Policy Alerts – Page 16 – Rising Powers Initiative

The NATO Summit and Afghanistan’s Future: Comments from Russia, India and China

Policy Alert #27 | May 29, 2012

Last week, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Chicago to discuss the future of NATO’s role in Afghanistan. This post highlights commentary on this topic from the Russian, Indian and Chinese press.

RUSSIA

Commentary in Russia generally called for greater Russian integration into NATO structures, while encouraging continued dialogue on NATO’s European missile shield plans.

The state-run Itar-Tass news agency took an optimistic view of Russia-NATO relations in a review of the 15 year partnership, praising the continued growth of “mutual understanding and openness” between Russia and NATO.

On Afghanistan however, Russian views were highly critical. Several commentaries called for an increased role for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Afghanistan. The CSTO, headquartered in Moscow, is a military alliance made up of seven former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that “NATO has so far ignored repeated offers from the CSTO bloc to start real action in fighting the Afghanistan drug trade” and that ” Russia is interested in the CSTO playing a bigger role in the anti-drug fight.”

“Another NATO Summit, trying to find solutions for a destabilized Afghanistan,” lamented Pravda “Why is Afghanistan destabilized? Because NATO destabilized it…the more NATO rears its demonic head, the greater the need for an enlarged and effective CSTO.”

INDIA

The main theme in Indian commentary was Pakistan’s role in hindering NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan:

Given Pakistan’s refusal to reopen NATO supply routes and its continued support for terrorists networks that support the Taliban, “NATO must further develop alternative supply routes to Afghanistan through Russia and central Asia,” urged the Times of India in an editorial. “It also needs to slow down current plans to withdraw troops.”

C. Raja Mohan argued that ” the US should play hardball” with the Pakistani army, and outlined four possible ways the US might “confront [Pakistan’s] double-game in Afghanistan.” Expressing a great-power realist viewpoint, Mohan said that the US, despite its weakening position in Afghanistan, still has enough levers to compel Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban.

Another concern was India’s relationship with NATO. An op-ed in the Indian Express lamented the absence of any structured engagement between India and NATO:

“Given that the [NATO] alliance was built on principles and values that its members ostensibly share with India, there are no reasons why India’s defense establishment should not be considering similar opportunities for interaction. India is certainly not interested in a formal partnership, but shared interests and realms of activity…lend themselves, at the very least, to an agenda for consultations and dialogue.”

CHINA

The officially-sanctioned press cast NATO as increasingly marginalized but also overly aggressive in recent military ventures. The People’s Daily argued that NATO “should not maintain its unsustainable life by exaggerating others’ military threats.” A commentary published by Xinhua pointed to various post-Cold War NATO missions and said that “NATO warmongering has triggered many disputes in the international community and even within the alliance itself.”

Asia’s Rising Powers at the BRICS Summit

Policy Alert #26 | April 29, 2012

The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa gathered in New Delhi last month for the 4th BRICS Summit, where they agreed to work toward creating a BRICS development bank, proposed trading with each other in their own currencies, criticized the slow pace of reforms in IMF governance, and expressed support for a UN rather than US or EU role in resolving crises in Iran and Syria. This Policy Alert examines the views of Russia, India and China on the growing importance of the BRICS.

RUSSIA

Commentary in Russia praised the deepening of coordination amongst BRICS countries and supported plans for a BRICS development bank while also emphasizing the need for further development of the bloc.

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of reform of “the world’s financial-economic architecture which fails to take sufficient account of [the BRICS’] role in the global economy,” and called for a key role for the BRICS in world affairs. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin added that Russia will continue to prioritize its relations with the bloc, which he called “the most telling symbol of transferring from a uni-polar to a more just world order.”

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, asserts that the BRICS value “national sovereignty as a fundamental structural element of the world system. This concept is an alternative to the Western approach that is based on the premise that today sovereignty is no longer as sacred and immutable as it was in the past.” In the state-run RIA Novosti, Lukyanov added, “the recipes for resolving international issues offered by the usual leaders (the West) either don’t work or produce the opposite effect. “

INDIA

Hosted in Delhi, the BRICS Summit drew extensive and diverse commentary in the vibrant Indian press, reflecting the contesting schools of thought on India’s foreign policy.

On economic matters, the proposal to set up a BRICS development bank drew much attention and generated heated debate:

Samir Saran and Vivan Sharan of the Observer Researcher Foundation outlined a series ofconcrete proposals for how such a bank could be designed, calling the bank “an idea whose time has come.” The ORF is an Indian think tank that hosted the BRICS Academic Forum, which produced policy recommendations for the summit.
Shoban Saxena, an editor with the Sunday Times of India, was also very optimistic about the bank. His criticism of Robert Zoellicks’s opposition to a BRICS bank prompted the World Bank to respond, saying Saxena’s article was a “misrepresentation” of Zoellick’s comments.
The Indian Express, however, was deeply skeptical, pointing to the “disparate interests” of the BRICS: India needs capital for development, China wants to globalize its currency, and Brazil is doing well with its own development bank. More broadly, the paper argued that “the biggest stumbling block” is “unease among members about the extent of China’s clout in the proposed venture.”
The other economic issue was the proposal to conduct trade amongst BRICS in their own currencies, an idea that the Economic Times strongly advocated before the summit. “Higher intra-BRICS trade, conducted in our own currencies will shield our economies from disruptions in the west,” said a later ET editorial. The paper also looked forward to the development of an “intra-BRICS currency market” that will “deepen demand for our currencies and spur further opening up of our trade and investment systems.”
On a related note, on March 30 the BRICS started cross-listing and trading futures on each other’s stock exchanges, conducting the transactions in domestic currency. As the aforementioned Saran and Sharan explain, “this will allow investors within BRICS to invest in each other’s progress…[and] facilitate greater liquidity, while simultaneously strengthening efforts to deepen financial integration through market-determined mechanisms.”

The summit further highlighted the contentious question of China’s role in BRICS and the implications for India-China relations:

The Hindustan Times interviewed several former Indian diplomats, who expressed skeptical and wary views of China’s clout in BRICS.
Rohit Viswanath of the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, on the other hand, suggested that the BRICS forum “provides an opportunity to improve relations with China and stabilise the regional environment by neutralising the role of China in Indo-Pak issues.”
Mihir S. Sharma, a columnist for the Business Standard, lambasted the Indian government’s tight security measures targeting Tibetans in Delhi during the summit. Calling it India’s “shameful kowtow,” Sharma derided the notion of “rebalancing” between China and the US.
C. Raja Mohan of the Center for Policy Research used the occasion of Hu Jintao’s visit to Delhi to analyze improvements in Sino-Indian relations over the past decade. “In its quest for a credible strategic framework to manage bilateral differences with Beijing,” wrote Mohan, “India is finally overcoming the mindset of 1962 that prevented Delhi so long from adopting realistic policies towards Beijing.”

More broadly, the geopolitical significance of the BRICS grouping remains uncertain:

Nationalist opinions such as The Hindu lauded the summit’s Delhi Declaration as “a clear signal that the states concerned have global weight and mean eventually to use it” on issues such as Iran and Syria. An op-ed in the same paper also lauded the BRICS’ “challenge to the two-century old hegemony of the West,” but cautioned that “it is imperative for BRICS to ensure and the world to perceive, that the Delhi Declaration is not the beginning of a new Cold War.”
Overall skepticism from an autonomy-oriented view was voiced by Brahma Chellaney at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research: “BRICS will be weighed down by internal contradictions, as symbolised by its members’ starkly varying political systems, economies, and national ambitions.”
In a Liberal Globalist view, Sanjaya Baru of the International Institute for Strategic Studies expressed concern that regionalism will undermine multilateralism, particularly the G-20, whose mix of “rising and risen powers” is necessary to manage global economic problems.
Others worried that India may not have what it takes to make the BRICS forum work. Kanti Bajpai, an international relations scholar, wrote in The Times of India: “India is the weakest link in BRICS. Its chaotic politics, abysmal human development record, low per capita income (the lowest in the group) and uncivil civil society make it an unreliable partner.” An Indian Expresseditorial also cautioned, “India must not lose sight of its national interests in pursuing economic and strategic issues…But, more than anything else, India has to first grow stronger and set its house in order before it can set the BRICS tone for multilateral reforms in a democratic fashion.

CHINA

In contrast to some Indian commentators’ enthusiasm for a BRICS bank, Chinese analysts were more reserved about the bank’s operational feasibility at this point.

Qu Xing of the China Institute of International Studies and Huang Wei of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) said that a BRICS bank would not rival the World Bank and IMF.

Overall, though, the BRICS grouping was lauded for pushing for “global rebalancing…in international governance,” as He Wenping of CASS argued.

Moreover, a Global Times editorial took issue with the criticism that the divergent value systems of BRICS members will undermine their future influence, arguing that “the mission of the BRICS is not directly related to values.” Pointing to the summit’s host country, the paper said “[India’s] identity as an emerging country far overwhelms its identity as a democratic country. The latter is a label the Western media like to use to balance China.”
Comparing the BRICS with the IBSA grouping (India-Brazil-South Africa), Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies commented that South Africa and Brazil no longer find IBSA necessary, while “India still highlights its importance as an alliance of democratic countries.” In light of this, Liu argued, China should support India’s goals in BRICS so that “India will have less reason to insist on the continuance of IBSA, and the BRICS as a whole will improve their position in the international system.”

North Korea’s Failed Rocket Launch Draws Reactions from Asian Powers

Policy Alert #25 | April 29, 2012

Earlier this month, North Korea announced with much fanfare its plans to fire a rocket into space, only to fail abysmally on the day of the launch. This post examines the domestic commentary from major Asian powers on what this says about the North Korean regime, and implications for Northeast Asian security more broadly.

SOUTH KOREA

In South Korea, officials condemned Pyongyang’s actions, while commentators speculated on whether North Korea might be more likely to conduct a new nuclear test following its rocket launch failure.

ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan condemned Pyongyang’s rocket launch as a “provocative act that threatens peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.” Hours after the launch, a defensive committee of South Korea’s National Assembly adopted a resolutiondenouncing the failed launch and warning against additional provocative acts.

In the days following the failed launch, Seoul and Pyongyang exchanged volleys of unusually strong threats.

Cho Min, a senior analyst at Seoul’s state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, stated, “The failed rocket launch has drastically undermined the North’s negotiating power with the U.S.and made it concerned over internal relaxation of its regime due to doubts over its young leader.”

An editorial in the Hankyoreh Sinmun added that North Korea “needs to understand that itsemotional response in no way helps the stability of its regime or the development of inter-Korean relations. We hope North and South alike exercise restraint so that the war of words does not escalate into a physical clash.”

Multiple editorials stressed the increasingly narrow set of options North Korea faces as a consequence of its actions:

Since Kim Jong-un’s “intentions to boast his country’s military prowess went up in smoke with the failed rocket launch…the only options left to Kim are to do something foolish like conducting another nuclear test…” argued the Chosun Ilbo.

The Hankyoreh Sinmun took a similar stance, adding that “if North Korea doesn’t change and engages in additional provocations, we’ll have fewer and fewer choices available.”

CHINA

The official People’s Daily sounded a routine call to resume the Six-Party Talks. Other media outlets reprimanded North Korea’s behavior, while also using the opportunity to criticize the U.S. and its allies.

In an editorial with the admonition, “Pyongyang must remember to heed China’s advice,” theGlobal Times noted that China’s official condemnation of the rocket launch was “the first time that China had openly taken a tough attitude toward Pyongyang since the new leadership came into power.” In another editorial, the paper placed the burden of reducing future tensions on the US, Japan and South Korea: “It is these three powers that are pivotal to changing North Korea’s way of behaving.”

The website China.org.cn, sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ran an editorial concluding that Japan was the “real beneficiary” of these developments on the Korean Peninsula, because “the acute response by Japan…is another excuse for it to strengthen its military forces.”

Analysis by Cheng Xiaohe, professor at Renmin University, noted that China’s open disapproval was markedly different from its acquiescence of North Korea’s satellite launch in 2009. Cheng explained, “That China applies rare public pressure on North Korea is based, above all, on its own interests. Later this year, China will see a change in leadership, and does not need anything, domestic or external, to make things more complicated.”

INDIA

Indian commentary on North Korea’s failed rocket launch was made a week later, in the context of India’s own successful test launch of its Agni V, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Beijing.

A sense of pride in both the missile test’s success as well as India’s international stature was evident in newspapers that normally span the political spectrum. Analysts pointed out that while North Korea was chided for its behavior, India’s test did not draw any criticism from the US.

“Unlike a North Korea or Iran, India’s purpose was not to overturn the existing international orderor blackmail its wealthier parts,” wrote the Hindustan Times in an editorial. “[India has] a larger commitment of earning a seat at the high table of power through…responsible behavior.”

The Hindu ran an op-ed entitled “It’s a high-five moment for the Agni,” in which the author analyzed the missile capabilities of India, China and Pakistan.

An op-ed in the Times of India called the missile test “a source of pride and strategic comfort for India.” The writers pointed out that this “will strengthen nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in Asia,” and that diplomatically it is “a symbol of India’s changed place in the world.”

JAPAN

In Japan, multiple editorials called on China to “act responsibly” to restrain Pyongyang’s behavior. The Japanese government came under fire for its perceived slow response in confirming the launch and alerting the public.

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimara condemned the launch, noting that, “Even if it was a failure, it is a grave provocation to our country and other countries concerned and violates UN Security Council resolutions.” Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda ordered his government to continue collecting information as a matter of urgency. “(I will) do everything I can to provide information to the public and strengthen cooperation with other countries.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun expressed dissatisfaction with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) presidential statement denouncing North Korea’s actions. Arguing that the presidential statement “lacks teeth,” the editorial urges China to be “aware of its own responsibility” and apply greater pressure on North Korea. Another editorial called on the UNSC to “strengthen economic sanctions to tighten an international noose around the country” while also encouraging Japan to “seek resumption of negotiations with the country, aiming at comprehensive settlement of nuclear, missile, and abduction issues.”

A commentary in Japan Today predicted that North Korea’s failure may push the hermit state into testing a nuclear bomb in an attempt to save face. “The humiliation of the rocket failure will be keenly felt by new leader Kim Jong Un,” said Toshimitsu Shigemura, North Korea expert and professor at Waseda University in Tokyo. “…Rumors will start that the new leader has failed to impress and is no good…the leadership will have to take measures to make up for that.”

RUSSIA

Russia took a stance similar to China following the launch, calling for moderation and balance, keeping the goal of restarting the Six-Party Talks in mind. “We don’t believe in further sanctions; they will bring nothing in terms of resolving the situation,” stated Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Asian Powers Assess Putin’s Electoral Victory

Policy Alert #24 | March 29, 2012

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was elected to his third presidential term on Sunday. In this Policy Alert, we examine reactions to his victory in Russia, China, India, and Japan.

RUSSIA

The Russian press overwhelming warned of a tough road ahead for Putin in all reform areas including the Russian economy, foreign relations, and domestic politics.

There was near universal agreement that Putin will encounter many forthcoming challenges:

Putin faces the daunting task of convincing “foreigners and Russians alike that Russia is not only a good place to live but a great place to invest,” says the Moscow Times. The editorial urges Putin to level the playing field for foreign investors, and to take action against government corruption.

“The next government no longer has the luxury of relying on rising oil revenues to fund growth and buy internal stability…Russia’s economy needs a new growth driver,” says Chris Weafer, chief strategist at Troika Dialog.

Alexei Makarkin, first vice president of the Center for Political Technologies, predicts that the government will respond to specific challenges on a case-by-case basis. “I don’t think the government will pursue a purely liberal or reactionary course,” Markarkin said. Rather, it willharden its policy in some areas and make concessions in others.

Commentators were mixed on the direction of Putin’s foreign policy:

Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs weighed in, predicting relative continuity in Russia’s foreign policy and more emphasis on domestic affairs.

Rising Powers Initiative Russia expert Andrew Kuchins takes a different view, arguing that because domestic political stability is Putin’s principal concern, he sees the United States as a threat to his sovereign rule. For the time being, Kuchins says that “Putin’s posture is a defensive anti-Americanism rather than hostile anti-American foreign policy. What’s certain though, is that the reset is over and Washington should prepare for a far more contentious relationship with Moscow.”

In many editorial circles, the focus is on the opposition’s future prospects:

Konstantin Eggert, commentator and host for Russia’s first 24-hour news station Kommersant FM, believes that “The opposition organizing street protests- i.e. those, who officially do not exist as a political force” has seriously undermined Putin’s ability to rule unchallenged.

Nikolai Petrov, scholar-in-residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center, adds that “the Kremlin has yet to adequately respond to the protestors’ demands. This probably means that the protests will increase in size and intensity.”

A “weak opposition” gave Vladimir Putin the victory, says Mikhail Remizov, president of the National Strategy Institute. In order to maintain his victory, Putin will need to reckon with the opposition, perhaps by taking a “coalition approach to forming the government. Opposition figures whose activity embodies the messages that Putin was sending to his voters could be partners in a coalition.”

CHINA

Interpretations of Putin’s victory echoed themes familiar to Chinese politics: stability and fighting corruption.

The state-run Xinhua News Agency reported that “Putin’s election victory reflects what most Russians want,” which is “stability and sustainable development.”

Commenting on the post-election protests, People’s Daily senior editor Ding Gang wrote, “These protestors are mainly unhappy with the severe corruption in Russian society. …If Putin is determined to wake the Russian bear from hibernation, he has to come up with methods to tackle corruption.”

Several editorials in the party-owned press took issue with Western criticism of Russia’s democracy.

“Finding fault with Russia’s democratic process is a way for the West to bring about splits in Russian society,” commented the Global Times.

“Many Western observers…can’t accept that Putin was still able to win the ballot with so many votes. Emotionally, the West doesn’t want Putin to come back,” said Jiang Yi, deputy director of Russian studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The geopolitical implications of Putin’s victory were also a main theme.

Xinhua‘s analysis pointed to “stronger China-Russia ties,” noting that the two countries share similar views on a range of global issues.

The aforementioned Jiang Yi, however, expressed a more reserved opinion: “I don’t think [China and Russia] will necessarily get closer after Putin comes back. The two will certainly continue their cooperation over some hot issues…[but] their calculations are still based on their own interests.”

On the future of U.S.-Russia relations, Feng Yujun of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations said that “the improvements achieved during Medvedev’s presidency in Russia-US relations are likely to end,” and that “Putin should stay alert to U.S. interference in Russia’s internal affairs.”

INDIA

Indian papers expressed mixed views on the prospects of democracy in Russia:

The Times of India urged Putin to embark on real reform and liberalization: “This might appear counter-intuitive to Putin, but strong-arm tactics to maintain political stability are no longer feasible….Russia needs a new social contract between its people and the government. As Putin begins his third term, he must start thinking of his legacy.”

The Indian Express, however, was more cynical, pointing to the “far worse” alternative of a Russia ruled by oligarchs. Therefore, the paper’s editorial predicted before the election that “this cynicism born of hopelessness is likely to ensure…that Putin returns as president of Russia.”

There was some analysis of geopolitical implications in The Hindu, which is generally skeptical of the West:

“Mr. Putin returns as President at a time when Russia’s policy of “reset” with the United States has hit a roadblock….The crisis in Syria has strengthened Russia’s strategic ties with China, which jointly opposed regime change in Damascus, but placed India and Russia on different sides of the barricade. Re-establishing consensus within BRICS on issues like Syria must be a priority for both the new Russian President and the Indian leadership.”

JAPAN

Editorials hailed Putin’s victory as an opportunity to improve Russia-Japan relations. This was echoed by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in a congratulatory phone call to Putin on Monday. Noda expressed hope for the “wise” resolution of the disputed Northern Territories between Japan and Russia.

Citing Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s January 28 visit to Tokyo, Suzuki Yoshikatsu, Senior Commentator at Jiji Press asserts that his visit “helped dispel the acrimony hovering over Japan-Russia relations…basically resetting the bilateral relationship in advance of Prime Minister Putin’s return to the presidency.”

China’s Military Budget Increase Draws Responses from Asian Powers

Policy Alert #23 | March 29, 2012

Earlier this month, China announced an 11.2% increase in its official defense budget, bringing the total figure to $110 billion (RMB 670 billion). Although this increase did not come as a surprise, the announcement still drew wary responses from India, Japan and Russia, which we examine in this Policy Alert.

CHINA

The message in the officially-sanctioned press was consistent across the board: China’s increasing military budget is in line with the nation’s overall economic growth, military modernization is necessary for responding to increasingly complex security challenges, and China is committed to peaceful development.

Wen Bing, a researcher with the People’s Liberation Army, further emphasized that China will not join any form of arms race.

The Global Times elaborated on this rationale in several pieces:

“The US ‘return to Asia’ has created a disturbance in China and neighboring countries. The fast growth of Asian military budgets is related to this factor,” stated the paper in an editorial. On a related note, Li Jie of the PLA’s Naval Research Institute argued, “Exaggerating China’s military power could help scare small countries around China and force them [to rely] more on the US.”
Wei Guoan, a military strategist in Beijing, was also defensive: “If we are strong enough, I don’t think other countries would be as bold today in violating our territory, such as in the South China Sea.“

INDIA

India is also reviewing its defense budget for 2012-13, which the government announced will be $38.5 billion (1.93 trillion rupees), or about one-third the size of China’s military spending. It was also reported that a high-level defense meeting had a special focus on China and Pakistan, in addition to internal security issues.

While noting that India’s budget is up 13.1% from last year, the Hindustan Times urged the government to “prioritize defence acquisitions to fast track what we critically need…rather than buying what is readily available so as to spend the budget.”

This increase, though, is not without strains on other fiscal needs. Before it was announced, the Economic Times had reported that “the symbolic reminder of China’s official military budget crossing $100 billion couldn’t have come at a worse time for India that is seeing a series of steps to curtail defence spending due to mounting fiscal crisis.”

C. Uday Bhaskar, former director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, praised the “clarity and determination” of China’s political leadership in modernizing its military. “A complete contrast is visible in India, [in which] no political stakeholder seems to have such levels of commitment to national security.”
In the same ETarticle, unnamed military officers also voiced support for indigenous military production, as well as a greater role for the military in national decision-making processes.
According to another ET article, “Outgoing army chief VK Singh has cautioned that the war-waging capability of the army has been hamstrung by long delays in procurement decisions.”

Some commentary discussed broader geopolitical implications:

C. Raja Mohan, known for his great-power realist views, wrote in the Indian Express: “China’s rising military expenditure is beginning to have an impact on the Asian balance of power, long before Beijing acquires military parity with Washington. …. To achieve its immediate political objectives, China does not have to match the United States weapon-to-weapon or equal its defence spending dollar-to-dollar. All it needs to do is to alter the local East Asian balance of power against the United States.”

On the transparency of China’s military budget:

Srikanth Kondapalli of Jawaharlal Nehru University questioned India’s officials and suggested, “Western estimates say the actual figure should be at least double, although Indian estimates place the budget at $150 billion rather than the Pentagon’s $220 billion figure.”

JAPAN

Government officials and Japan commentators voiced disquiet over China’s double-digit military budget increase while simultaneously calling on China to exercise greater responsibility by making its military spending more transparent.

Top government spokesman Osamu Fujimura expressed concern over China’s military budget increase, urging China to “boost transparency through an exchange of dialogue in the field of security.”
An editorial in the Yomiuri Shimbun concurred, asserting that the opacity of China’s military spending “leaves Japan with no alternative but to maintain its vigilance” and “strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance to boost its deterrent power. “
Citing a “high ranking Chinese military officer,” the Asahi Shimbun stated that China’s actual defense budget for fiscal year 2011 was about 1.7 times higher than the officially announced figure. Thus, the Asahi predicts, “the actual amount earmarked for the Chinese military is almost certainly considerably larger [than the amount announced].”

RUSSIA

Although the Russian media had little to say on China’s military budget increase, the final text of a report outlining Russia’s economic development strategy until 2020, released earlier this month, identifies the growth of China’s economic potential and international status as a “main risk” for Russia. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, expands on the implications of the Strategy 2020 report: “Russia is clearly apprehensive about the rise of China. For the first time in recent history, Russia is weaker than its neighbor, and the gap will continue growing … how should Russia co-exist with China today and in the next five to 10 years if the current dynamics persist?”

Turmoil in Syria: Chinese and Russian Views

Policy Alert #22 | February 29, 2012

Last week, China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down. In this Policy Alert, we examine Chinese and Russian views on the Syrian crisis.

CHINA

Commentary in China was generally critical of the West and supportive of China’s UN veto on Syria as a stance consistent with its approach to international issues.

A number of Chinese state-run news outlets criticized the West for intervening in Syria’s internal affairs, adding that the rejection of the UN resolution reflects the will of Moscow and Beijing to counter Western influence.

At present, Syria has become “a game by and between great powers…that seek to set the template for resolving the crisis of a sovereign state,” declared the People’s Daily.
Xinhua editor Lu Hui argued that, “Behind the excuse of ‘for democracy and liberty of the Middle East,’ the real motive of the Western countries is to change the political landscape of the whole Middle East area for their own benefit.” He outlines two benefits the West hopes to gain via Syria:

- First, bringing down the Syrian government will “increase the West’s chips on the Iranian issue as Syria and Iran enjoy close relations.”
- Second, “the United States, a strong patron of Israel, also hopes to instill a new regime in Syria which distances itself from Iran and becomes less hostile to Israel and the West.”

RUSSIA

Most analyses of the veto explained it as a lesson learned from last year’s experience with Libya, during which Russia had abstained on the UN Security Council resolution that authorized the no-fly zone over Libya. Commentators stressed the need to avoid repeating a potential “Libya scenario.”

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of the Russia in Global Affairs journal: “After Moscow refrained from using its veto in the UNSC, paving the way for ‘humanitarian intervention’ by NATO, the ‘no-fly zone’ mandate was almost immediately shifted into a regime change operation led by France and Britain. Russia felt its cooperation had been abused. It is because of this that Moscow now refuses to cooperate on Syria.”

Referring to the UN veto: “That’s a perfectly clever move; we’re protecting our own interests,” said Vladimir Bartenev, a global affairs analyst with the Moscow State University. In the event that the West bypasses the Security Council, “one of Russia’s objectives is to paint the West as idiots ignoring the United Nations.”

Yevgeny Satanovsky, head of the Middle East Institute think-tank agrees, adding that “such an intervention would be illegitimate in the eyes of the global community.” He also notes that “a possible intervention would be a prelude to a standoff with Iran, Syria’s main ally.”

Commentators were mixed on Syria’s strategic importance to Russia:

Igor Panarin, Dean of Russia’s Diplomatic Academy, views Syria as Russia’s “strategic ally, who could assist Russia in restoring its military presence in the Mediterranean.” Classifying those countries that were in favor of the UN vote as “NATO heavyweights,” Panarin suggested that their “ultimate objective is most likely turning Syria into another Iraq.”

Andrei Murtazin from the state-run Ria Novosti states that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s February 7 trip to Damascus “reaffirmed Russia’s readiness to stand up to the West and the Arab League in defense of its last remaining ally in the Middle East.” Nonetheless, Murtazin concludes that “confrontation with both Arab and Western countries would greatly damage Russia’s hard-won international image as a democratic state

Rising Powers Celebrate the Opening of Sochi Olympics

Policy Alert #21 | February 20, 2012

The extravagant opening ceremonies on Friday marked the official start of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, attracting global attention to the world’s most popular sports event and to the political controversies surrounding it. In this Policy Alert, we examine commentary from Russia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea on politics and the Olympic Games.

RUSSIA

Russian leaders and commentators emphasized the successful opening of the Sochi Olympics and its promises for Russia’s future while downplaying criticism against the sports event.

President Vladimir Putin hailed the opening ceremony. “I think that I would express everyone’s opinion by saying that this show was very bright, appropriate for Russia, and impressive…At the same time, I would like to point out that this is only the beginning.”
President Putin defended the Olympics as “a great festive occasion…for all sports devotees over the world,” dismissing critics as “habitual Russophobes.”
The Games’ organizers lauded the Sochi Olympics for welcoming a record-high number of over 50 world leaders to the opening ceremony, pushing aside the notable absence of other state leaders, including those from the U.S., the U.K., France, and Germany.
Russia Beyond the Headlines asserted that contrary to the popular “myths” about the Olympics, foreign visitors do not need to worry about terrorism, weather conditions, and the persecution of gays and lesbians.
Ivan Timofeev, program director at the Russian International Affairs Council, characterized the Olympics as Russia’s comeback to “the big game” since the collapse of the Soviet Union. He emphasized the importance of capitalizing on the Olympics’ economic opportunities to spur future growth and improve the country’s international image.

CHINA

Chinese leaders and media highlighted the importance of President Xi Jingping’s attendance at the opening ceremony for boosting Sino-Russian relations.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi lauded President Xi’s visit as a demonstration of his country’s friendship with Russia and its support for the Olympics cause, calling it “the beginning of China’s major diplomatic actions in 2014.”
China Daily argued that the visit “proved that China-Russia relations have been moving full steam ahead,” opening up more opportunities for trade, cultural exchange, and security cooperation.
The Global Times argued that in the absence of other world leaders from the U.S, the U.K., France, and Germany, President Xi’s visit strengthened the Sino-Russia relationship, which the paper called, “a significant pillar of world peace and balanced global power.”
Xinhua commented that Xi’s visit provided “a timely vote of confidence in a close neighbor and friend,” while the Western leaders and media only focus on criticizing Russia because of their “Cold-War mentality.”

INDIA

Indian media responded to the recent Indian Olympic Association’s corruption scandal that led to a ban on the use of the Indian flag in the Sochi Olympics.

The Business Standard lamented that India faced “the ignominy of witnessing three of its athletes march without the national flag during the opening ceremony.”
The Indian Express brushed aside the “hysteria over the missing flag,” urging Indians to focus instead on obtaining medals.

Indian commentators also expressed critical views on President Putin’s political success in the Sochi Olympics.

The Business Standard bashed the Olympics as “a global window on Russian corruption and inefficiency” in light of its unprecedented $51 billion price tag. The paper also cast doubt on the Games’ benefits to the Russian economy.
The Indian Express critiqued the Sochi Games as “the stage for spectacular agitation… Global outrage over Russia’s anti-gay and blasphemy law could make this the ‘most protested’ Games ever.”

JAPAN

Japanese news outlets expressed concerns regarding the safety of the Olympic Games.

The Yomiuri Shimbun argued that “Russia should do its utmost to ensure safe Olympic Games,” noting the looming terrorist threats and tight security surrounding Sochi.
The Mainichi Shimbun lamented that “it is ironic that this major sports festival that symbolizes peace in the world will be held while security personnel are on high alert against possible terrorist attacks.”

Meanwhile, much attention has been paid to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the opening ceremony and his meeting with President Putin to discuss the Northern Territories issue.

The Sankei Shimbun argued that Prime Minister Abe must not compromise on the return of all four disputed islands and use the meeting to advance the negotiation.
Hiroshi Kimura, professor emeritus of political science at Hokkaido University, remained skeptical that Putin will reciprocate Abe’s favor by returning all the islands, because of the domestic conservative oppositions in Russia.

SOUTH KOREA

Korean newspapers discussed the diplomatic ramifications of President Park Geun-hye’s absence at the opening ceremony, and the lessons of the Sochi Olympics for the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics.

The JoongAng Ilbo argued that President Park “has demonstrated a questionable performance in the diplomatic field” by missing the “Olympic opportunity.”The paper noted that all other leaders in East Asia, including those from China and Japan, attended the opening ceremony to advance their diplomatic agendas with Russia.
The Dong-A Ilbo claimed that South Korea must draw lessons from the Sochi event to ensure the Pyeongchang Olympics’ success. “Korea must use the Russian event as an opportunity not only to improve its athletes’ performance but also to check up what we should do in various fields, including preparation and operation of the Korean event.”

Taiwan’s Elections and Reactions from Asian Powers

Policy Alert #20 | January 29, 2012

On January 14, Taiwan’s voters elected incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou to a second term in office, while also giving his ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) a legislative majority. In this Policy Alert, we highlight Chinese, Indian and Japanese commentaries on the implications of this election for cross-strait relations and regional politics.

CHINA

The party-owned press hailed Ma’s electoral victory as one more step closer toward political negotiations with Taiwan:

The People’s Daily: “The concept of the peaceful development in relations between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait is more deeply rooted….According to the facts, no one can say “no” to peace, no one can refuse negotiations, and no one is willing to close the door of exchange and cooperation, and mutual benefit.”

Taking note of the intense interest in Taiwan’s election amongst Chinese netizens, the Global Times emphasized the importance of national unity and explained that “systems designed for modern countries are not suitable for gigantic countries like China.”

INDIA

Indian commentaries focused on the opportunity to expand India’s economic relations with Taiwan, with references to geopolitical competition with China:

Editorial by The Times of India: “Rich Taiwanese investors are looking for opportunities abroad – which China is capitalising aggressively on. Yet Taiwan doesn`t get much foreign policy attention from New Delhi. It remains a blind spot in India`s `Look East` policy, owing perhaps to some combination of India`s fear of offending China and the [Ministry of External Affairs’] terminal caution.”

Nitin Pai writes in the Business Standard: “India faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the geopolitical stability suggested by a KMT government means greater economic opportunities for India to engage Taiwan. …On the other hand, a Beijing less preoccupied with issues in its backyard will find it easier to project power elsewhere, including against India. …Unless New Delhi uses the space created by Saturday’s elections to rapidly scale up economic ties, India will have little upside from Ma’s success.”

JAPAN

Japanese newspapers from different ends of the political spectrum converged in their skepticism that Ma’s victory boded more stable cross-strait relations:

Editorial by the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun: “Of concern is to what extent China and Taiwan can move beyond the focus on economic relations and become closer politically. …A hastily forged political relationship with China would cause instability in Taiwan, thereby leading to cross-strait tension….An emergency across the Strait of Taiwan could escalate and endanger the security of Japan. We hope that Ma will steer his administration with discretion.”

Editorial by the liberal-leaning Asahi Shimbun: “China still keeps ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and is expanding its naval power around the island. The current stability in Sino-Taiwanese relations is as fragile as a glass sculpture and far from what constitutes true peace.” In the same editorial, the paper also urged a strengthening of Japan-Taiwan ties through measures such as the signing of a free trade agreement.

Indian Views on a Nuclear Armed Iran

Policy Alert #19 | January 29, 2012

Can India play a role in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons? This Policy Alert highlights the differences in opinion amongst top Indian experts on issues of nuclear disarmament, India’s energy security, and Indian-Iranian relations.

India’s “Great Power Realists” and “Hyper-Nationalists” are ideologically in favor of nuclear deterrence as a means of maintaining international security. On the other hand, “Leftists” and “Neo-Nationalists” are staunchly opposed to any country acquiring nuclear weapons.

Bharat Karnad, well-known security expert at New Delhi’s Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, believes that India is more secure because it has nuclear weapons. He does not support President Barack Obama’s call for global nuclear disarmament, and generally is less critical of the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Mani Shankar Aiyar, Member of the Indian Parliament, argues that universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament should be the most important item on the international community’s security agenda. He considers all nuclear-armed countries, from the United States to China to Iran, as threats to India’s security; even India itself should not have developed nuclear weapons.

For those opposed to a nuclear-armed Iran, what do they think should be done? “Liberal Globalists” and “Standard Nationalists” tend to support multilateral diplomacy over great power politics.

Lalit Mansingh, former Foreign Secretary of India, thinks that a nuclear-armed Iran would definitely be a threat to India, particularly because Pakistan, North Korea and China are behind Iran’s proliferation efforts. Mansingh believes that sanctions do not work, and further stresses that India will not follow the United States in imposing bilateral sanctions. However, India could support sanctions if they are imposed on the basis of a United Nations resolution. In addition, Mansingh is disappointed that President Obama has toned down his initial call for global nuclear disarmament.

On the question of Indian-Iranian relations, and specifically Iran’s energy supply to India, expert opinion is divided:

Karnad argues that India cannot alienate Iran, for several reasons. India’s Shia Muslim population is the second largest in the world, and they have a close affinity with the Iranian clergy. Moreover, India needs Iranian energy, which would be difficult to source elsewhere. India also relies on Iran’s Chabahar port for access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Mansingh strongly disagrees that India’s Muslim population is a factor constraining Indian policy toward Iran. He believes that Indian Muslims identify with a democratic India and would support Indian security over a nuclear Iran. Mansingh is also confident that India would be able to source its energy from other suppliers if imports from Iran were stopped.

The above views were expressed at a conference on “India as a Global Power: Contending Views from India,” held on January 23, 2012 and co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ Rising Powers Initiative and the Center for a New American Security. Details on the event, including speaker biographies and audio recordings, are available here.

Kim Jong-il’s Death Draws Major Reactions in Asia

Policy Alert #18 | December 29, 2011

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il this week provoked a variety of reactions across the globe. Kim Jong-un, the late Kim’s third son, will succeed his father. In this Policy Alert, we examine reactions to Kim’s death from Asia and what it means for North Korea’s future.

JAPAN

Given Japan’s proximity and interest in the Korean peninsula, reactions were markedly heightened. Many speculated on what the post-Kim era might mean for Japanese interests in the region.

Kim’s death triggered a flurry of responses from Japanese government officials, who emphasized their hope for continued stability while monitoring developments on the Korean peninsula:

Foreign Minister Koichiro Genba and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met in Washington on Monday and agreed to “closely monitor the situation and coordinate closely with each other by sharing information between Tokyo and Washington, and among Japan, the United States and South Korea.”
In a telephone conversation Tuesday, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and President Barack Obama also confirmed the need to make concerted efforts to secure stability on the Korean Peninsula. Noda told reporters that Japan “hopes that Kim’s death has no negative impact on peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.”
Finance Minister Jun Azumi instructed officials to examine potential economic fallout from the development in North Korea, warning that “we need to prepare for any contingencies.“
Chief Cabinet Secretary Osamu Fujimura stated that Japanese intelligence had not detected any “worrying changes” in the configuration of North Korea’s military that would affect Japan’s national security, but that he would keep a careful eye on the situation in Pyongyang.
Urging a continued policy of “dialogue and pressure,” former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated that he hopes North Korea “respects the opinion of the international community as much as possible and thinks that this is a big chance to transform itself tremendously.”

A group of academics mulled over North Korea’s future and its relations with the rest of the world in a roundtable interview with the Asahi Shimbun.

Noting Pyongyang’s close ties with Beijing, Masao Okonogi, professor emeritus at Keio University, predicted that China’s leaders will support the Kim Jong-un regime, fearing the consequences of a North Korea plunged into turmoil. Okonogi also predicted that North Korea’s foreign policy will remain unchanged for the time being.
Shunji Hiraiwa, a professor of North Korean politics and diplomacy at Kwansei Gakuin University, added that although Kim Jong-un studied in Switzerland, this does not necessarily mean he has a more open mind towards the West. Since for the time being, he will be supported by the party and the military, “It will take time for his personality to be reflected in the country’s external policies.”

Several editorials highlighted Kim’s death as an opportunity to spur investigations into the abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s, which Pyongyang admitted to during a September 2002 visit by former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi.

INDIA

There is little discussion of India’s broader interests in Northeast Asia, but commentaries do reflect the range of foreign policy orientations in Indian society.

The Times of India and its sister paper The Economic Times are cautiously optimistic that this might be “a great opportunity for change” and reform in North Korea. Expressing the liberal-globalist belief in economic engagement, editorials urge South Korea, Japan and the US to “open channels of communication and offer economic aid…[to] provide North Korea’s new leadership with sufficient incentive to relax the system from within.”
Leftists in India tend to be skeptical of the use of military power. An editorial in The Hindu says South Korea’s recent “military grandstanding, conducting provocative naval exercise…and assuming a hostile political science” are “not the intelligent way.”
From its commentary on North Korea, “the quintessential rogue state,” the nationalist-leaning Hindustan Times brought the focus back to the subcontinent. “While Indians may see North Korea as a distant hermit kingdom, they should perhaps take a closer look because…the country that parallels the behaviour of North Korea the closest is Pakistan. They should…realise that reeling in a rogue state is as much about patience and guile as it is about power and will.”

CHINA

A common theme in the state-controlled press was the expectation of a peaceful and stable transition in North Korea.

Zhang Tingyan, a former Chinese diplomat to Pyongyang, said Chinese-North Korean relations “should develop at a relatively proper pace….A peaceful transition is good for everyone, and that’s what will happen for the DPRK’s relations with the ROK, US and Japan.”
Editorials in The Global Times were dedicated to highlighting the importance of China’s role in ensuring a smooth transition in Pyongyang. “China’s stance has played an important role in contributing to the current situation,…a successful example of international diplomacy…China’s clear and firm attitude in supporting North Korea has restricted the choices of other countries.” The Communist Party-supported paper also urged China’s attitude to be “resolute in maintaining the independence of North Korea, protect the country’s transition of power from external interference, and ensure its freedom to choose its own path.”
In contrast, Gong Keyu, deputy director of the Centre for Asian-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, commented in the Indian newspaper The Hindu that Kim’s death “is not good news for the Six-Party Talks.”

RUSSIA

Officials announced that relations between Moscow and Pyongyang would remain unaffected, while some commentators alluded to a possible opening in DPRK relations with the change in leadership.

President Dmitry Medvedev sent his condolences to Kim Jong-un on Monday, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Kim Jong-il’s death would not impair relations between Russia and North Korea.

Several scholars debated whether Kim Jong-un’s ascension might bring liberalization to the DPRK’s foreign relations:

Raising a parallel with the Soviet Union, researcher Yevgeny Kim at the Institute of the Far East with the Russian Academy of Sciences said that the “possible emergence of a figure similar to progressive leader Mikhail Gorbachev could lead to the ‘destruction’ of the North Korean regime.
Pavel Leshakov, a Korea expert at Moscow State University, disagreed, noting that “the Soviet example has taught the North Korean elite not to embrace outright reformism.”

WHAT THE RISING POWERS INITIATIVE(RPI) EXPERTS ARE SAYING

Characterizing North Korea’s future as “uncertain“, Gregg Brazinsky, associate professor of history and international affairs at the George Washington University asserted that “Pyongyang’s most pressing concern right now is likely that its adversaries will view Kim Jong Il’s death as a sign of weakness and initiate new efforts to topple the North Korean government,” For this reason, Brazinsky urged the Obama administration to “do something to alleviate some of the fear and mistrust.”
Narushige Michishita, an expert at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, noted that because Kim Jong-un is closer in age to young policymakers of his generation who have developed a taste for cell phones and computers, “we can expect some new things, but we don’t know if that will result in political transformation.”

Asian Powers Comment on U.S. Plans for Asia-Pacific Economic Integration

Policy Alert #17 | November 29, 2011

The United States is “pivoting” toward Asia. This strategy was formally publicized last month with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s essay on “America’s Pacific Century.” This week, President Barack Obama has been visiting Asia to push for a Trans-Pacific trading bloc and stronger military ties with US allies. How are major Asian powers reacting to America’s strategy to “re-engage” the Asia Pacific region? This Policy Alert highlights Chinese, Russian and Japanese views on the economic aspects of this strategy.

CHINA
Chinese officials have so far made only brief comments on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), all of which express China’s support for regional economic integration but stressing its preference for existing mechanisms. Assistant Commerce Minister Yu Jianhua said any trade mechanism should be “open and inclusive,” while Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei said economic integration should proceed in a “step-by-step manner.”

Commentary in the press characterized the TPP as a part of a wider strategy to contain China:

Li Hongmei, editor of the People’s Daily Online, wrote that “the U.S. intends to play a dominant role in the to-be Trans-Pacific architecture by handpicking its members and systemizing and regulating them in political and military spheres in accordance with its own standards so as to turn out a comprehensively economic and political alliance under the U.S. leadership.”

In addition to similar criticisms, a Global Times editorial pointed out that “any Asian cooperation with the absence of Beijing will not have much heft. China never lacks channels for conducting cooperation with its regional counterparts.”

Academic opinions leaned toward a “wait-and-see” attitude:

Wang Yuzhu of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences said, “Economic regionalism is China’s most pragmatic choice, because the international architecture is changing rapidly. China has to recalibrate its relations with the rest of the world.”

According to Lu Jianren, deputy director of the APEC Study Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “How the TPP negotiations will progress is still a matter of great uncertainty. What can be certain is it will be strategically detrimental to the old ASEAN Plus Three coalition, which has long been lagging behind in forming a free-trade zone that can allow a level of economic unity in the region.”

RUSSIA

As Russia gears up to host the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostock, commentary on U.S. re-engagement in Asia was introspective, questioning Russia’s own unique orientation as both a European and Asian state.

An article in the state-run RIA Novosti cited Asia’s prominence in global trade as a driving factor for pushing U.S. policy eastwards. Referencing APEC’s announcement that it has lowered regional trade costs by 5 percent, the author noted that “21 very different economies have quietly created a common economic mechanism by using methods contrary to those of the EU (the Europeans favor universal and stringent regulations)” and contemplated Russia’s role as both a European and Asian state as it prepares to host the 2012 APEC summit in Vladivostock.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of the Russia in Global Affairs journal, echoed these sentiments, adding that “the Asian challenge will change Russia’s view of the world and force it to reevaluate its traditional-and now largely anachronistic- focus on the West.” Consequently, Lukyanov notes that “Russia needs a comprehensive Asian strategy, including efforts to develop its Far East and secure its position in Asia.”

On the TPP, President Dmitry Medvedev took a wait-and-see approach, stating, “I don’t really understand what will result from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. When it is really operational and bears fruit, then I would say that this so-called club could become interesting for us.”

JAPAN

At the APEC summit earlier this week, Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced that Japan would partake in the TPP negotiations, generating a flurry of debate and widespread media coverage questioning the role Japan should play in the negotiations, if any.

Those opposed to Japan’s participation in the TPP cited pressing domestic issues that should take precedence:

“Reconstruction and healing must precede entry into TPP,” read one Japan Times headline, labeling Noda’s decision as “unwise and naïve, suggesting an ignorance of pressing domestic concerns such as the social and economic effects of March 11.”

Several articles in the Mainichi Daily News urged Prime Minister Noda to take initiative in allaying concerns among the general public about Japan’s participation, adding that Noda “cannot win broad public support for participation…unless he shows a determination and willingness to take the lead in explaining why.”

Others editorials appeared cautiously optimistic, highlighting the possibility of an increased regional presence for Japan:

“Japan has emerged from an extended period of quietness to underscore its presence in economic diplomacy,” declared one editorial, noting that Canada and Mexico quickly expressed their interest in participating in the free trade accord shortly after Japan’s announcement. A high-ranking official in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry added, “There was likely concern about being left behind if they [Canada and Mexico] did not join in the creation of TPP rules that would likely become the future standard for the Asian market.“

Arguing that the “linchpin of Japan’s diplomacy is its relationship with the United States,” a commentator in the Asahi Shimbun praised Tokyo’s efforts to enhance its ties with Washington. “From this point of view, the TPP can give Japan diplomatic leverage in dealing with China.” At the same time, the Asahi urged Japan to “serve as an intermediary between the TPP countries and China.“

Our next blog post will examine Asian reactions to the geopolitical dimensions of America’s ‘pivot’ toward Asia.

The U.S. “Pivots” Back to Asia. How are the Region’s Major Powers Reacting?

Policy Alert #16 | November 29, 2011

In our previous blog post, we examined Asian reactions to the economic aspects of America’s “pivot” back to Asia strategy. This Policy Alert looks at what China, India, and Japan are saying about the geopolitical implications of US plans to strengthen its presence in Asia.

CHINA

Official commentary specifically on this topic was expressed by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson during a regular press briefing: “In handling Asia-Pacific affairs, one should comply with the basic trend of peace, development and cooperation upheld by regional countries, and respect the diversity and complexity of the region.”

Similarly, the press has stressed China’s commitment to peaceful development and coexistence with neighbors. Commentaries characterize US intentions as reflecting a “Cold War mentality” aiming to encircle China, then explain why such plans are likely to fail:

In general, the entire region is suspicious of US motives. An article in the People’s Daily says Asian countries are “unlikely to approve of the US attempt to impose its values on them or the so-called ‘leadership’ it aspires to exercise in Asia.”

Specific countries such as Australia cannot be counted on either, because Australia [is] currently swaying between China and the US,” says a Global Times editorial. Li Hongmei, editor of the People’s Daily Online, also cites a former Australian defense official who said the plan “was a very risky move” for his country.

Economically, strategic encirclement of China is not truly possible because of Chinese economic clout. “Any country which chooses to be a pawn in the US chess game will lose the opportunity to benefit from China’s economy. This will surely make US protection less attractive.“

China may also retaliate economically at neighboring countries, such as the Philippines, for cooperating militarily with the US. The Philippines is “walking a very fine line,” warned a Global Timeseditorial that recommended economic “punishment” such as postponing the implementation of investment agreements and decreasing imports from the Philippines. In the meantime, “China should enhance cooperation with countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, allowing them to benefit more from the Philippine vacuum.”

For reactions by Chinese netizens, the Dutch nonprofit foundation Global Voices has a report here.

INDIA

Across the board, commentary in India is welcoming of America’s plan to strengthen its presence in Asia, and sees this renewed attention on the region as a chance for India to assert its strategic role.

“The American push for an open and inclusive definition of the Asia-Pacific community converges with Indian interests,” said an editorial in The Times of India. “If East Asia is where the action is, then Indian diplomacy needs to focus here and make New Delhi a significant player in the region. India shares centuries-old cultural and civilisational links with East Asia which deserve to be leveraged.”

“Southeast Asian and Pacific Rim countries are welcoming a larger US presence in defining a new century’s security template. Framing the developments is China’s rise, which has determined Washington’s toughening tone,” says an Indian Express editorial. “Delhi ought to wake up to this new world order and utilise the opportunities thrown up to dynamically involve itself in shaping the new Asian security order.”

It is unclear exactly what kind of strategic role India can and should play, however.

India is “not yet big enough to be treated as a viable balancing partner by smaller countries” in the region, says the Hindustan Times. Rather than trying to contain China, the editorial writes, “the game is about trying to preserve sufficient autonomy of action for other Asian countries that they can resist when Beijing lapses into aggressive or bullying behavior.”

Anita Inder Singh of the Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution in New Delhi also cautions that “India cannot take the US for granted” because the reality of America’s fiscal constraints, coupled with the US troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, mean that India should strengthen its own military capacities so that it can play a role in maintaining regional stability.

On the other hand, Nitin Pai, founder of a strongly nationalistic strategic think thank in India, wrote in aBusiness Standard op-ed that “India today is in a position to be a swing power.” In his confident outlook, Pai further commented that “China today is at its most vulnerable since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989,” in all matters from geopolitics to economics and internal security.

JAPAN

Japanese press focused on the speech President Obama delivered last Thursday in Australia securing an agreement to station as many as 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin and announcing that the U.S. would expand its role in the Asia-Pacific for the long term.

Citing fears of a fast-growing China with expanding military and economic power, commentators welcomed the expanded U.S. role:

The Daily Yomiuri noted that “U.S. military forces stationed in Okinawa Prefecture and South Korea are within range of China’s ballistic missiles. Securing a U.S. military foothold outside the range of those missiles is indispensable to strengthening deterrence.” For this reason, “the new U.S. strategy is welcome as it will contribute to the region’s stability and prosperity. The role of the Japan-U.S. alliance is certain to become more important.”

Obama’s announcement “does not mean that U.S. bases in Japan are any less important,” declared the Asahi Shimbun. “The Japan-U.S. alliance remains the linchpin of the American forward presence in Asia. But new geostrategic realities have necessitated adjustments in the U.S. military posture.” As for China, stated the Asahi, “it has only itself to blame. By throwing around its increasing weight over the last couple of years, China has unnerved much of East Asia,” thereby driving U.S. friends and allies even more firmly into Washington’s arms.

Burma and the U.S. Pivot to Asia: Commentary from Asian Powers

Policy Alert #15 | November 29, 2011

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama visited three Southeast Asian countries in his first foreign trip after being reelected. The Asian media’s attention has focused on Obama’s visit to Burma, and as we point out In this Policy Alert, the Indians are highlighting Obama’s trip as a continuation of the U.S. pivot, while the Chinese are downplaying its significance. For South Koreans, Burma’s liberalization evoked comparisons with North Korea’s political development.

INDIA

An op-ed in the Times of India expressed strong support for the U.S. pivot, listing a series of concrete measures that show the “seriousness of the competition for influence” and the “enduring impact of American democracy’s soft power” in Burma.

Even The Hindu, generally more skeptical of U.S. power, gave credit to the Obama administration for crafting a Burma policy that is both more strategic and pragmatic than that of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The Indian Express, in contrast, was much more supportive of Indian foreign policy, arguing that Obama’s visit “vindicates” India’s past policy of gradually promoting change by engaging rather than isolating Burma. In the larger context of this U.S. pivot to Asia, Express columnist C. Raja Mohan noted that “smaller nations of Asia are caught in a bind.” He urged the Indian government to take on more responsibility as a rising power to “mitigate great power tensions and defuse regional conflicts in Asia.”

CHINA

“Don’t read too much into Myanmar visit,” ran the headline of a Global Times editorial. Noting that the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not react negatively to Obama’s visit, the paper said this “shows China’s confidence” and that “it doesn’t have to overreact.”

Similarly, Jin Canrong of Renmin University also said “China needn’t overreact“. China should expand cooperation with the U.S., making the two rely on each other. Meanwhile, “it should enhance mutual trust with ASEAN countries to create a favorable space for its own development.”

As a contrast to such expressions of nonchalance, however, a Xinhua commentary said the pivot was raising “suspicion and contention among Asian countries,” and a People’s Daily op-ed criticized the Obama administration for “playing tricks“

SOUTH KOREA

While the Korean media is heavily focused on upcoming presidential elections, the JoongAng Daily took note of Obama’s speech in Burma calling on Pyongyang to follow Burma’s path of peace and progress, give up its nuclear weapons program, and open up. The paper supported Obama’s remarks, calling on North Korea to “seize a golden opportunity” and noted that Obama’s attendance at the East Asia Summit and visits to Thailand and Burma illustrate Washington’s “solid will…to attach specific meaning to the grand cause of ‘shifting the axis to Asia.'”

Do Asians See a Role in Solving the Eurozone Crisis?

Policy Alert #14 | October 29, 2011

The Eurozone’s debt crisis has spurred talk about a possible role for BRIC countries to lend a helping hand through increased financing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While discussions are still under way over whether the IMF will even step into the euro crisis, rising powers such as China and Brazil continue to express interest. G20 finance ministers and central bankers met in Paris over the weekend and said they expected the October 23 European Union summit to “decisively address the current challenges through a comprehensive plan“. This Policy Alert highlights the views in China, India, and Russia on this issue:

CHINA

The mixed views in China indicate an interest to help the Eurozone in such a way that is both economically practical and politically beneficial to China-EU relations.

Several op-eds in the People’s Daily highlight China’s shouldering of responsibility in global finance. They point to China’s purchase of European debt securities, expressed confidence in the Eurozone, and continuing trade and investment relations with the EU.

Nevertheless, some voices emphasized that “China has to be cautious while expanding in Europe,” and consider “many factors including investment return, security, risk and national interests.”

Ding Gang, a senior reporter with the People’s Daily, was more blunt about what China should expect in return: It is only “the most basic fair treatment” to ask that the EU recognize China’s market economy status and end the arms sale ban on China.

Specific policy recommendations came from a recently organized academic forum at Tongji University. It was reported that Qiao Yide, secretary-general of the Shanghai Development Research Foundation, recommended the following: 1) purchase bonds from multilateral institutions (the European Financial Stability Facility) instead of national bonds; 2) encourage Chinese businesses to expand in Europe; and 3) increase the euro’s weight in the currency basket of the Chinese yuan.

A Global Times op-ed commented on the geopolitical opportunity of the crisis. Liu Zongyi, research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, sounded optimistic aboutChina-EU cooperation that would help the two economies avoid possible financial shock from “the irresponsible monetary policy of the US” and the threat of “the falling value of the US dollar.”

INDIA

Not much is being said in India about any role that the country could play in the EU financial crisis. This is not entirely surprising given India’s general reluctance to be out in front on controversial international issues. Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee echoed the IMF’s general position that “the issue of sovereign solvency ought to be resolved by the Europeans themselves.”

In contrast, an op-ed in The Economic Times last month argued that, compared to Brazil’s pro-activeness, India is missing out on a diplomatic opportunity to assert itself in the politics of global finance.

RUSSIA

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has been particularly vocal in expressing his views on the European debt crisis, calling for an increased BRIC role in international financial institutions:

In an interview with Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, Putin emphasized that the BRIC group should lead the reform of international financial systems. “I think it’s time to talk about reforming existing institutions, and first of all I mean global financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. And here we agree that the role of the BRICS countries in those organizations must be enhanced, given the growing importance of our countries’ economies.” At the same time, Putin noted that “Europe’s heavyweights have enough resources to solve the problem,” and he did not foresee a large role for the BRICS in the euro crisis.

Echoing the PM’s statements, Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak stated that Russia is “ready to help other economies that need our resources,” but that this should be done through the IMF and other institutions, since “larger European countries cannot be supported solely through the framework of bilateral agreements.”

Noting that “the process of creating post-crisis models for global development is progressing with difficulties,” Putin has called for the creation of a “Eurasian Union” of former Soviet countries that could serve as a bridge between Europe and Asia while strengthening the global economy.

Regardless of the outcome of the crisis, Putin stated on Monday that Russia has a “high margin of safety to be ready for any turn of events in the global economy.”

Chinese Reactions to U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

Policy Alert #13 | September 29, 2011

Last Wednesday, the Obama Administration announced a $5.85 billion arms sales package to Taiwan, featuring upgrades for 145 of Taiwan’s F-16 A/B fighter jets. In this blog post, we highlight the contrast between China’s official responses to the arms deal, and reactions published in the Chinese media. The differences underscore some of the tensions and competing voices in China’s foreign policy establishment.

OFFICIAL REACTIONS

In Beijing, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun summoned US Ambassador to China Gary Locke to protest the arms sales. The acting US military attaché to China was also summoned by China’s Ministry of Defense.

In New York, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton: “China urged the U.S. to attach great importance to China’s solemn position and take it very seriously, correct the mistake of selling weapons to Taiwan by revoking the above-mentioned wrong decision, eliminate its negative influence, stop arms sales to Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan military contact, and take real actions to uphold the larger interest of China-U.S. relations.”

Defense Ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng said at a press briefing that “planned China-U.S. military exchanges, including high-level visits and joint exercises, will definitely be impacted.”

COMMENTARY IN THE PRESS

The US-China relationship will suffer – such is the general sentiment voiced in several editorials and op-eds. In “A blow to Sino-US ties,” Shen Dingli of Fudan University writes that “Washington’s new arms sales to Taiwan squanders chances for further cooperation in economic and political areas,” and that “the US will have to deal with the consequences.” Sounding a similar note, Zhu Feng of Beijing University says that analysts who downplay Beijing’s reaction^[1] risk “overlook[ing] the negative consequences of China’s opposition.” Another common theme in the criticism is that the US is “putting domestic law above an international treaty,” referring respectively to the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 US-China communiqué, and calling for the abolishment of the TRA.
The Global Times has expressed strong dismay that official reaction to the arms sales has thus far been limited to verbal protests. Its 9/23 editorial says “China needs to do more than condemn” so that the nation’s own political credibility is not harmed. In reference to strong reactions from Chinese netizens, the paper further argues that “the authorities should give clear responses to public opinion, rather than make people guess at its actual stance.”

A subsequent 9/24 editorial recommends specific retaliatory measures: openly announce the suspension of military exchanges with the US, sanction American companies selling arms to Taiwan, cut imports from the US, and impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. Speculating on the possible consequences of such retaliation, the same Global Times editorial outlines reasons for China to be optimistic:

“First, arms sales rather than other issues will receive less support from Western media. For this reason, China will meet minimum criticism from the world when challenging the US. Second, the US is ready to face China’s retaliation. Considering the large scale of the arms sales this time, the possibility of the US to take countermeasures against China is slim. Third, the US usually plays a supportive role encouraging defiant provocations taken by China’s neighbors. China’s revenge against the US will receive political and diplomatic effects in the whole region without bullying others directly.”

The above sentiments were echoed in a forum hosted by the People’s Daily, the official paper of the Chinese Communist Party:
- Peng Guangqian, PLA major general: “Those who harm China’s core interests should pay the matching price. Besides diplomatic protest, efforts are also needed in other aspects like bringing down the level of military communication and imposing sanctions.”
- Li Li, National Defense University of the PLA: The arms deal “will exert a strong negative influence on the normal development of the bilateral relationship.”
- Sun Zhe, Tsinghua University: “I think China’s reaction will be escalated gradually.” Whether or not the US decides to sell additional arms to Taiwan (i.e. the F-16 C/Ds) “will directly influence the strength of China’s actions.”

[1] See for example, articles in The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, and The Christian Science Monitor.