Abstract
Announced in 2010, Russia’s “Turn to the East” is aimed at reducing the country’s economic dependence on the West and to take advantage of Asia’s growing economies. The policy has been given added impetus due to falling oil prices and Western sanctions which have plunged the Russian economy into crisis.
Since President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000, Russia’s Asia-policy has been China-centric. But Moscow’s fear of being reduced to the status of junior dependent partner, and China’s economic slowdown, have forced the Kremlin to seek new opportunities in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia.
Economically, however, Russia is a minor player in Southeast Asia, and aside from natural resources, energy technology and arm sales, there seems little scope for expansion in Russia-ASEAN trade.
Due to a larger defence budget and the acquisition of new equipment, today Russia’s military presence in Asia is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War. However, the most prominent aspect of Russia’s defence engagement with Southeast Asia remains arms sales to regional states, especially Vietnam.
Russia’s engagement with ASEAN is superficial. Moscow has not been a proactive participant in ASEAN-led security forums such as the East Asia Summit because of its limited influence and its more substantive interests in other inter-state forums.
Moscow has adopted a low-key approach to the South China Sea dispute as it is not a major stakeholder and because it does not want to offend its two most important partners in Asia, China and Vietnam, which are rival claimants.
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