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Xi in Moscow and Kishida in Delhi & Ukraine—a One-Way Alliance vs Delicate Dancing

Policy Alert #254 | March 31, 2023

Last week, from March 20-22, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow for a three-day state visit. Both Putin and Xi published articles in each other’s national media before the visit, which ended with them penning and signing two joint statements “making plans and arrangements for the growth of the bilateral relations.

Meanwhile Japanese Prime Minster Kishida’s visit to Ukraine hours after Xi arrived in Moscow, was painted as mirroring Xi’s to Moscow. The Japanese support to Ukraine was seen as the West’s response to China’s support of Russia, and was heavily criticized in Chinese media, which also took issue with Kishida’s visit to India just before Ukraine, adding to India’s difficulties in charting a course through troubled waters.

Russian media saw Xi’s visit as a mark of support from China and attacked critics, but Chinese media and Foreign Ministry statements were far more measured, which was seen as “a likely reflection of the unequal power balance within the alliance.” This contrast  is similar to the discrepancy in analysis between Russian and Chinese national media that was observable after the September 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand. In both cases, Russians went further than their Chinese counterparts in drawing conclusions about how Russia and China were forming a block to oppose the US-led West.  Significantly, Xi’s first words after landing in Moscow were to state that the China-Russia bilateral relationship was built “on the basis of no-alliance, no-confrontation and not targeting any third party”.

 

CHINA
As a whole, Communist Party of China (CPC) officials and media have insisted that China is not allied to Russia against the US, despite being strongly critical of the US in Ukraine and Xi essentially endorsing Putin for his reelection. The International Criminal Court in The Hague issuing a warrant for Putin did not stop Xi from making speeches vaunting the international order underpinned by international law” while standing side-by-side with Putin.

However, despite the words extolling the deep friendship between the two countries and between the two leaders themselves, and while Putin showed an unusual level of deference towards Xi, Xi did not offer unequivocal support of Russia in Ukraine in return. He stood firm with the established line of China being the best possible peace broker and showcased the success of the Iran-Saudi Arabia negotiations as further evidencing this claim. That is not to say China made any steps towards the US. Back in Beijing, when asked if China was providing cover for Russia, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin took his gloves off for a press conference’s last question and stated that the US have “been involved in virtually all the conflicts and wars in Europe”.

Chinese media covered the visit extensively, with hundreds of articles for the three-day event just in major publications. All painted a vibrant picture of the China-Russia relationship. Many restated China’s “objective and impartial position” over the Ukraine “issue” and put forward the Chinese peace plan Some voiced critics of the West through op-eds, including some written by American citizens. Official declarations only pointed to  a “third party”, but state media featured numerous articles that showed more teeth, overtly criticizing NATO, Japanese PM Kishda’s trip to Ukraine’s,  or depicting the US as a “warmonger rattling its sword”.

In all its condemnation of belligerence, China did not condemn Russia for its invasion and avoided the term entirely, instead preferring “crisis” or “issue” and on March 27th, China voted in favor of Russia at the UN Security Council. Officials stated that “China maintains communication with all sides”. In addition to vaunting the peace plan, Chinese media remarked that “Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has responded more positively to China’s position paper” and hoped to convince the international community to support the plan, which would  isolate the US as “standing in opposition to the vast majority of international community“. Some articles also pointed to the increasing gap between the US and European countries on this question, and interpreted European leaders visiting China as direct support for Chinese policy, indirectly inferring that Xi’s trip to Russia was less impartial than claimed if an official visit is equated as a show of support.

 

INDIA
Indian media had more diverse takes on the state visit, some articles saw the visit as  Xi making concessions to Putin, while others called Xi’s visit to Moscow a “shot in the arm” for Putin. Indian media was not overall critical of the event and played down the negative impact for Russia-India ties, supported by Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov, who stated that the growing Russia-China ties were not “harming the Russia-India strategic alignment”.

Indian media overall also did not share the perspective that the meeting was sealing an alliance between the two countries, dismissing this “Western” notion. There were diverging voices, such as former Indian Ambassador to France Mohan Kumar, who thought the visit “could have the effect of pushing India to align itself more to the West“. Despite some debate over the consequences and how meaningful the visit was, Indian media in general agreed that stronger ties between Russia and China are difficult for India to accept amidst tensions with China. India has placated Russia for over a year by not overtly denouncing the war in Ukraine and adhered to  Russian requests to avoid the term “war”, instead saying “crisis” or “challenge”, but this did not stop Russia from fully embracing Xi and courting Chinese support.

Kishida’s visit to India was welcomed, especially after the absence of Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi  from the G20 meeting. His visit was interpreted as an attempt to get India to side against Russia, an attempt that was not seen too harshly, perhaps because it was not expected to succeed.

  • The center-right newspaper Times of India published an opinion piece from former chairman of India’s Joint Intelligence Committee SD Pradhan, who disagreed that the visit displayed “China’s dominance over Russia” and pointed out tension areas between the two, which should prevent China from being able to “influence Russia to change its India policy”.
  • As Russia is increasingly entangled with China, The Daily Pioneer, a pro-BJP newspaper, honed in on other partners India has started to rely on to counter China, such as Australia and Japan.
  • The liberal Indian Express published a take correcting Western media about the intricacies of geopolitics among Asian rising powers, as well as a counterpoint aligning closer to Western media considering the growing ties between Russia and China to be detrimental to India. The coverage of the visit was completed by an  overview of the different visits made by East Asian state leaders in March.

 

JAPAN
Japanese media viewed Xi’s visit to Moscow unfavorably, seeing the visit as “cementing ties” between China and Russia and creating a “united front against the U.S”. Japanese media also saw the visit as a quid pro quo, the visit was “a political boost” for Putin, and Xi “walked away with a statement of support on Taiwan “.

Kishida’s visit to India was  more popular across the board, and Japanese media as a whole expressed support for stronger Japan-India cooperation, and noted that Japan would do well to focus more on India in addition to aligning with the US to counter China. While in India, Kishida promoted his “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision and pushed Modi to join Japan in condemning Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, even though India has increased its imports of Russian crude oil. Earlier in March, the Yomiuri Shimbun noted the US and Europe’s concern over the India-Russia relationship, but concluded that as an Asian country, Japan should build closer relations with India, “based on a different perspective from that of the United States and Europe”.

Regarding Kishida’s trip to Ukraine, Japanese media noted Chinese criticism of Kishida’s visit to Ukraine by Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin, as well as President Zelensky’s appreciation of the visit. Domestically, the visit was well perceived, including by Kenta Izumi, head of the main opposition party in Japan, except when it came to Kishida’s choice of gift to Zelensky.

 

RUSSIA

Russian media celebrated Xi’s visit to Moscow, calling it “historical”, a “tectonic geopolitical shift” and even the “most important, most great, and most gargantuan geopolitical, geo-economic, strategic-military events in the 21st century”. Xi’s avoidance of the term “alliance” was noted, but rather than considering it a sign of China’s reluctance of durably tying itself to Russia, it was rationalized by explaining that the Russia-China relationship is beyond mere geopolitics and is now a “holistic phenomenon”.

Beyond lauding Putin and Xi, Russian media put forward the Chinese peace plan through assertive op-eds which saw EU leaders announcing their future visits as endorsements of the Chinese peace plan, which could cause a “weakening of American influence over the EU”, though some analysts saw the US as the only driver in the West, while “the EU is but a passenger”, and a vassal to the US. At the same time, some columnists guessed that Xi will not want to meet Zelensky despite Chinese assurances that “China maintains communication with all sides”.

Kishida’s visits did not go unnoticed, the Russia-India relationship was covered by Russian media which sought to defend it against the idea that India would be rebuked by Russia tying the knot with China, a notion dismissed by Russia’s ambassador to India.  When it comes to Kishida’s visit to Ukraine, Russian media took aim at Kishida for visiting the country, but rather than lamenting the consequences for Russia, painted the visit as a domestic political mistake for Kishida.

 

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.

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