Asia Report #55 | September 30, 2021
Taiwan is a leader in considering how technology can promote democratic principles, a question that democracies around the world are currently grappling with. The pandemic has only intensified the digitization of Taiwan’s democracy. How is Taiwan experimenting with innovative digital oversight mechanisms? What does its civic tech communities and digital ecosystem look like? And importantly, what does Taiwan’s performance tell us about possible pathways to a digitized democratic future for others?
To answer these questions, the Sigur Center’s Taiwan roundtable featured a leading panel of experts, including Puma Shen, Assistant Professor at National Taipei University, Taiwan; Mei-Chun Lee, Postdoc Researcher, Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Science, National Taiwan University & Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan; and Melissa Newcomb, Senior Program Manager for the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China Illiberal Influence programs at the National Democratic Institute. The panel was moderated by Deepa Ollapally, Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at The George Washington University.
How to Categorize and Respond to China’s Disinformation Campaigns
Puma Shen opened the conversation by discussing how to categorize and respond to disinformation campaigns by China in Taiwan. In examining the general disinformation campaign, he explained, there are certain points that should be addressed. First, there must be adversaries that operate either intentionally or recklessly. Second, the information must be misleading. Third, we must examine the channels that spread disinformation and fourth, people must truly believe the information, which means the impact is significant. In thinking about how to counter disinformation in Taiwan, Shen has four guidelines to decide which approach to apply. The first is finding the footprint and focusing on the adversaries, especially if it is coming from China—the biggest threat to Taiwan. Second, focusing on the content, he warns, can complicate the process because there are lots of fake posts. Third, governments can focus on specific channels like Facebook and Twitter, which allows them to concentrate on behavior. Lastly, the victim orientation approach can be used to identify which type of people are most vulnerable.
Originally, Chinese adversaries circulated rumors face-to-face, but YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and a multiplicity of discussion forums online spread information differently than how it spreads offline. The Central Committee of the Communist Party in China organizes disinformation both online and offline to initiate attacks, so current information studies tend to specify the information’s origins. Messages are spread by the Chinese state and circulated by anonymous fan pages. However, we should be vigilant about the type of attack involved, as in the case Shen disclosed, too many similar messages produced by authentic accounts is often the anomaly, instead of the origins of sources themselves.
There are three types of investment that China makes in disinformation campaigns. First, the foreign actors could directly donate; for example, local newspapers could have connections to foreign actors in China. Second, Chinese actors could invest in domains not related to this information, such as the gaming industry, to spread disinformation. Third, foreign actors pay those on social media to disseminate articles that favor them. After an appropriate investigation, transparency is key to inform the public if information has been compromised. In order to combat those vulnerable to disinformation, such as young people or those who are apolitical, debunking is very important. Resistance to stronger regulations and further disclosure from social platforms give Taiwan and other countries little leverage over China, so exploring more innovative policy options and building cross country policy consensus is necessary for making substantial negotiation between governments and social platforms possible.
The Taiwanese model does not formally involve cooperation between the government and civil society, but rather a decoupling framework that generates the framework of trust. While Shen advises civil society to keep its distance, Mei-Chun Lee, on the other hand, believes that cooperation between government and civil society should depend on the topic. When fighting COVID-19, collaboration is necessary. But in terms of combatting disinformation, the government acting as the authority of trust is more complicated, which is when civil society can keep adequate distance from the government to balance the dynamic of power. Lee describes civil society as neither collaborative or resistant but “parasitic,” working together when necessary and pushing back against the government when needs are not being met.
How Civic Tech Fights COVID-19 and Infodemic: Taiwan’s Case
Mei-Chun Lee revealed how civic tech is being used to fight COVID-19 and infodemics in Taiwan. The term “civic tech,” which became popular in Taiwan five years ago, is the process of using technology to promote social good. In Taiwan, civic tech is largely led by citizens instead of the government. An example of civic tech in Taiwan is Gov-Zero, one of the largest civic tech communities around the world, comprising thousands of participants including tech people, activists, designers, NGO workers, civil servants, and researchers. Audrey Tang, Digital Minister of Taiwan, was a participant in Gov-Zero before she entered the Taiwanese government. Through Gov-Zero, people participated in monthly “hackathons,” joining task forces to build various tech projects focused on current issues as diverse as supervising the government to environmental protection to gender equality through a grassroots approach to activism. Lee defines “hackers” in this case as people willing to use various technologies to fix societal problems as against our usual characterization of hackers as rogue actors.
Lee explained how the motto “I am nobody” is a code to action in Taiwan, transforming citizens from bystanders to activists. Civic tech is especially active when crises occur. For instance, during COVID-19, civic tech has forged face mask maps, allowing citizens to check where to buy masks, cofacts, a crowd-sourced rumor reporting and fact-checking platform, and SMS contact tracing. It’s important, Lee noted, to remember that this is not a long-term solution, but a new and creative way to provide quick responses to society’s immediate needs. Trust and community are the main drivers behind civic tech, equipping citizens with new technologies to fight for democracy.
Taiwan and Democracy in a Digital Age
Lastly, Melissa Newcomb discussed the National Democratic Institute (NDI)’s role in promoting democracy in Taiwan in a digital age. In 2020, recognizing that Taiwan’s democracy is a model for other nations, the NDI opened a regional office in Taiwan. With the Open Government Partnership, NDI has worked with the civic tech community in Taiwan to pursue radical transparency in government. Taiwan announced its own Open Government National Action Plan in 2019. What is remarkable about Taiwan’s digital democracy is that it is a whole-of-society approach under the shadow of China: the executive branch, legislative branch, civic tech, civil society, and individuals. Other democracies like the U.S. can learn from Taiwan’s transformation in areas such as improving access to high-speed internet in rural areas, digital and media literacy campaigns, information consensus building, protecting citizens’ personal data, and examining private sector surveillance.
Taiwan has borne the brunt of China’s disinformation campaigns. As China’s sharp power grows globally and other illiberal actors increasingly resort to disinformation tactics, democracies around the world could look for lessons from Taiwan’s experience and its innovative responses within a strongly democratic digital context.
By Lily LaMattina, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative
