to find mutually acceptable ways to ease tensions as soon as possible, using well-functioning mechanisms of bilateral dialogue in accordance with their political agreement on non-violence.” Russia’s planned meeting of the trilateral “RIC” subset of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) went on as scheduled on June 23rd. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied that he attempted to help mend ties between them: “We have never set the goal of helping India and China improve their bilateral relations. These countries have everything they need to address and review any problems that arise in their relations, as problems can arise between any countries, including neighbouring states. I don’t think that India and China need help and assistance aiming to somehow resolve their disputes or situations.” In early July, India finalized an order of weapons and fighter jets from Russia.

In an op-ed for state-supported RT, Retired Colonel Andrey Akulov outlined the rationale for Russia’s seemingly hands-off approach to the dispute between China and India: “It is true that, unlike the US, Russia is not willing to be directly involved as a go-between, but a reduction of tensions and launching talks on border demarcation would be an ideal scenario that it wants to see happen. India and China are the global actors that Moscow needs to further its economic interests and foreign policy goals. Each great nation serves as a counterweight to the other. Besides, China counterbalances the US, while India counterbalances China.”

Rising Powers Respond to Anti-Racism Protests

Policy Alert #211 | June 18, 2020

On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, an unarmed black man, was killed by police in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The gruesome act was caught on camera and widely shared on social media. Protests against police brutality and racism quickly spread across the United States and across the globe. In this RPI Policy Alert, we survey the Rising Powers’ response to these protests and their take on politics and race in the US, rarely if ever, holding up a mirror.

CHINA

At a regular press conference, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian condemned racial discrimination in the US: “[W]e are following the latest developments of the situation following the death of George Floyd. ‘Black lives matter.’ […] What is happening right now once again shows the seriousness of racial discrimination and violent law enforcement by the police, and the urgency for the US to address them. We hope the US government will take concrete measures to fulfill its due obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination to protect the legal rights of ethnic minorities in the US.” In response to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s allegation that the Chinese Communist Party is exploiting George Floyd’s death for propaganda, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying argued that his suggestion was uncalled for: “Even under such circumstances, Mr. Pompeo is still full of lies and slanders. It’s just sad. From Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech ‘I have a dream’ in 1963 to George Floyd’s moan of ‘I cannot breathe’, 57 years have passed, and yet equal rights is still a dream for ethnic minorities in the US, a country where serious systemic racism still exists. This is not foreign propaganda; this is an everyday phenomenon in the American society that should be reflected upon, as unanimously appealed by people from all walks of life in the US.” At another press conference, an exchange between a reporter from the Global Times and Spokesperson Hua highlighted the US’s “double-standards” in each country’s treatment of members of the press. Earlier this month, the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute released a report pointing out that despite recent efforts by Twitter and Facebook to remove accounts created and used by state-linked information operations, recent activity by China-linked accounts on Twitter indicate that “the operation continues and has pivoted to try to weaponise the US Government’s repost to current domestic protests and create a perception of a moral equivalence with the suppression of protests in Hong Kong.”

In an editorial, the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, argued that the US’s support for democracy protests in Hong Kong and disdain for the current protests at home exemplify the US’s double-standard: “They praised the violent protesters in Hong Kong as heroes, but called domestic demonstrators rioters. They slammed the Hong Kong police, who enforced the law in a restrained manner, even though the US National Guard will not hesitate to fire at people.”
In an editorial, the state-supported China Daily mused what the Trump administration’s tactics mean for its control of the situation: “The irony is that although the protests are one of the few things that the US administration has found impossible to attribute to China, the White House has opted to step up its China-bashing in a bid to try to divert people’s anger and attention from the issue.” In another editorial, the Daily asserted that Trump’s response would do more harm than good: “[A]lthough he labels himself as a president of law and order, the law and order he is promising is only more of the same excessive force that has triggered the current unrest.”
The nationalist Global Times countered US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s comparison of China to Nazi Germany with its own: “China hasn’t engaged in a war with any foreign country for 32 years. But in the same period, how many wars have been launched by the US? […] The US has pulled out of international organizations that help maintain world peace, while in contrast China has been a resolute defender of a world framework under the United Nations. […] Which country on Earth acts more like the Nazis?” Furthering its position that the US is on the decline, the Times claimed that the discord in the US demonstrates its inability to lead: “The US remains the strongest power in the world, but its strength is not enough to support its ambition of reshaping the global order. The country has too many urgent domestic issues. […]The US political elites should be realistic and stop arbitrarily escalating external confrontations and playing party politics. They should figure out what the American people really need and help them fulfill their wishes.”
Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the Global Times, predicted in an op-ed that protests of this nature were sure to continue in the US: “White supremacy will eventually come to a dead end in the US. The mainstream values and historical views will gradually change. This will be a revolutionary process for American society, and will lead to a lot of entanglements, conflicts, and even pain. It is hard to say whether the US political and legal system that was built under the dominance of the whites can deal with these changes smoothly.”
In an op-ed for the independent South China Morning Post, Brian Y.S. Wong, an MPhil candidate at Wolfson College, Oxford, and Rhodes Scholar-elect for Hong Kong 2020, compared the protests in the US and Hong Kong and concluded that “[t]he way out is not unrestrained majoritarianism ending up with disenfranchised minorities, neither is it authoritarian rollbacks of civil liberties. Politicians should exhibit courage and responsibility by listening, apologising and making amends – otherwise, all talk of restoring ‘peace and stability’ is futile.”

INDIA

In a phone call with President Trump to discuss the 2020 G7 Summit and the COVID-19 pandemic, Prime Minister Narendra Modi “expressed concern regarding the ongoing civil disturbances in the US, and conveyed his best wishes for an early resolution of the situation.”

The liberal Indian Express was optimistic that the protests would result in meaningful change: “The participation in the protests shows that the wound has cut deeper and wider this time, across racial lines. Perhaps even on Trump’s side of the fence, it may turn out to be the proverbial straw on the camel’s back that can force America to confront the reality of the distance it has still to cover — to fulfil the possibilities of its own admirable democratic ideals.”
The liberal Hindustan Times warned that the domestic discord in the US was a boon for the Chinese government: “Watching its geopolitical rival fumble the ball repeatedly will come as a relief. More worrying, it may encourage an already heightened sense that the Middle Kingdom faces no real check or balance in the international system. The US can do better and, for reasons well beyond its borders, it needs to.”
The pro-government Daily Pioneer similarly urged restraint: “Seeing police in riot gear and highly militarised forces on the streets will not only give demagogues elsewhere in the world little pause for thought before indulging in their own violent reprisals. It will also weaken the case for democratic governments with Chinese politicians showing American anarchy as a contrast to their own vision of the world.”
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, a contributing editor at the Indian Express, disagreed with claims that the protests would weaken Trump ahead of the 2020 elections in a comparison with former President Richard Nixon: “Nixon greatly benefited from the narrative of disorder in the Sixties; whether Trump can do so is an open question. But there is no question that he will try. America will come out of this, in the short run, more authoritarian and polarised.”
In an op-ed for the Hindustan Times, former Union Cabinet Minister Salman Khurshid noted the similarities between law enforcement’s crackdown in the US and similar responses to protests in India against the Citizenship Amendment Act: “Much evil has been done in history in the name of State security. We see the same happening today in India.”

JAPAN

Japanese public broadcaster NHK came under fire for an animated video explaining the protest for a children’s program that was criticized for being “tone-deaf and offensive.” In addition to omitting discussion of police brutality and racial injustice, the since-removed video also used insensitive caricatures of Black Americans. Although the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun was the only major news outlet to weigh in on the protests, several rallies have been held in Tokyo and Osaka, including one held in response to the police’s treatment of a Kurdish man in the capital.

The conservative Yomiuri Shimbun questioned President Trump’s handling of the unrest, which it characterized as “exacerbat[ing]” the situation with “provocative remarks: “Leaders from all walks of life must send a message of reconciliation to the public to calm the situation. Trump’s behavior is far from that. He criticized Democratic governors for being weak and stressed the need to control their states by force. With the presidential election approaching in November, he seems to be focusing only on white voters.”

RUSSIA

At a regular press conference, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia was monitoring the protests in the US and had been in communication with the US State Department regarding law enforcement’s injury of Russian journalists covering the events. Spokesperson Zakharova went on to criticize President Trump’s Executive Order on Advancing International Religious Freedom amidst the domestic crisis: “I would like to believe that before showing their zeal in protecting the rights of the ‘suppressed’ and ‘dissenters’ in other countries, US authorities will start to scrupulously observe democratic standards and ensure the freedoms of their citizens at home.”

In an op-ed for state-funded RT, Artyom Lukin, associate professor of international relations at Far Eastern Federal University in Russia claimed that the protests demonstrate an increased likelihood of a collapse of the US: “I don’t believe the US disintegration is imminent or likely. On the contrary, America could emerge a reinvented and rejuvenated nation out of the current crisis. Nevertheless, the scenario of US implosion has now definitely left the realm of the hypothetical.” Lukin argued that such a collapse would not be to the benefit of Russia, given that “the US is the devil we know,” and the risk of such a collapse “prov[ing] contagious, triggering fragmentation processes in other super-states.”
RT also provided a sounding board for critics of the protests. RT published an anonymous letter allegedly written by a University of California Berkeley professor that RT described as “calling out things impossible to openly discuss on campus, including the Democratic Party co-opting Black Lives Matter and the suppression of dissenting voices.” RT also featured British journalist Guy Birchall’s assertion that the movement’s tactics are antithetical to liberal values as “[c]ollective guilt and justice are two of the most illiberal notions known to man,” and former New York University professor Michael Rectenwald decrying public apologies as “Maoist-derived rituals.”
The nationalist Pravda Report, on the other hand, featured interviews and op-eds more sympathetic to the protests such as an interview with American University Professor Peter Kuznick, an op-ed by legal editor of the Pravda Report David R. Hoffman that turned Secretary of State Pompeo’s Nazi Germany analogy against the Trump administration, an interview with linguist Noam Chomsky, and an op-ed by American journalist John Stanton.
In the independent, Dutch-based Moscow Times, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute Mark Galeotti analyzed the Russian media’s reporting of the protests in the US and concluded: “1. The Russian media is not delighting at your misery; and for that matter 2. The Russian media isn’t that interested in you.”
In his analysis for the Moscow Times, Ilya Klishin, former Digital Director of the New York-based Russian-language RTVI channel, instead focused on Russians’ online reactions to the US protests against the context of the looming vote on President Vladimir Putin’s proposed amendments to the constitution that would enable him to remain in power until 2036: “[E]motions are boiling over. People are posting from morning until evening about what and who should burn, while others insist that those setting the fires should be shot. Maybe it would all be comical. These people can’t even bring themselves to go out and do a solo picket in Moscow where not a single window was broken during the lock-down. But it’s not really funny at all — maybe because of that smothering premonition of the gathering storm.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic – The Taiwan Factor

Policy Alert #210 | June 3, 2020

The coronavirus pandemic has exacerbated cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei and catapulted it to global attention. China claims Taiwan as its territory and has blocked the island’s participation as an autonomous actor in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). Although Taiwan was allowed to attend the WHO’s annual World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer from 2009 to 2016 under President Ma Ying-jeou, it has not been allowed to attend during President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, which the Chinese government views as too independence-leaning. Despite a coalition of governments led by the United States, including the European Union, Japan, and fourteen of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies expressing support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the 2020 Assembly, it was not allowed to participate as an observer due to Chinese pressure. Tensions between WHO Director General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and the Tsai administration had been souring, beginning with charges that inquiries from Taipei for verification about the virus’s potential for person-to-person spread were allegedly ignored by WHO officials in January. Relations spiraled downwards in April, when Tedros accused Taiwan of coordinating a campaign of harassment against him, which the Tsai administration denied. Yet Taiwan’s resounding success in stopping its own outbreak–with a reported total of 443 confirmed infections and seven deaths at publishing–and donations provided through its “Taiwan Can Help” program have only continued to keep Taiwan in the spotlight and called into question China’s intransigence in the midst of the pandemic.

In this third installment of RPI’s Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic Series, we provide an overview of perspectives from China, Taiwan, and the international community on how the pandemic is affecting cross-strait relations and how that dynamic is affecting the two sides’ place in the international community. For more insight on this topic, we encourage our readers to watch the video from the COVID-19 and Taiwan’s International Space Reimagined webinar hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the East Asia National Resource Center.

Views from Taiwan

In The National Interest, Vincent Yi-hsiang Chao, the Director of the Political Division at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, challenged WHO officials’ claim that the organization’s secretariat is legally incapable of granting observer status for the WHA on its own: “[I]t can be argued that the failure to invite Taiwan is also a political, rather than a legal, determination. […] Given Tedros’s public call for countries to avoid politicizing public health pandemics, the very same standards should arguably apply to the WHO.”
In an op-ed for the Taiwan News, which supports the Pan-Green Coalition that includes the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, Holmes Liao, senior advisor at Taiwan’s Institute for Information Industry, Taiwan News, interpreted China’s international charm offensive as domestically-oriented: “[T]he aim of China’s global propaganda is not to convince the world that the communist regime governs a peace-loving country with a legitimate foreign policy, political value, and an attractive culture. [..T]he supposedly external global propaganda is aimed at an internal audience.”
Kelvin Chen, a staff writer for the Taiwan News, juxtaposed international frustration with China’s handling of the virus and the quality of its donations to other countries with Taiwan’s smaller, but more successful efforts: “The island nation has striven for transparency this whole time, holding daily press coronavirus conferences and sharing its epidemic strategy. Furthermore, the nation has demonstrated that an effective virus response does not need to be authoritarian, contrary to what China wants the world to believe. Taiwan has proven to the world that it is a reliable and compassionate ally”.
The Taiwan News featured interviews with Industry, Science, and Technology International Strategy Center director Ray Yang and Taiwan Institute of Economic Research economist Darson Chiu on the opportunities for Taiwan if other states begin diversifying their supply chains away from a reliance on China.
In The Diplomat, Jeremy Huai-Che Chiang, non-resident research associate with the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, analyzed the pandemic’s effects on Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP): “[T]he continued deteriorating of cross-strait ties will only further strengthen this Southbound trend, forcing domestic stakeholders to increasingly forgo hopes for a return to the warm ties with China seen in the [former President] Ma Ying-jeou era. This will lessen domestic resistance (and passiveness) and increase complementarity in some sectors toward Tsai’s NSP prescriptions.”

Views from China

Zhu Songling, professor at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University, claimed that the Tsai administration’s efforts at the WHO were an effort to curry favor with the US: “Using the outbreak and the meeting of the World Health Assembly, the World Health Organization’s decision-making body, Tsai has displayed only hostility toward the mainland in order to seek the US’ favor. Which makes her real motive clear: helping Washington to contain Beijing even at the cost of sacrificing cross-Straits relations and risking the island residents’ well-being.”
Tang Yonghong, deputy director of the Taiwan Research Center at Xiamen University, accused the Tsai administration and the US of “using the coronavirus outbreak as a ploy to target the mainland” in an op-ed for the China Daily: “For the US, China’s continuous rise－combined with the fear that China may surpass its power－and the intertwining of the two sides’ interests due to globalization, prompted it to identify Beijing as its top strategic competitor. [..T]he US has been exploiting all possible means to curb China’s rise, including by blaming it for the outbreak and playing the ‘Taiwan card’.” In a second op-ed, Tang also claimed that the Tsai administration is attempting to mislead Taiwan’s residents at home: “the Taiwan authorities are seeking to take advantage of the epidemic and to exploit Taiwan residents’ worries to play their political tricks, hyping the falsehood that Taiwan is a global anti-epidemic loophole.”
In an op-ed for the state-supported China Daily, Li Zhenguang, professor at the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing Union University characterized the discord at the World Health Organization as symptomatic of the US’s decline: “This is an era of multilateralism; the days when the US arbitrarily manipulated global organizations to maintain its hegemony are gone. According to the UN Charter, the UN and its affiliated bodies are built to serve all countries and people rather than one single country and its people. And the US, despite its muscle power and allies, has not been able to change this fact nor has it succeeded in preventing many developing countries to uphold fairness and justice in international relations or in resolving regional and global disputes.”
Cary Huang, a China affairs columnist and former Beijing bureau chief for the independent South China Morning Post, argued in an op-ed for The Post that Taiwan has “emerg[ed] stronger from the pandemic,” given the increased domestic support of Tsai’s administration, economic growth despite the pandemic’s disruptions to the global economy, and a prominent and positive position in the international community as a result of its successes in battling its own outbreak and donations abroad.

Views from Outside Experts

In an op-ed for the Taipei Times, John Lim, a former associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History, argued that Taiwan came out on top of the spat between WHO Director General Tedros and the Tsai administration: “It turned into a ‘battle of unequals’ initiated by Tedros, but his display lacked meticulous tactical thinking and effective strategic adjustments. Taiwan used this to its advantage by highlighting the effects of its epidemic prevention efforts and successes. It also allowed Taiwan to promote its ‘Taiwan can help’ strategy, which has given the nation more visibility internationally than it has experienced in decades, while also focusing global attention on its outstanding epidemic prevention efforts.”
Joseph Tse-hei Lee, executive director of the Global Asia Institute and professor of history at Pace University, wrote in an op-ed for the Taipei Times that China’s increasingly “combative diplomacy has set off too many firestorms and galvanized opinions critical of Xi at home and abroad. It is bound to dissipate China’s hard-earned standing and reputation in the global community.”
In his analysis for the University of Nottingham’s Taiwan Insight magazine, T.Y. Wang, chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Illinois State University and co-editor of the Journal of Asian and African Studies, explained that China’s perceived missteps in two global health emergencies only helps Taiwan’s image: “As Beijing is perceived as a culprit for both the 2003 SARS epidemic and the current COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan finds itself in an improved international standing that may be beneficial to its bid for membership in the WHO.”
In Foreign Policy, Joshua Eisenman, associate professor at the University of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs, and Sean King, senior vice president at Park Strategies, a business advisory firm that represented Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2012, interpreted China’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward Taiwan as symptomatic of painting itself into a corner: “The rigidity of China’s rhetoric toward Taiwan, its primary core interest, has almost obligated Beijing to adopt aggressive policies that continue to undermine its own stated policy objectives.”
Bonnie S. Glaser, senior advisor for Asia and director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Matthew P. Funiaole, senior fellow with the China Power Project and senior fellow for data analysis at the CSIS iDeas Lab, suggested in Foreign Policy that despite the heated rhetoric, the risk of a cross-strait conflict remain low: “The Chinese Communist Party undoubtedly feels insecure in the face of global criticism of its lack of transparency during the early days of the outbreak and its efforts to quash investigation into the origins of COVID-19. […] While there is no denying there has been an increase in Chinese pressure against Taiwan since the beginning of the pandemic, there is also no known evidence to suggest that Xi has fundamentally altered his strategic calculus.”
In an op-ed for the business-focused Economic Times, Former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal urged the Indian government to side with Taiwan: “India should also support the restoration of Taiwan’s participation as an observer in the forthcoming World Health Assembly on the basis of Taiwan sharing valuable information about its success in controlling the virus. […] China cannot claim others support its territorial integrity while it violates theirs with impunity, be it in the South China Sea or in the Himalayas. If China succeeded in thwarting the US, European, Japanese and Australian move to support an independent virus enquiry and on Taiwan’s participation, it would garner a major diplomatic victory that will shift the power balance further in its favour, which is not in India’s interest.”
In Foreign Affairs, Jason Lanier, Office of the Chief Technology Officer Prime Unifying Scientist at Microsoft, and E. Glen Weyl, founder and chair of the RadicalxChange Foundation and Office of the Chief Technology Officer Political Economist and Social Technologist at Microsoft, argued that Taiwan’s successful marriage of technology and civic engagement highlighted the similarity behind China and the US’s bumbled initial responses to the pandemic: “It is possible that the AI prowess of China and the United States in fact stood in their way. Both have a technocratic, top-down vision of the future of AI, in which a small digital elite, concentrated in a few tech hubs and largely separated from the concerns of the rest of the population, produces tools meant to be used by the rest of the population.”
Jo Kim, a contributor to The Diplomat, argued that China is doing itself no favors in trying to quash Taiwan’s public relations blitz: “Ironically, Beijing’s maladroit diplomacy and propaganda are contributing to Taiwan’s success in undercutting the mainland’s PR offensive.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.

Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic – China’s Prospects

Policy Alert #209 | May 28, 2020

RPI’s Special Series on Revisiting the World Order under a Pandemic continues in this Policy Alert, which focuses on how the COVID-19 pandemic is raising new debates on how to view the world order and power. In this issue, we focus on China’s prospects in a shifting world order with insights from Chinese scholars and international experts.

China’s role as the origin country of the novel coronavirus, coupled with its position as the world’s production hub and rising influence in international relations, has put the country front-and-center on the international stage as the pandemic continues. As it gained control of the virus, China pivoted from recipient of aid to a major provider of it. This shift has been met with suspicion and criticism as well as assertions that China’s initial response worsened the situation for the international community. China’s influence at the World Health Organization has also faced scrutiny for both the WHO’s sluggish response to the pandemic and the ongoing political issue of Taiwan’s potential participation in the midst of a global crisis, which will be addressed in our next Policy Alert. Amidst a barrage of criticism from the United States, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lijian Zhao promoted a conspiracy theory that the virus originated in the United States on Twitter. The move has been regarded as an exemplification of repeated fumbles by China to increase its standing in the world order.

A note to our readers: Some of the pieces below have been published by journals that maintain paywalls for full access to their content. We would like to remind our student readers that they may have full access to these journals through their universities’ digital collections or by logging on to their universities’ virtual private networks (VPNs).

Views from China

In The Diplomat, Bao Huaying, Chief of Division for International Exchange at Beijing Foreign Studies University and Visiting Fellow at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs East Asia National Resource Center, outlined five key challenges–to the country’s credibility, diplomacy, public relations, finances, and economy–China faces as a result of the pandemic, and predicted that Beijing would weather the storm to bring change: “[…]China will not step down; instead, it will fight fire with fire, and confront these severe challenges with retaliation. In the post-pandemic time, the world is likely to come to a new normal marked more by all-around clashes than cooperation.”
Wang Wen, professor and executive dean of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, writing for the Global Times, argued that the US was going the way of a “failed state”: “[T]he Trump administration has nearly destroyed the foundation of international order that’s been in place since the end of the Cold War. It has pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and many other international treaties and organizations. […It] has doubled the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet via measures including quantitative easing and strong stimulus policies, making [the] US dollar the most unstable factor in the global monetary order. It has also severely shaken the international financial system.”
Shen Yi, director at the Research Center for Cyberspace Governance at Fudan University, similarly argued in The Times that the pandemic has only exacerbated the US’s decline in the international community: “From a theoretical perspective of international relations, the US, as a hegemonic power and global leader, should assume responsibility for providing the global public goods. [T]he US, at the center of global leadership, does not have enough capacity or willingness to provide the global public goods. The two pillars of US hegemony – military strength and financial system – can only play a very limited role in this fight against the virus.”
Ding Gang, senior editor at the People’s Daily and a senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, joined the discussion about reassessing measures of state capacity in the wake of the pandemic. “The pandemic is another wake-up call to boost state capacity and it is necessary not only in economics. Western scholars are discussing the end of neoliberalism, because they have seen the importance of state capacity,” Ding wrote in an op-ed for the Global Times.
In response to Francis Fukuyama’s interview with French magazine Le Point [French only], founding director of the Center for Strategic and Peace Studies at the China Foreign Affairs Academy Su Hao asserted that China’s domestic institutions were the source of its strength in stifling its COVID-19 outbreak: “The strength of a country can be measured by a government’s executive powers, mobilization ability and people’s willingness to cooperate. […] Our top-down, systematic and comprehensive governance system has provided us with great ability to handle crises such as COVID-19.” Su further explained that China is also leading in terms of its production capacity: “The production of medical products requires huge resources and great human resources, which Western countries lack.”
Yu Yongding, director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argued in the China Daily that the pandemic offers an opportunity for China and the US to avoid a Thucydides trap by stabilizing their relationship, if they seized it: “[T]he two sides have the same core interests in combating global challenges like the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, financial instability, and any number of other common enemies that may emerge in the future.”
In an op-ed for the government-supported China Daily, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairperson of the Center for International Security and Strategy of Tsinghua University Fu Ying acknowledged that China’s public relations blitz in the wake of the pandemic had room for improvement: “Only by winning the recognition of foreign audiences and learn from their feedback can the influence of the narrative be improved and strengthened.”
In the Global Times, Chu Yin, professor at the University of International Relations, opined that a major change to the world order was unlikely. On the one hand, “The idea of de-sinicization is an absolute delusion, as China has been playing an indispensable role in the global economy and global supply chain after China joined the World Trade Organization,” while on the other, “[The] US’ influence in global security affairs, at least, is still irreplaceable.”

Views from International Experts

In a commentary for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sam Bresnick, assistant editor and web coordinator at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, and Paul Haenle, Maruice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, warned that the US’s retreat is providing ample opportunity for China to expand into the vacuum it is leaving behind: “While the U.S. government is retreating from the international stage and leaving its allies high and dry, China sees an opportunity to fill the leadership void and enhance its global standing through emergency aid and assistance to countries around the world.”
In Barron’s, Susan Thornton, a retired US diplomat and senior fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale University Law School, similarly argued that concern over a Chinese takeover is misplaced: “China’s governing system has not adapted well to social media, citizen journalism, and viral videos. In a fragile authoritarian state, public opinion can be harnessed, but it can also be destabilizing.” Thornton pointed out, however, that the pandemic may be a useful testing ground for Beijing and that China could hone its response for future crises.
Diana Fu, associate professor of political sciences at the University of Toronto and an affiliate of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy Institute, warned in her analysis for Foreign Policy that China’s ability to weather the storm of the pandemic might erode the liberal world order by encouraging regime change in other countries: “The pandemic’s legacy for many may be that living in a Chinese-style dictatorship is far superior to living in the West’s free societies that cannot harness disorder quickly. For the governments and people of the so-called free world, restoring order also means, eventually, tearing down the restrictions on liberty the coronavirus forced.”
In an article for The National Interest exploring the pandemic’s effects on the world order, Amitav Archarya, professor of international relations at American University, National Interest, argued that the pandemic hardly guarantees China’s rise: “Until China accepts its own share of responsibility for the outbreak, its international image is not going to be rehabilitated.”
Michael Green, professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University and Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Evan S. Medeiros, professor of Asian Studies at Georgetown University dismissed claims of China benefiting from the pandemic given that its aid is being criticized as substandard, there is widespread frustration with its handling of the virus and transmission of information, and the recent conspiracy theory spun by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson via Twitter: “[I]ts approach has a whiff of desperation, which hints at Beijing’s own insecurity about the mishandling of the outbreak.”
Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, claimed that China’s attempts to seize the political and strategic opportunities provided by the virus has backfired: “A boomerang effect from Xi’s overreach seems inevitable. A pandemic that originated in China will likely end up weakening the country’s global position and hamstringing its future growth.”
Andrew Small, senior transatlantic fellow with the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and associate senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), argued in a commentary for the ECFR that while the US may be retreating from the international stage, China is alienating itself from the followers of the US-led order who are becoming more inclined to reorganize themselves, too: “[A]s US threats to defund the WHO have demonstrated, Europe will also have to deal with the argument that many global organisations are being so hollowed out by China that, in the long term, the only viable course is to build plurilateral alternatives among like-minded partners”.
ECFR senior policy fellow Anthony Dworkin echoed this point in his commentary for the organization, but maintained that such a move would still require wrangling the two rivals: “The EU will find allies around the world who are eager to work in a more cooperative way – but any effort to repair the international system will also need a strategy to deal with the US-China standoff.”

RPI acknowledges support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its activities.