Asia Report #54 | August 5, 2021
The recent reversal of fortunes for democracy movements in Asia, particularly in Hong Kong and Myanmar, stands in contrast to an earlier highly successful campaign for political liberalization in Taiwan. The ongoing democratic crisis in the region warrants a closer comparison of these three movements, and what parallels and differences may be found. The role of young activists and use of media as a tool of mobilization seem to hold across cases but the geopolitical context has dramatically changed with the rise of China and its increasingly assertive behavior. How do democratic prospects look?
To delve into these questions, the Sigur Center’s recent Taiwan Roundtable featured a panel of leading experts including Michael Hsiao, Chairman of the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, Kharis Templeman, Program Manager of Stanford University’s Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific, Christina Fink, Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University, and Shirley Lin, Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs.
Michael Hsiao, a close observer of the events, led off the discussion by highlighting the four principal outlets of opposition employed by Taiwan’s democracy movement prior to 1987. First, local elections provided a means of establishing a credible opposition to Kuomintang (KMT) rule through participation in local political processes. Second, a limited number of liberal intellectuals operating within the KMT party apparatus, coupled with vocal opposition from religious organizations, advanced the early democracy movement’s aims through institutional means as well as civil society. Third and critically, “Dangwai Opposition” books and magazines published throughout the 1970s and 1980s provided an outlet for criticism of the KMT regime along with fruitful discussion of Taiwan’s political future. Lastly, three waves of grassroots social reform movements throughout the 80s reflected increased awareness and participation among liberal members of a burgeoning middle class. Moreover, Hsiao stressed the leading role of young activist intellectuals in the authoring of “Dangwai Opposition” publications due in part to a political climate that inhibited participation by those within established academic circles.
Building upon the discussion of Taiwan’s democratic struggle, Kharis Templeman noted that the principal point of contention driving the movement in Hong Kong is the means by which the government is selected. Despite a guarantee under the Basic Law that both the chief executive and the legislature would be selected through free elections in which all citizens were permitted to participate, indirect and illiberal mechanisms such as “functional constituencies” as well as an electoral college sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s priorities were instituted subsequent to 1997. The pendulum swung between reform and repression until Beijing’s unilateral imposition of a national security law subsequent to the 2020 presidential election which provided supposed legal justification for the arrests of protest leaders and political candidates in the democratic camp, along with the targeting of independent media outlets such as Apple Daily. This, for Templeman, represents a body blow to the One Country, Two Systems policy.
While Templeman sees numerous parallels between Hong Kong’s democracy movement and that of Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, he contends that politically, “the tape is running backwards.” While Hong Kong initially enjoyed greater freedoms similar to the later stages of Taiwan’s movement, Hong Kong now more closely resembles Taiwan’s political systems circa 1975. Templeman sees the reasons for the Taiwanese movement’s success as threefold. First, the KMT regime’s idea of “Free China” was supposed to be “Democratic China.” Second, the KMT regime suffered a progressive loss of legitimacy within the international community. Third, and arguably of greatest importance, was the KMT’s vulnerability to pressure from the United States.
Conversely, Templeman presented five principal factors that have contributed to the foundering of Hong Kong’s democracy movement. First, shifting geopolitical terrain presents far greater challenges than those previously confronted by Taiwan. Second, the significance of mass protests relative to the attitudes of CCP officials in Beijing has decreased dramatically. Third, western influence over Beijing, particularly that of the United States, has waned. Fourth, a hard line Xi Jinping is far less willing to tolerate political action independent of the CCP. Finally, Xi has exhibited a willingness to sacrifice the Party’s credibility and image in order to impose greater control over Hong Kong.
Christina Fink, in addressing the roots of Myanmar’s democracy movement, identified two primary historical struggles that have defined the post-independence period: democracy and federalism. While a brief interlude beginning in 2011 allowed for greater investment in democratic institutions and social services, the period of military rule was marked by both non-violent struggle as well as armed resistance among those residing in Myanmar’s ethnic nationality areas. Thus, Fink notes a widespread sense that the military regime must be stripped of its political power, secured through the February 1, 2021 coup, in order to preserve the gains made during the brief period of liberalization.
Spearheading this effort were members of Gen Z, who sought to ignite a Spring Revolution which would aid in eradicating military influence from political processes. This activism among the nation’s youth was complemented by a civil disobedience movement comprised of government and private sector employees who ceased carrying out their duties to convey their refusal to aid in preserving the regime’s power. Moreover, select members of both the Gen Z and civil disobedience coalitions have joined ethnic armed groups in waging a campaign of violent resistance. This embrace of force as an arrow in the quiver of the democracy movement has been sanctioned by the parallel National Unity government, thus leading to the proliferation of People’s Defense Forces throughout the country.
Fink went on to note the central role played by social media in organizing the largely decentralized movement, as well as exposing individuals who have aided the regime through a controversial practice Gen Z activists term “social punishment.” The military’s response to the various protest movements has come in the form of halting their access to funds, material goods and information, with the latter resulting in the widespread targeting of media outlets.
Shirley Lin framed the discussion with key questions related to sustainability of the movements, generational attitude shifts, the nature of democratic values pursued, and the impact of the external security environment as a permissive or constrictive condition. Pointing to the involvement of young people in all three cases, Lin asked how the views of older generation and Gen Z on democratization stack up, and what the experience from Taiwan foretells about the ability of movements to sustain the democratic momentum. Lin concludes that despite the democratic backsliding and difficult geopolitical context, she remains hopeful thanks to the huge involvement and commitment of youth.
By Ben Briedman, Rising Powers Initiative Research Affiliate, Elliott School of International Affairs.
