Abstract
In November 2008, the financial capital of India, Mumbai, was struck by terrorists who the Indian (as well as the American and the British) intelligence later confirmed had received extensive training from the Pakistan-based group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, or Army of the Pure. Given the sophistication of planning and execution involved, it soon became apparent that this was a commando-style operation that possibly had the involvement of a state actor. As physical evidence mounted in terms of satellite phone calls, equipments, and boats used for the attack, Pakistan’s hand was seen as smeared all over the operation. Though India conceded that probably the new civilian administration of Asif Ali Zardari was not behind the attacks, the army and the ISI were seen as the main culprit (Chengappa 2008).
The public outcry after the Mumbai attacks was strong enough for the Indian government to consider using the military option vis-à-vis Pakistan. But it soon turned out that India no longer had the capability of imposing quick and effective retribution on Pakistan and that it no longer enjoyed the kind of conventional superiority vis-à-vis its regional adversary that it had enjoyed for the past five decades (Gupta 2009). This was a surprising conclusion for a nation that the international community regarded as a major global economic and military power, pursuing a defense modernization programme geared towards making arms purchases of more than US$35 billion over the next few years. Yet in many ways, it underlined fundamental weaknesses in Indian defense policy, especially its ad hoc attempts towards arms procurement and defense modernization. This article examines the trends in defense spending and arms procurement in India since the early 1990s, a period that has seen India rising in the global inter-state hierarchy. It argues that a lack of strategic orientation in Indian defense planning will make it difficult for India to effectively use its resources and this will circumscribe India’s rise as a global military power. First an overview of trends in Indian defense spending is presented followed by a discussion of the drivers of the Indian defense modernization program. Subsequently, India’s ties with its major defense partners—Russia, Israel, and the West—are examined. Finally, the constraints that will continue to constrain India’s ability to emerge as a major global military power are examined.
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