Abstract: This study analyzes the debate on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program among
the Pakistani elites, who include scientists, strategists and politicians. The study
examines the nuclear doctrine that emerges from this, as well as the likely ways in
which it can impact peace and stability on the Indian subcontinent. It also underlines
the possible influence of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine on the nuclear doctrine of
other “unrecognized” emerging nuclear weapon states such as North Korea. After its
creation and independence in August 1947, Pakistan’s elites considered survival to
be the primary national strategic objective of the country in the harsh international
environment, especially with regards to India. This understanding shaped Pakistan’s
security policy in the early years, post August 1947. The three wars Pakistan
fought with India proved that the collective security policy and the anti-nuclear
weapons advocacy by Pakistani defensive realists was not the best strategy in the
prevailing security environment. In this backdrop, the Multan meeting in January
1972 initiated a fierce debate on whether a nuclear weapons program was the
best strategy for ensuring national security. The participants included defensive
realists, offensive realists, liberals and separatists. The offensive realists won the
debate, shaped Pakistan’s nuclear policy, and initiated its nuclear weapons program.
Separatists here refer to the sub-nationalist forces that seek political separation from
Pakistan. Full text available here.