Policy Alert #252 | January 26, 2023

The relationships and power dynamics between China, India, Japan and Russia in 2022 were shaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The proximity between the Japanese and American stances towards the invasion was expected, and confirmed during Japanese Prime Minister Kishida’s meeting with U.S. President Biden on January 13. However, the way that India’s government under Prime Minister Modi would react was unknown. As such, his interactions with Russian President Putin were heavily scrutinized and the initial Indian declarations regarding the war carried a lot of weight. On the other side of the spectrum, China was not widely expected to side with the US. Instead, the interrogation resided in the level of support that Chinese President Xi Jinping would show towards Putin.

Another important factor in the quadrilateral balance, in addition to the evolution of each rising power’s relationship with Russia, was the state of the China-India relationship, in the midst of bloody border skirmishes in Ladakh. As such, a worsening relationship between China and India could prevent the two countries from aligning on a common position and presenting a united front. This was reinforced by domestic encouragement in both China and India for aggressive posturing and provocations, such as the invitation of border commander Qi Fabao at the NCPCC to celebrate his involvement in  the June 15, 2020 skirmish in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. In parallel, Japan announced a strengthening of Japan India military ties, which was seen by China as being encouraged by the U.S. as it tries to isolate Russia and China.

This policy alert will focus on media coverage of international meetings where heads of state met, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, the COP 27, and G20. Coverage of other events, such as the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (NCPCC), Vostok 2022 military exercises in Russia, or ASEAN forums, also provided information and context to understand internal and external perceptions of each of these rising powers’ current stance towards the war in Ukraine, as well as the fluctuations of their relationships with each other.

RUSSIA

After February 2022, Russia looked for support among its neighbors and rising powers. Putin publicly advocated for a strengthening of the SCO during the Summit in Samarkand, pitting an aggressive and sanction-prone West against the developing countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Russia also held the Vostok 2022 military exercises, in which Chinese, Indian, Laotian, Mongolian, and Syrian troops participated. Putin personally attended the exercises, highlighting their symbolic importance, and the importance he attached to presenting the appearance of a united front against the West. When covering the COP 27 meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh, Russian state media emphasized the divide between Asian and African developing countries and Western “rich countries”. Russia has been trying to build support against Western condemnations of the war in Ukraine by building coalitions or criticizing the West.

In particular, Russia is prioritizing the Russia-China relationship. Russia has issued strong statements in support of China over Taiwan and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has stressed that Russia and China are aligned and that there were “no discrepancies at all” between them. To push this point further, Xi and Putin closed the year 2022 by having a virtual meeting on December 30th, in which Xi emphasized BRICs cooperation against “hegemony and power politics” and Putin invited Xi to a state visit in Russia in early 2023.

• Government-funded Russia Today published several articles and podcasts about the COP 27, stressing how developing countries diverge with the West over climate issues.
• According to the Moscow Times, an independent publication, Russia was “pitiful and cynical” at the COP 27, ignoring the environment to focus on pushing other interests.
• The Pravda Report, a nationalist newspaper, covered the SCO Summit by noting Putin’s support of China, and did not mention Chinese concerns about the war in Ukraine.

CHINA

Xi and his foreign policy towards Russia have remained ambiguous throughout 2022, despite their “no limit” partnership announced in 2021. Xi provided overt support for Russia in some settings, and slight admonition is others. Specifically, Xi’s uncharacteristic expression of concerns during the SCO Summit was the only rebuke of Russia and it was not confirmed during subsequent meetings. Indeed, during the latest meeting in date, Xi endorsed a Russian statement and commended Russia for trying to “resolve the conflict through diplomatic negotiations”.

Despite the context of the Covid-19 pandemic and unusual pressure on the CPC government from its own population. Xi won a decisive victory at the NCPCC. This cemented his “complete control” over Chinese foreign policy, setting aside concerns of diverging voices within China.    However, it did not offer a clear idea of how strongly Xi, and by extent China, would support Putin. In 2022, various events and official declarations have led to media characterizations about the Chinese-Russia relationship either improving or deteriorating, depending on the circumstances, with some diverging interpretations over the same events.

One of the most commonly identified areas of friction is the competition for influence in Central Asia. While these seemingly competing efforts do not signify a shift in relationship, they did come at a time where Central Asian countries seemed to tun away from Russia. Simultaneously, Xi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and signed several deals, which with zero-sum thinking would indicate China is gaining influence to Russia’s detriment. Political posturing aside, China remains crucial to the survival of the Russian economy, and the war in Ukraine has at most tempered their partnership.

• The China Daily a state-supported and CPC-owned newspaper, highlighted Lavrov’s support over Taiwan
• The independent South China Morning Post devoted several articles to the China-Russia relationship, with conclusions ranging from faltering to a renewed partnership.

 

INDIA

Modi and his government also played a delicate exercise in diplomacy, being courted by Russia and the US, and showing overtures to both.  Prime Minister Modi spoke out in a rare public rebuke of Russia at the SCO Summit, but then External Affairs Minister Jaishankar almost immediately walked back those remarks. In similar fashion, India participated in the Russian Vostok exercises and showcased the routine nature of the drills while acknowledging US concerns, and then planned to participate in exercises alongside the US.

India’s position towards Russia is different than China’s, despite its shared intentional ambiguity. India has shown less support to Russia than China and crucially, has played both sides, whereas China has remained staunchly critical of the US and the West. Coherently, the India-China relationship is inscrutable as China cannot condone Indian steps towards the US but will support India elsewhere, such as India hosting the 2023 SCO summit. At the COP 27, both countries shared a common position over the issue of loss and damage funding or opposing the carbon border tax. But after a brief détente, China contrasted these statements with actions seen by Indian media as “rubbing salt on wounds” or controversially sending a “spy ship” to Sri Lanka.

In contrast, India has made notable efforts to improve its relationship with Japan. It avoided tensions with Japan over Indian participation in the Russian Vostok exercises by electing not to participate in maritime drills, which were close enough to Japan to cause an issue. In late 2022, India and Japan also agreed to hold joint exercises of their own. Despite these clear steps towards a stronger relationship however, it cannot be ascertained that India is turning towards the West or here again playing all sides, only that India is determined to play a major role.

• The left leaning The Hindu looked at India’s participation at the Vostok exercises through the lens of regional power competition, observing that India was placating Japan.
• The Daily Pioneer took a strong position against China, whether over the removal of Hu Jintao at the NCPCC or China’s sending of a spy ship to Hambantota.

JAPAN

Japan has condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine repeatedly and in much stronger terms than either China or India. Its relationship with Russia was strained even before the war as both countries claim the Kuril Islands, and tensions have only increased as Russia deployed missile to them. Japan closed out 2022 by announcing a visit by Kishida to Washington, one of several stops of a diplomatic trip to several European partners, to which he reiterated Japan’s condemnation of Russia and also acknowledging tensions with China. In the span of a decade, China has gone from a strategic partner of Japan to “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan”. Kishida has made reforming Japanese defense key to his administration, and this effort is targeted in large part towards deterring China.

This position is popular but not unanimous in Japan, as opposition parties and newspapers have called for accountability and criticized what is seen as a step away from diplomacy despite Japanese and US interest not always being aligned exactly. Japan has also improved its relationship with India, reinforcing links with a major regional partner which is not strictly aligned with the US.

• The Japan Times, a centrist newspaper, soberly reported that Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev suggested Kishida should kill himself for his subservience to the US.
• The business focused Nikkei published an opinion article noting Japan’s strong economic ties to Russian companies, despite talks of sanctions and diplomatic condemnation. 

 

By Gabriel Savagner, M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs at GW. Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative.